Klein v. Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho Clerk\u27s Record Dckt. 46314 by unknown
UIdaho Law 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law 
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs 
11-2-2018 
Klein v. Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho Clerk's Record Dckt. 
46314 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs 
Recommended Citation 
"Klein v. Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho Clerk's Record Dckt. 46314" (2018). Idaho Supreme Court 
Records & Briefs, All. 7566. 
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/7566 
This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs at 
Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs, All by 
an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact 
annablaine@uidaho.edu. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
Erica M Klein 
 vs.
 Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho
Supreme Court Case No. 46314-2018 
 
CLERK’S RECORD ON APPEAL
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, 
in and for the County of Bannock
HONORABLE RICK CARNAROLI
Gary L. Cooper
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered
Attorney for Appellant
Boise, Idaho





Erica M Klein 
vs. 
BANNOCK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-4584 
Location: 
Judicial Officer: 
Bannock County District Court 
Carnaroli, Rick 


















Case Number History: 
Previous Case Number: CV-2017-4584-OC 
CASE INFORMATION 
AA- All Initial District Court 
Case Type: Filings (Not E, F, and HI) 





Klein, Erica M 
CASE ASSIGNMENT 
CV-2017-4584 




Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho 
EVENTS & ORDERS OF THE COURT 
File Location (Judicial Officer: Camaroli, Rick) 
Idaho Supreme Court: Diane's Desk 
New Case Filed Other Claims (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C. ) 
New Case Filed-Other Claims 
W Complaint Filed (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C. ) 
Complaint Filed 
ti Summons Issued (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C. ) 
Summons Issued 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C. ) 
Case 
Status: 11/22/2017 Active - Pending 
Lead Attorneys 
Lyon, Kenneth Eugene, III 
Retained 
775-398-5800(W) 




Filing: AA- All initial civil case filings in District Court of any type not listed in categories E, 
F and H(l) Paid by: Kenneth E. Lyon, III Esq. Receipt number: 0035472 Dated: I 1/22/2017 
Amount: $221.00 (Check) For: 
II Family Case Law Information Sheet (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C. ) 
Case Information sheet 
Attorney Retained (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C. ) 
Plaintiff: Klein, Erica M Attorney Retained Kenneth E Lyon Ill 


















BANNOCK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-4584 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C. ) 
Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page 
Paid by: Elam & Burke - Jeffrey A. Thomson Receipt number: 0036112 Dated: 11/2912017 
Amount: $5.00 (Credit card) 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C. ) 
Miscellaneous Payment: Technology Cost - CC Paid by: Elam & Burke - Jeffrey A. Thomson 
Receipt number: 0036112 Dated: 11/29/2017 Amount: $3.00 (Credit card) 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C. ) 
Filing: I I - Initial Appearance by persons other than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: 
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd. Receipt number: 0038330 Dated: 1212112017 Amount: $136. 00 
(Check) For: Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho (defendant) 
• Answer (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C. ) 
Answer and Demand for Jury Trial-by Farmers Insurance Company thru atty Gary Cooper 
Attorney Retained (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C.) 
Defendant: Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho Attorney Retained Gary L Cooper 
Family Case Law lnfonnation Sheet (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C. ) 
Case Information Sheet 
• Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Nye, David C. ) 
Affidavit of Service-summons and complaint seved on Farmers Insurance thru Megan Dickson 
on 12/14/2017 
II Order (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Order for Submission of Information/or Scheduling Order s/Carnaroli 01/08/2018 
• ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick ) 
Joint Response to Request for Submission of Scheduling Information-by attys Lyon and Cooper I 
II Motion (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick ) 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment-thru atty Gary Cooper 
'II Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick ) 
Memorandum in support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment-by atty Gary Cooper 
'II ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Declaration of Gary L. Cooper in 'Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
• Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Notice of Hearing Hearing Scheduled (Motion/or Summary Judgment 03/26/2018 OJ :00 PM) 
• ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion/or Summary Judgment-thru atty Kenneth Lyon 
/II 
II Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick ) 
Affidavit of Ryan Lewis in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion/or 
Summary Judgment 
• Affidavit (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Affidavit of Kenneth E. Lyon /II in Support of Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
















BANNOCK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-4584 
• Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment-by atty Gary 
Cooper 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 03126/2018 O 1 :00 PM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Morse 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
Motion for Summary Judgment (I :00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment scheduled on 03/26/2018 01 :00 PM· 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Morse 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than JOO 
11 Order (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick ) 
Memorandum Decision and Order Deyning Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
s/Carnaroli 05/03/2018 
• Hearing Scheduled (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Notice of Hearing-Hearing Scheduled (Motion 06125/2018 04:00 PM) dfdt's motn to 
reconsider-by atty Gary Cooper 
'II Motion (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick ) 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider-thru atty Gary Cooper 
• Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider-by atty Gary Cooper 
11 Opposition to 
Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
II Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Reply Memorandum in Support of Motion to Reconsider; dfdt atty cooper 
DC Hearing Held: Court Reporter:# of Pages: (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/25/2018 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Morse 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
dfdt's motn to reconsider 
Motion Hearing (4:00 PM) (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
dfdt's motn to reconsider Hearing result for Motion scheduled on 06/25/2018 04:00 PM: 
District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Stephanie Morse 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing estimated: less than 100 
II Court Minutes 
II Minute Entry and Order (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Minute Entry and Order; Isl J Carnaroli 6-27-18 -- court took matter of dfdt's motnfor 
reconsideration under advisement and will issue a written decision 
• Memorandum (Judicial Officer: Carnaroli, Rick) 
Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider; Isl J Carnaroli 

















BANNOCK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-4584 
7-10-18 
• Motion (Judicial Officer: Camaroli, Rick ) 
Defendant's Motion for Permission to Appeal; dfdt atty cooper 
'II ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Camaroli, Rick) 
Plaintiff's Non-Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Permission to Appeal; pltf atty /yon 111 
'II Order (Judicial Officer: Camaroli, Rick) 
Order Granting Motion for Permission to Appeal; Isl J Carnaroli 8-17-18 
ti Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc 
Showing receipt of Defendant's Motion for Permission to Appeal 
ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Camaroli, Rick ) 
Filing: l4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Supreme Court Paid by: Gary Cooper 
Receipt number: 0028365 Dated: 9/2612018 Amount: $129.00 (Check) For: Farmers 
Insurance Company of Idaho (defendant) 
Appeal Filed in Supreme Court (Judicial Officer: Camaroli, Rick ) 
Appealed To The Supreme Court 
il Notice (Judicial Officer: Camaroli, Rick ) 
Notice of Appeal: Gary L. Cooper 
ti ROA - Converted Event (Judicial Officer: Camaroli, Rick) 
Clerk's Certificate of Appeal: Signed and Mailed on 9-27-18. Received check for deposit of 
clerk's Record in the amount o/$100.00 check# 39039 
• Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc 
Reporter's Transcript and Clerks record due to counsel on JJ-1-18. Due in SC on 12-6-18 
ti Supreme Court Document Filed-Misc 
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript Due Date Set 
'II Request for Additional Clerk's Record 
ti Transcript Lodged 
11 Transcript Filed 
II Receipt 
for Payment of Supplemental Transcript 
FINANCIAL INFORMATION 
Defendant Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 
Balance Due as of 10/30/2018 
Other Party Unknown Payor 
Total Charges 
Total Payments and Credits 








Printed on 10/30/2018 at 11:32 AM 
Page 6
BANNOCK COUNTY DISTRICT COURT 
CASE SUMMARY 
CASE No. CV-2017-4584 
PAGE 5 OF 5 Printed on 10/30/2018at11:32 AM 
Page 7
V ORIGINAL 
:-.. · KENNETH E. LYON, III 





















10389 Double R Blvd 
Reno, Nevada 89521 
Phone: (775) 398-5800 
Fax: (775) 398-5801 
KENNETH E. LYON, JR. 
JSB # 1117 
5785 Rio Vista Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
r .. -. ! -~ ! t --. . ~ .• 
: ~. ' . 
,..., "'' "D· C r '' ,r-· Uf ·: ,, ., _, . ,. l' ·~ J'"\ V i' • 1wi I L 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 












COMES NOW, Plaintiff ERICA KLEIN, by and through her undersignt:d counsel, and I 
hereby complains, alleges and avers against Defendant as follows: 
PARTIES 
1. At all times material hereto, Plaintiff ERICA KLEIN was a resident of Bannock 
Couat:1, State ofldaho. 
2. lip,.:,n information and belief, at all times material hereto, Defendant FARMERS 
rNSURANCE COMPANY 01- IDAHO (hereinafter "Farmers Insurance") was an Idd10 Stock 

































3. Farmers Insurance is an "insurer" as defined in I.C. §41.103. 
4. On or about October 10, 2009, Farmers Insurance issued a policy of automobile 
insurance to Plaintiff, identified as Policy Number 75 17608-01-97. 
5. The above-referenced policy provided insurance coverage for Plaintiffs 2008 
Chevrolet Malibu. 
6. The above-referenced insurance policy included underinsured motorist ("UIM") 
coverage for which Plaintiff paid an additional premium so that Plaintiff would be compensated 
by Farmers Insurance in the event of a covered loss. 
7. The above-referenced insurance policy was entered into within the jurisdiction of 
the State of Idaho and within the jurisdiction of the above-entitled court. 
8. The above-referenced insurance policy was in full force and effect on February 1, 
2010. 
9. On February 1, 2010, Plaintiff was the driver of her 2008 Chevrolet Malibu when 
her vehicle was t-boned by a vehicle driven by a third party tortfeasor. 
;;}t 10. 
"i;,f'11. 
The sole cause of the collision was the negligence of the third party tortfeasor. 
Plaintiff was permanently injured as a result of the February 1, 2010 accident. 
On or about December 9, 2010, Plaintiff notified Farmers Insurance of her intent 
to resolve her injury claim with the third party tortfeasor for his full liability limits and also 
notified Farmers Insurance of her intent to pursue a claim for UIM benefits under the above-
referenced policy. 
13. On or about January 4, 2011, Farmers Insurance provided Plaintiff with its 



















14. On or about April 25,2011, Plaintiff resolved her injury claim against the third 
party tortfeasor for his full liability insurance limits. 
15. On or about November 7, 2012, Plaintiff submitted a UIM demand to Farmers 
Insurance. 
16. On or about December 12, 2012, Farmers Insurance issued a check to Plaintiff for 
the undisputed portion of the UIM benefits owed to her under the above-referenced policy. 
17. Although Farmers Insurance issued a payment to Plaintiff for the undisputed 
portion of the UIM benefits it recognized were justly due under the above-referenced policy, 
Farmers Insurance acknowledged that such payment did not resolve Plaintiffs UIM claim. 
18. On or about July 7, 2016, Plaintiff advised Farmers Insurance of her intent to 
submit a supplemental demand package with updated medical information in an effort to reach a 
final resolution of her UIM claim. 
19. On or about August 12, 2016, Farmers Insurance responded to Plaintiffs notice, 
1 7 in part, by stating it was prepared to respond to any demand for payment under the terms of 











20. On or about February 7, 2017, Plaintiff provided Farmers Insurance with her 
supplemental demand which included updated medical records concerning Plaintiffs injuries, as 
well as the additional medical expenses Plaintiff had incurred since her initial demand and 
payment of the undisputed benefits referenced above. 
21. Farmers Insurance failed to respond to Plaintiffs supplemental demand within 
sixty (60) days ofreceipt of proof ofloss as provided in 1.C. 41-1839. 





















FIRST CLAIM FOR RELIEF 
(Mandatory Arbitration) 
Plaintiff incorporates all previously alleged paragraphs as though they had been 
stated in full herein. 
24. The above-referenced insurance policy states that any determination of the amount 
of damages Plaintiff is entitled to recover under her underinsured motorist coverage shall be made 
by agreement between the Plaintiff and Farmers Insurance. If no agreement is reached, such 
decision will be made by arbitration. 
25. The above-referenced insurance policy further states that if Plaintiff and Farmers 
Insurance do not agree as to the amount of payment under Plaintiffs underinsured motorist 
coverage, either Plaintiff or Farmers Insurance may demand that the issue be determined by 
arbitration. 
26. The above-referenced insurance policy further states that the arbitrator shall be 
1 7 selected by agreement between Plaintiff and Farmers Insurance. If an agreement on an arbitrator 











27. The above-referenced insurance policy further states that the arbitrator shall 
determine the amount of payment under Plaintiffs underinsured motorist coverage as determined 
by the policy. 
28. The above-referenced insurance policy further states that formal demand for 
arbitration shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction and that the court shall be located in 


































29. Since payment to Plaintiff of the undisputed portion of the UIM benefits Farmers 
Insurance recognized were justly due under the above-referenced policy, Plaintiff has incurred 
additional medical expenses and general damages in a dollar amount in excess of $10,000.00. 
30. Plaintiff and Farmers Insurance have been unable to reach a final agreement to the 
amount of underinsured motorist benefits Plaintiff is entitled to receive under the above-
referenced policy and therefore arbitration of this issue is necessary. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief as follows: 
1. For this Court's Order compelling Defendant to arbitration to obtain a final 
resolution of Plaintiffs claim for underinsured motorist benefits to include 
payment of Plaintiffs remaining special and general damages caused by the 
February 1, 2010 accident; 
2. For attorney fees, costs of suit, pre-arbitration/pre-judgment interest; 
3. For appointment of an arbitrator as may be required; and 
3. For such other relief as the Court may deem proper. 
<.,.. 
DATED this -:2,,\ day ofNovember, 2017. 
I 
Kenneth E. Ly , III I . 
Idaho State &h- No. 4431 / 
Law Office(~f Kenneth E. Lyon, III 
10389 Double R Blvd 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 






FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
CASE NO. CV-2017-4584-OC 
ANSWER AND DEMAND 
FOR JURY TRIAL 
_:r: :Jt12,t,. ol) JpJ. 
COMES NOW the Defendant, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho, and in answer to 
Plaintiffs Complaint admits, denies and alleges as follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 
Plaintiffs Complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and should be 
dismissed. 




Defendant denies each and every allegation of Plaintiffs Complaint not herein expressly and 
specifically admitted. 
THIRD DEFENSE 
Defendant denies all allegations contained in the individual paragraphs of Plaintiffs 
Complaint which are different from or in addition to the specific admissions contained in the 
following answer: 
1. Answering Paragraph 1 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits the allegations therein 
contained. 
2. Answering Paragraph 2 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits that Farmers Insurance 
Company ofldaho is a stock insurance company which is and was at all times material to the 
matter at issue a property and casualty insurance company, duly organized under the laws of 
the State of Idaho and doing business in the State of Idaho. 
3. Answering Paragraph 3 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits that it is an "insurer" as 
defined in I. C. Section 41-103. 
4. Answering Paragraph 4 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant admits that it issued Policy 
Number 75 17608-01-97 with an effective date of 10-10-2009 and expiration date of 04-10-
2010 to Erica M. Klein by Offer of Renewal in reliance on the statements contained in the 
Declarations. 
5. Answering Paragraph 5 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant states that the insured car 
identified in the Declaration page of Policy Number 75 17608-01-97 was a 2008 Chevrolet 
Malibu LTZ VIN 1GlZK57798Fl 77441. 
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6. Answering Paragraph 6 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant states that Policy Number 75 
17608-01-97 contained Endorsement 1180A (Schedule for Higher Underinsured Motorist 
Limits) and Endorsement El 179i (Coverage C-1 UNDERinsured Motorist Coverage). 
7. Answering Paragraph 7 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant states that Erica M. Klein 
represented by accepting the Offer of Renewal that she resided at 516 S. 8th Ave, Pocatello, 
Idaho at the time of renewal on 10-10-2009 and renewed her policy through agent Gina L. 
Wixom located in Hillsboro, Oregon. 
8. Answering Paragraph 8 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant states that at the time of the 
accident on February, 1, 2010, Klein was insured by Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho 
under policy number 75 17608-01-97 with an Underinsured Motorist (UIM) benefit having 
limits of $500,000. 
9. Answering Paragraph 9 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant states that on February 1, 2010, 
Klein was driving a 2008 Chevy Malibu at between 15 and 25 mph on East Benton when her 
vehicle was struck on the passenger door by another vehicle emerging from an alley and the 
driver of the vehicle which struck Klein on February 1, 2010, was insured by Allstate 
Insurance Company with applicable bodily injury liability limits of $25,000. 
10. Answering Paragraph 10 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies the allegations therein 
contained. 
11. Answering Paragraph 11 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies the allegations therein 
contained. 
12. Answering Paragraph 12 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant states that it was December 14, 
2010 that Klein's lawyer notified Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho that the lawyer 
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believed there was a UIM claim under Klein's policy with Farmers, but did not at that time 
make a claim or submit a Proof of Loss in support of a claim under the UIM provisions of 
the policy. 
13. Answering Paragraphs 13 and 14 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant states that Klein settled 
with Allstate and its insured for the $25,000 liability limits under the Allstate policy on April 
25, 2011. 
14. Answering Paragraph 15 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant states that on November 7, 
2012, Klein through her lawyer, submitted a Proof of Loss to Farmers with some 432 pages 
of medical records to support the UIM claim. 
15. Answering Paragraph 16 and 17 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant states that on December 
12, 2012, Farmers notified Klein's lawyer that Farmers considered $75,000 as the "amount 
justly due" and by letter dated December 13, 2012, the $75,000 check was forwarded to 
Klein's lawyer and it was cashed. 
16. Answering Paragraph 18, Defendant states that between December 13, 2012 and its receipt 
of a letter dated July 7, 2016 Klein and her lawyer took no action to supplement or make 
additional claim forUIMbenefits, to-wit: (1) On July 7, 2013, Farmers wrote Klein's lawyer 
and asked if "you want us to keep her [Klein's] U nderinsured Motorist claim open." There 
was no response; (2) On November 5, 2013, Farmers wrote Klein's lawyer asking him to call 
to discuss options to resolve the claim including mediation. Follow up letters dated 
December 1, 2013 and January 22, 2014 reflect that Farmers and Klein's lawyer discussed 
options to move the claim forward, but Klein and Klein's lawyer took no further action until 
the letter dated July 7, 2016 was received by Farmers. In further response to the allegations 
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contained in Paragraph 18, Defendant states that the letter contained no information which 
would supplement Klein's previous claim or which made claim for additional benefits under 
the policy's UIM provisions. 
17. Answering Paragraph 19 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies the allegations therein 
contained because the allegation references only a portion of the letter of that date and the 
portion quoted is taken out of context. 
18. Answering Paragraph 20 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant states that by letter dated 
February 7, 2017, Klein's current lawyer updated Klein's medical history with a 
supplemental demand package for the UIM policy limit of $500,000, less the offset for the 
$25,000 Allstate liability limit and credit for the $75,000 previously paid by Farmers. 
19. Answering Paragraph 21 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies the allegations therein 
contained and in further response states the following: (1) I. C. Section 41-1839 has no 
provision requiring insurers to respond to multiple proofs of loss; (2) Defendant timely 
responded to Plaintiffs initial Proof of Loss and paid Plaintiff the amount justly due under 
the policy which was accepted by Plaintiff; the subsequent February 7, 2017 supplemental 
demand did not require a response within sixty (60) days; and subsequent to February 7, 
2017, Klein's lawyer provided additional information which he requested Farmers to 
consider and provided oral extensions of time to respond. 
20. Answering Paragraph 22 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant denies the allegations therein 
contained. 
22. Answering Paragraph 23 of Plaintiffs Complaint, Defendant restates its answers to all 




23. Answering Paragraphs 24, 25, 26, 27 and 28 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant denies the 
allegations therein contained because the said allegations contain paraphrased statements 
regarding provisions of the policy which are inapplicable and not controlling since the policy 
speaks for itself. 
24. Answering Paragraph 29 and 30 of Plaintiff's Complaint, Defendant denies the allegations 
therein contained. 
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Klein's claim for UIM benefits is barred by the five (5) year written contract statute of 
limitations contained in I. C. Section 5-216 which applies to Klein's claim for UIM benefits under 
her insurance contract with Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho. 
SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Klein's claim for UIM benefits accrued either on the date ofloss, February 1, 2010, or the 
date on which she settled with Allstate and its insured for the $25,000 liability limits under the 
Allstate policy on April 25, 2011 and under either scenario her February 7, 2017 supplemental 
demand and her demand for arbitration filed on November 22, 2017 is barred by the five (5) year 
written contract statute oflimitations contained in I. C. Section 5-216. 
THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Because resolution of the statute oflimitations defense is not subject to arbitration, this Court 
should resolve that issue before appointing an arbitrator or ordering arbitration in this matter. 
FOURTH AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
Defendant is entitled to an award of its attorney fees and costs incurred in defending against 
Plaintiff's Complaint. 
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V 
WHEREFORE, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho prays for judgment as follows: 
1. An Order declaring that the accrual date for Klein's claim for additional UIM benefits 
accrued on either the date of the accident (February 10, 2010) or the date Klein settled with the 
tortfeasor (April 25, 2011) and that Klein's claim for further UIM benefits from Farmers is barred 
by the five year written contract statute oflimitations; 
2. An Order awarding Farmers its costs and attorney fees incurred herein; and 
3. Such other and further relief as the Court deems proper. 
DEFENDANT DEMANDS A JURY TRIAL ON ALL ISSUES SUBJECT TO A JURY TRIAL 
5-f-
DATED thisJC day of December, 2017. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
5-r 
I hereby certify that on theL day of December, 2017, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to: 
Kenneth E. Lyon, III 
Attorney at Law 
10389 Double R Blvd 
Reno, NV 89521 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
5785 Rio Vista Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 







[ ] Express mail 
[ ] Hand delivery 
[ ] Facsimile: 
[ V Electronic: ken.lyon21@gmail.com 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IN AND 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
ERICA M KLEIN , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 




ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF 
INFORMATION FOR 
SCHEDULING ORDER 
A Complaint was filed in this matter on the 22nd day of November , 2017. The 
Defendant has now appeared and/or answered and the case is at issue. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, pursuant to I.R.C.P. 16, that the parties, through their 
counsel (or the parties themselves if self-represented), confer and submit to the Court, 
within fourteen (14) days of the date of this Order, a joint statement containing the 
following information: 
(1) Whether any service is still needed upon any unserved parties. 
(2) Whether motions to add new parties or otherwise amend the pleadings are 
contemplated. 
(3) Whether the parties currently contemplate or anticipate any pre-trial motions. 
(4) Whether the case presents any unusual time requirements for trial 
Case No.: CV-2017-0004584-OC 
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preparation. 
(5) The agreed amount of time required for trial. 
(6) Whether the case presents any unusual times requirements for discovery. 
(7) Whether any party requests court-ordered mediation. 
(8) Two stipulated trial dates, one no less than nine (9) months and no more 
than twelve (12) months from the date of this Order, and a second no less than twelve (12) 
months and no more than fifteen (15) months from the date of this Order. These trial 
dates cannot be during the first full week of any month. 
(9) Whether there are other matters conducive to determination of the action that 
the parties agree should be brought to the attention of the Court prior to entering a 
Scheduling Order. 
The parties shall agree as to which party shall make the joint submission but, if they 
cannot agree, Plaintiff shall be responsible to make the submission. 
Upon receipt of this joint submission the Court will issue an Order setting the matter 
for trial with appropriate dates for discovery, disclosure of witness, etc. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if the parties do not file the stipulation required 
herein, within the fourteen (14) days set forth, the Court will set this matter for trial on a 
date available to the Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the submissions requested in the order are 
deemed by the Court to constitute the scheduling conference required by IRCP 16(a). 
However, if either party wishes a more formal scheduling conference please contact the 
Court's clerk and one will be scheduled. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that unless the Court receives written notification to 
the contrary, all documents sent by the Court to counsel will be delivered electronically. 
Case No.: CV-2017-0004584-OC 
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Counsel is hereby instructed to provide the Court with an email address they wish to have 
documents delivered to. Counsel will also have the continuing obligation to notify the 
Court upon any change to the email address submitted. 
NOTICE: ELECTRONIC FILING IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT IS NOT 
YET AVAILABLE. PLEASE CONTINUE TO PHYSICALLY FILE DOCUMENTS UNTIL 
FURTHER NOTICE. 
DATED this~ day of January, 2018. 
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ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the ~day of January, 2018 I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the 
manner indicated. 
Kenneth E Lyon Ill 
Gary L Cooper 
Cooper & Larsen 
PO Box4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Case No.: CV-2017-0004584-OC 
□ U.S. Mail 
0 E-Mail 
D Hand Deliver 
~ Fax: (775) 398-5801 
□ U.S. Mail 
~ E-Mail 
D Hand Deliver 
□ Fax: 
Robert Poleki 
Clerk of the Court 
By:_-----jQt/~----
Deputy Clerk 
ORDER FOR SUBMISSION OF INFORMATION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER 
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Kenneth E. Lyon, lil - Idaho Stare Bar #443 I 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. - Idaho Stare Bar# I I 17 
I 0389 Double R. Blvd. 
Reno, NV 89521 
Telephone: (775) 398-5800 
Facsimile: (775) 398-580 l 
Email: ken@.lyonlaw.net 
Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar# 1814 
J. D. Oborn - Idaho State Bar #9294 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third A venue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 







OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
CASE NO. CV-2017-4584-OC 
JOINT 
RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR 
SUBMISSION OF SCHEDULING 
INFORMATION 
COME NOW the.parties, by and through counsel ofrecord, and respond to the Court's 
Order for Submission oflnformation for Scheduling Order with the following: 
1. The parties do not need a trial date because the immediate issue before the Court is 
JOINT RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING INFORMATION - PAGE 1 
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whether Klein's UIM claim is barred by the five (5) year statute of limitations which 
applies to claims for benefits under insurance contracts. The issue for the Court to 
detennine is when the statute oflimitations accrued. This will be presented to the Court 
by a Motion to Dismiss or a Motion for Summary Judgment to be filed within the next 
thirty (30) days by cmmsel for the Defendant. 
2. If the Court grant's Fanners' Motion and dismisses Klein's UIM claim that will resolve 
the issues presented in the Complaint. If the Court denies Farmers' Motion Klein's UIM 
claim will be decided by arbitration as provided for in the insurance policy. The only 
issue which might involve the Cow-t at that point is to appoint an arbitrator if the parties 
cannot agree on an arbitrator. 
3. If the Court feels it would be helpful, the parties are available for a telephone conference 
with the Court t°J;cuss the unique issues presented by this case. 
DATED this~ day of January, 2018. 
Law Offices of Kenneth E. Lyon III 
I x-f1'--DA TED this ..\.U- day of January, 2018 
JOINT RESPONSE TO REQUEST FOR SCHEDULING INFORMATION - PAGE 2 
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-- . 
Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar # 1814 
J. D. Oborn - Idaho State Bar #9294 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Email: gary@cooper-larsen.com 
jd@cooper-larsen.com 
Counsel for Defendant 
. -- pv ": oa 
1~·1'1 C\::'?, L~\C; ;1 ..; \)pi\ -v
_,.c,. _ __...,~~'' 
':J" -crf:-1 -;-~-~: '. ;\ 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 










CASE NO. CV-2017-4584-OC 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF IDAHO, 
DECLARATION OF GARY L. COOPER 
IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Defendant. 
I, Gary L. Cooper, under penalty of perjury of the laws of the State ofldaho, hereby declare 
and state as follows: 
1. I am attorney with Cooper & Larsen, Chartered that has been retained by the 
Defendant to defend it in this matter. As such, I have personal knowledge of the facts 
stated herein. I have personally reviewed the claim file maintained by Farmers 
Insurance Company ofldaho regarding any and all claims made by, or on behalf of, 
Erica Klein. 
DECLARATION OF GARY L. COOPER IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 




Mr. Mike Morrissey 














































Date I Amount I Doc I 
2/6/10 57.03 KLEINUIM • 108, 
114, 122, 124, 138 
2/4/10 0.81 KLEINUIM • 111, 
115,122,124,138 
2/4/10 1.95 KLEINUIM -111, 
115,122,124,138 
2/11/10 1.05 KLEINUIM -113 
2/11/10 1.95 KLEINUIM .. 113 
2/17/10 21.85 KLEINUIM .. 116, 
117, 138, 144 
2/25/10 33.11 KLEINUIM • 101, 
102,129,131 
3/11/10 10.00 KLEINUIM • 101, 
102,130,132 
3/15/10 48.39 KLEINUIM • 101, 
102,128,133 
3/29/10 5.00 KLEINUIM -105, 
106,127 
4/9/10 10.00 KLEINUIM .. 103, 
104,127 
5/9/10 5.00 KLEINUIM • 120, 
121 
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Her prescription charges, include $538.79 in prescription charges with ___ · 
Shaver Rx & Compound Center (KLEINUIM .. 257 through 260 and 419 through 421) to 
date, as follows: 
I Provider I Descril!tion I Date I Amount I Doc 
Shaver Phannacy Oxycodone 1/28/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Metaxalone 1/28/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Phannacy Tramadol 1/28/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Phannacy Voltaren 2/14/11 $32.70 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Phannacy Metaxalone 3/14/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Tramadol 3/14/11 $5.00 KLEINUJM .. 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Oxycodone 3/18/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Oxycodone 5/6/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Amitriptyline 5/6/11 $2.60 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Tizanidine 5/6/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 259 
Shaver Phannacy Gabapentin 5/6/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Oxycodone 6/6/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Amitriptyline 6/6/11 $2.60 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Tizanidine 6/6/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Gabapentin 6/6/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Zolpidem 6/9/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Zolpidem 7/1/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Amitriptyline 7/1/11 $2.60 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Tizanidine 7/1/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 259 
Shaver Pharmacy Oxycodone 7/5/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 258 







Mr. Mike Morrissey 


















































Date Amount Doc 
8/5/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 258 
8/5/11 $2.60 KLEINUIM • 258 
8/5/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 258 
8/23/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 258 
8/24/11 $5.00 KLEJNUIM • 258 
9/6/11 $5.00 KLEJNUIM • 258 
9/6/11 $2.60 KLEINUIM • 258 
9/23/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 258 
9/26/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 258 
10/5/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 258 
10/5/11 $2.60 KLEINUIM • 258 
10/24/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 258 
10/26/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 258 
11/4/11 $20.17 KLEINUIM • 258 
11/4/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 258 
11/4/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 258 
11/4/11 $2.60 KLEINUIM • 258 
11/4/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 257 
12/5/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 257 
12/5/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 257 
12/5/11 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 257 
12/19/11 $2.60 KLEINUIM - 257 
1/4/12 $5.00 V'...LEINUIM - 257 
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Date I Amount I Doc I 
1/4/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 257 
1/16/12 $1.64 KLEINUIM - 257 
1/16/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 257 
1/16/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 257 
1/16/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 257 
1/16/12 $2.60 KLEINUIM - 257 
2/6/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 257 
2/10/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 257 
2/10/12 $4.48 KLEINUIM .. 260 
2/14/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 260 
2/15/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 260 
2/15/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM .. 260 
3/5/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 260 
3/5/12 $5.00 KLEJNUIM • 260 
3/5/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 260 
4/16/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM .. 419 
4/16/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM .. 419 
4/16/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 419 
4/16/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 419 
4/19/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 419 
5/16/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 419 
5/16/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 419 
5/16/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 419 
5/30/12 $5.00 KLEiNUIM - 419 
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Date Amount Doc 
6/13/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM .. 419 
6/13/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM .. 419 
6/14/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 420 
6/14/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM .. 420 
7/9/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 420 
7/9/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 420 
7/9/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 420 
7/10/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 420 
7/14/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 420 
7/14/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 420 
8/8/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 420 
8/8/12 $5.00 KLEINUJM - 420 
8/9/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 421 
8/13/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM - 421 
9/6/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 421 
9/6/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 421 
9/13/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 421 
9/13/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 421 
10/13/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 421 
10/13/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 421 
10/25/12 $5.00 KLEINUIM • 421 
10/31/12 $54.10 KLEINUIM - 421 
10/31/12 $22.30 KLEINUIM • 421 
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In an effort to relieve the pain, Erica has from time to time received 
massages as her pain has flared up. She has incurred $1,870.00 to date at Studio 145 for 
that palliative treatment of her injuries. KLEINUIM - 251 through 252 and 422 through 
424. 
Lost Wages 
Because of the crash, Ms. Klein has been unable to work, the foregoing 
evidence PTO FT [Paid-time-off full-time] and SICKFT [Sick full-time] that were hours 
deducted from her accumulations and which reduced her ovm benefits by 107 hours. See 
KLEINUIM - 425 through 431 at $27.00 per hour that totals $2,889.00 in lost 
wages/benefits that Ms. Klein suffered because of the crash. This number is believed to 
be much higher and this information will be supplemented as more lost wages are 
determined. 
TABLE OF SPECIAL DAMAGES 
I DESCRIPTION I AMOUNT 
PortneufMedical Emergency Room. KLEINUIM -17, 19, 20 $538.61 
Rocky Mountain Emergency Physicians KLEINUIM - 18, 21 $209.00 
Portneuf Medical Center :MRis (3/9/10). KLEINUIM - 22, 23, 134 $3,882.00 
Pocatello Radiology Associates (3/9/10 :MRI Reads)($273.00 and $544.00 
$271.00). KLEINUIM • 134 
Pocatello Family Medicine. KLEINUIM - 47, 48, 134 $989.00 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center. KLEINUIM -190-192 $2,612.68 
Anesthesia Associates. KLEINUIM - 193-194 $4,196.00 
Dr. Amy Reid. KLEINUIM - 63,134,150, 151, 221-227 $3,240.00 
I 
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I DESCRJPTION 
PortneufMed. Center Cervical :MRI (1/19/12). KLEINUIM • 241 
Pocatello Radiology Assoc. (1/19/12 :MRI Read) KLEINUIM - 242 
Portneuf Medical Center Epidurals (1/27 /12, 3/1/12, and 4/9/12). 
KLEINUIM - 243-245 
Dr. Juan J. Leon, Epidurals (1/27/12, 3/1/12, and 4/9/12). 
KLEINUIM .. 221 
Superior Physical Therapy. KLEINUIM - 246-248 
Rehab Authority. KLEINUIM .. 249-250 
PortneufMedical Center Physical Therapy. KLEINUIM - 418 
Ethan Fisher, LAC. KLEINUIM - 253-255 
Pharmacy Charges (see pharmacy charge tables herein) 
Studio 145. KLEINUIM - 251-252 and 422-424 
Lost Wages. KLEINUIM - 425-431 
TOTAL 














Despite the $47,339.93 in economic losses, Erica is not better. 
I 
Erica has historically been a very active and outgoing person who loved to 
constantly be doing things and staying busy. However, since the February 1, 2010 T-bone 
crash, she has suffered daily chronic back/neck pain. Prior to the crash she was a very 
strong person, with high pain tolerance, her chronic pain has made her feel vulnerable and 
weak. AB is the case with chronic pain, it has changed her life for the worse; she cries 
:frequently, and often feels depressed. 
Ms. Klein wakes up in pain, goes to work in pain, does her chores and 




Mr. Mike Morrissey 
November 7, 2012 
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Additionally, she also no longer enjoys working out and going to the gym, wfilcli she did 
prior to the crash, often 4-5 times week. She also previously enjoyed skiing, 
snowmobiling, and wake boarding; however, she no longer participates in these activities 
because of the pain that she knows she will experience. 
Despite being a healthy  prior to the crash, she now feels like 
her back and neck are that of an  While Ms. Klein desires the pre-crash 
health she previously enjoyed, this crash has changed her life to one of physical therapy, 
pain injections, doctors appointments, tens unit, pain pills, heating pads, and laying down. 
A life she would not choose for anybody- including herself. 
Instead of looking forward with a anticipation of the next day, she wakes up 
each morning after a poor night's rest to another day of pain. Ms. Klein explains that she 
hates crying, yet she can't stop. She says it "feels as if my tears should have ran out by 
now.'' While she would rather be enjoying the outdoors, mowing my lawn, or planting 
flowers or her garden, or going to the gym-these will not be her plans today or 
tomorrow because of this crash. 
Additional Information 
Idaho Code§ 4.1-1839 "sets forth the amount of time within which to 
investigate and determine coverage [30 days] in order to avoid liability for an award of 
attorney fees if a lawsuit is later filed to recover under the insurance policy. Idaho Code 
§ 41-1839(1) provides that the insured is entitled to an award of attorney fees if the 
insurer fails to pay the amount justly due for a period of thirty (30) days after proof of loss 
has been :furnished as provided in such policy, certificate or contract. That thirty-day 
limit is for the benefit of the insured. The purpose of the statute is to provide an 
incentive for insurers to settle just claims in order to reduce the amount of litigation 
and the high costs associated with litigation ... " Estate of Holland, et al. v. 
MetropolitanPropertyandCasualtylns. Co. eta/, Idaho Docket No. 38157-2010 *16· 
17 {Idaho Sup. Ct. 5-29-12)(citations omitted). 
Accordingly, if there is anything additional you need, please let us Imow as 
soon as possible. In the event you need any additional records, bills, documents or 
infonnation we have attached an Authorization for Release of Infonnation. KLEINUIM ~ 
432. 
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This Authorization for Release of Information is intentionally left blank as 
to the provider so that Farmers can request any records it deems necessary consistent with 
its opportunity to "investigate and determine its liability." A submitted proof ofloss is 
sufficient when the insured provides the insurer with enough information to allow tlte 
insure1· a reasonable opportunity to investigate and determine its liability." Greenough 
v .. Farm Bureau Mut. /ns. Co. 0£ Idaho, 142 Idaho 589, 593, 130 P.3d 1127, 1131 
(2006). 
This Authorization for Release of Information is intended to allow Allstate 
to investigate and determine its liability. 
PROOF OF LOSS DEMAND PURSUANT TO IDAHO CODE§ 41 .. 1839 
Based on all of the foregoing, including the current $47,339.93 in economic 
losses and the substantial and on-going general ~amages, Ms. Klein contends that the 
amount currently ''justly due'' under Idaho Code§ 41-1839 is $250,000.00, based upon 
current losses as set forth herein. 
This Proof of Loss is submitted pursuant Idaho Code§ 41-1839, and is 
further made subject to the :fiduciary duties of a first-party insurer. See e.g., White v. 
Unigard Mut. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 94, 98-99, 730 P.2d 1014 (1986). 
This Proof of Loss is further made subject to the 30-day time limitation of 
Idaho Code§ 41"1839. 
Additionally, would you upon receipt of this Proof of Loss, please produce 
for us all records, bills, statements, and all of the Farmer's underinsured claim file. 
Sincerely, 
RSL/ 
Enclosures: Supporting documents labeled KLEINUIM - 1 through 432 




December 12, 2012 
Send all couespondoacc to, 
Bmail• claimsdocnments@hpcs com 
Nr.tiona.l Document Center 
P.O :BCllC 268994 
Oklahoma City, OK 73126-8994 
Fax (877) 217~1389 
Law Offices of Lowell N. Hawkes 
1322 B CENTER ST 
POCATELLO ID 83201 











Dear Mr. lewis: 
Based on the information io hand, I am in a position to offer $75,000.00 (Seventy Five Thousand Dollars) to 
resolve your client's uninsured motorist claim, inclus1Ve of all su.bogation and/orliens. 
Per our conversation I am have the check cut fur the $75000 as the amount justly due as soon as our printer in 
the Pocatello office is repaired. I was told we should be able to print the check m the morrung. I am working to 
obtain the insured1s car policy for you and will send a copy as soon as it is available to me. 
Once yor/.ve had an opportunity to discuss this offer with your client, please give me a. call. 
I can be reached at 208-589-6895. My scheduled office hours ate Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 
5:00 p.m. Mountain Time. 
Sincerely, 
Farmers Iosmance Company ofidaho 
t\ 0· -\ 
~~~W\~ 
M.ike Morrissey 









December 13, 2012 
Law Offices of Lowell N. Hawkes 
1322 E CENTER ST 
POCATELLO ID 83201 











Send all correspondence to: 
Email: claimsdocuments@hpcs.com 
National Document Center 
P.O. Box 268994 
Oklahoma City, OK 73126-8994 
Fax: (877) 217-1389 
I have enclosed a check in the amout of $75,000 for the amount justly due. 
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me at 208-589-6895. My office hours are 
Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Mountain Time. 
Sincerely, 
Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
~W~M~ 
Mike Morrissey 
















NON-NEGOTIABLE NON-NEGOTIABLE NON-NEGOTIABLE NON-NEGOTIABLE 
NON-NEGOTIABLE NON-NEGOTIABLE NON-NEGOTIABLE NON-NEGOTIABLE $75 1000 • 00""*1 
Lowell N. Hawkes, chartered 
Trust Account For Erica Klien 
1322 E. CENTER 




Clrum Unit Number: 
Check Number. 



















THE onfu1MAL cocur.mNT t1AS A REfLECTIV.. WATEm!Anit oN m SACK. • HOLD AT AN ANGLe To VIEW \'/NEIii Cl!ECKUIG ·ms EfWORSa.mrr. 
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Law Offices of 
LOWELL N. BA WKES, CHARTERED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
Licensed m Idaho and Utah -(208) 235-1600 Fax (208) 235-4200 
VIA FAX 877-217-1389 
Mr. Dan Emerson 
Farmers Insurance 
National Document Center 
P .0. Box 268992 
Oklahoma City, OK 73126-8992 
Re: Erica Klein 
Claim Number: 
Date of Crash: 
Dear Mr. Emerson: 
January 30, 2013 
1015457772-1-5 
February 1, 2010 
Thank you for your call today, in follow-up to your January 16, 2013 letter, 
regarding your assignment as the new adjuster to further handle this claim. 
As I mentioned, Erica is scheduled to see a Neurosurgeon in a few weeks to 
get a surgical assessment; I believe that will occur February 20. We both agreed that she 
probably needs such an opinion based on the facts. As you requested, I will forward you 
information as I receive it so that we can continue to work toward resolution of the claim. 
As for your inquiry regarding whether an :MRI or what further diagnostics 
will be done, I do not Im.ow. However, if Farmers would like to have an MRI ordered 
please let me !mow; I am happy to pass that on. 
In the meantime, if you need anything from me relative to our continued 









July 7, 2013 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 E CENTER ST. 
POCATELLO, ID 83201 











Send all a>trespondence to, 
Email c:lahmdocumena@hpcs com 
National Doc:nment Center 
PO. Dox268994 
Oklahoma. City. OK 73126-8.994 
Fu- (877) 217-1389 
·RECEIVED 
JUl 11 2013 
Thank you for takmg the time to discuss Ms. Klein's U ndersmsured Motorise cla.un with me on July 5, 2013. 
As we discussed, you still do not a have a surgical opinion in 1egards to Erica's injuries and it's unclear whether 
or not she 1s still treating. Would you please provide us documentation in regards to the above and/or whether 
or not you want us to keep her Underinsured Motonst claim open. Your help would certainly be appreciated. 
If you.have any questions or concerns, I can be reached at (208)895-2819. My scheduled office hours are 
Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Mountain Tune. 
Sincerely, 
Farmers Insurance Company ofidaho 
~.~ 
Dan Emerson 








November 5, 2013 
Law Offices oflowell N. Hawkes 
1322 E CENfERST 
POCATELI.O ID 83201 











Send oil con-cspondcn~ to 
Emnil· claumdocwneni:s@hpa coai 
P.O BOJC 268994 
Oklaho!ll:a City. OK 73126-8994 
F111t: (877) 217-1589 
The injmy claim for your client, Erica Klein, has been reassigned to me for handling. 
In revlewing the file, it appears you were reviewing the possibility of mediat1on to resolve the claim, PlellSe give 
me a call at yout earliest opportunity so we can discuss thls option to try and get this claim resolved. I would 
also appreciate any new information you may have regarding yow: client's treatment 
I can be reached nt (208)23 5-9808. l a.pp.tecia.te your cooperation i1nCI look forwatd to working with you. 
Sincerely, 
Farmets Insurance Company ofldnho 
d~ 
Dan Surmelis 
Field Claims Representative 
(208)235-9808 
-,opovc7 







December 1, 2013 
Law Offices of Lowell. N. Hawkes 
1322 E CENTER ST 
POCATELLO ID 83201 









Send 11,ll coxrespondcaee to• 
Bnuul. daimsdocuments@hpcs com 
PO Box 268994 
Oklahoma City, OK 73126-8994 
FIIX! (877) 217-1389 
I run writing in follow up to Ms. Klein's claim As my prior letter indicated, I have been reassigned her claim for 
handling. 
I would appredate the oppottunh:y to discuss this drum with you. I would also appreciate receiving nn.y 
additional medical documentation regarding treatment your client has rece1ved since ow: initial evaluation was 
completed. 
Please give me a c~ at your earliest oppo.ttunity so we can discuss this claim. I cnn be reached at (208) 
235-9808. I appreoate your cooperation and look forwatd to working with you. 
Sincerely, 
Farmers Insurance Company ofldnho 
d~ 
Dan Sutmelis 
Field Claims Representative 
(208)235-98 08 
v~n'l.O't'} 








Januaty 22, 2014 
Law Offices of Lowell N. Hawkes 
1322 B CENTER ST 
POCATELLO ID 83201 











Toll Free, (800)-135-7764 
Send :tll c0tres1>0ndcn~ to 
Emrul claimsdocuments@hpCb com 
National Document Cent.et 
PO. Box 268994 
Oklnhoma City. OK 73126-8994 
Pax: (877) 217-1389 
I I:,,, ... _ ..
,. ' 
I appreciated the op_portnruty to discuss Ms. Klein's claim with you. As we discussed, I would apprec.iate 
receiving an update regarding the status of her tteatment. 
The last tteatmeoc mformation we have is from October 261 2012. If she has obtained additional treatment 
since that time, please forward the medical bills and records for cl1at treatment for out .review. 
We also discussed possible mediation of the claim. Once you obtain an update reg.u:cliog her treatment status, 
please contact me to d1Scuss possibly moving th1s claim towards a final resolution. 
I appreciate your cooperation in this matter. If you have any questions or concerns1 I can be reached at 
(208)235-9808. My scheduled office hours are Monday through Friday from 8·00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Mountain 
Time. 
Sincerely, 
Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho 
d~ 
Dan Surmelis 
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Oklahoma City, OK 73126-8994 
RE: Insured: 
Claim No.: 
... : . .. ·PolicyNo.:-• 
... - · Date of Loss: 
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V 
Please be advised that this office, in association with the law office of Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr., 
has been retained by Erica Klein to resolve her outstanding underinsured motorist claim arising 
from the above loss. Please direct all future correspondence and communication to my office here 
in Reno. · · · 
I have had a chance to review the file from Ms. Klein's prior counsel and it appears the 
underinsured motorist claim was left open pending a better understanding of Ms. Klein's ongoing 
medical needs~ including potential surgery. We are workin_g on obtaining these additional medical 
records to assist in a final evaluation. Firially, in reviewing the file it appears Farmers was 
interested in resolving this matter by way of mediation. Please advise if this is still your preference. 
Thank you for y~ur assistance. Please let me know if you have ~y further _questions . 
.... - . :,: 
KEL/mlm _, ·· 
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February 1, 2010 
Erica.Klein 
PS Fnr,n :JBOD. July ~UM 
Sc:~ Rr.vc~e tur 111:-.trnr.trnn~ 
Claim#: 
Date of loss: 
Injured Patty: 
Sent via Cettified Mail - Return Receipt Requested 
Dear Mr. Lyon; 
This correspondence confltms your representation of the insured, Erica Klein.. 
Our investigation into this loss, and the insured's claim, is ongoing. While out investigation is 
ongoing~ please be advised of the following policy language pertinent to this loss: 
WHAT TO DO IN CASE OF ACCIDENT 
Other Duties 
A person claiming any coverage of this policy must also: 
1. Cooperate with us and assist us in auy matter concerning a claim or suit. 
2. Send us promptly any legal papers received tdating to any claim or suit. 
3. Submit to physical examinations at our expense by doctors we select as often as we may 
reasonably require. 
4. Authorize us to obtain medical and other records. 
5. Provide us with any wtitten proofs of loss we require. 
6. Notify police within 24 hours and us within 30 days if a hit~and-run motorist is involved and 
an•uninsured motorist claim is to be filed. 
8. Submit to a.n exii.Jllination. under oath upon our request. 
Please note, a failure to comply with the above policy language will be construed as a breach of the 
policy and may compromise the inS\lted's coverage under the policy. 
As you are awai:e, we have previously tendered the amount of $75,000.00 to Mrs. Klein and her prior 
counsel, Lowell N Hawkes, Chartered. This tender is global in nature, includes all exposures against 




~ u g. 15. 2016 9: 51 AM No. 4948 P. 2/2 
Please be advised, if this matter proceeds to Arbitration the decision of the arbitrator is binding and, if 
the decisio.o/awa.cd of the amount due is less than chat amount, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
reserves the right to recover the difference between the decision/award and this payment. Specifically, 
the policy states: 
The decision in writing of the a.tbit.tatot will be binding subject to the terms of this 
insurance. 
We are prepared to respond to any demand for payment under the terms of the insured's contract 
within 60 days of receipt of~ proof of loss. Said proof of loss must be accompanied by related medical 
bills, cha.rt notes, narrative reports, records and/or wage loss suppo.tt. P.cior medical records mu.st also 
accompany the proof ofloss fot the 5-yeai: pedod prior to the accident. 
Should this lettet leave you with any questions, please feel free to contact me. I can be reached by 
phone ar (208) 235~9808. 
Very truly yours, 
Fa.rmets Insurance Company of Idaho a~ 
Dan. Su.tmelis, GCA 
Special Oaims Representative 
C: Gina. Wixom, a.gent 
P.O. 1099 
Blackfoot, ID 83221-1099 
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LAW OFFICES OF 
KENNETHE. LYON,ID 
10389 Double R Blvd. 
Reno, Nevada 89521-- · 
•LICENSED IN TELEPHONE: (775) 398-5800 
NEVADA AND IDAHO FACSIMILE (775) 398-5801 
Dan Sunnelis 
Fanners Insurance 
National Document Center 
P.O. Box 268994 




Date of Loss: 
Dear Mr. Sunnelis: 





This letter follows our prior discussions in reference to the above loss. As you are aware, 
a prior demand for UIM benefits was presented to Farmers on November 7, 2012 by Ryan 
Lewis, Ms. Klein's counsel at that time Pursuant to Farmers' request, said demand included the 
medical records and billings up to that point in support of Ms. Klein's demand. It also included a 
copy of Ms. Klein's medical records for the five years prior to the February 1, 2010 accident, as . 
well as an executed Authorization for Release of Information allowing Farmers to obtain any of 
Ms. Klein's prior medical records it felt relevant and necessary to review in evaluating her UIM 
claim. 
On December 12, 2012, Farmers completed its evaluation and tendered $75,000 to 
resolve Ms. Klein's claim. However, the claim was not resolved due to the fact that Ms. Klem 
was anticipatmg a surgical assessment which was necessary to consider before any final 
evaluation could be made. The claim was assigned to you on or about November 5, 2013 
wherein you requested additional mformation and the possibility of mediation. Additional 
inquiries were made to Mr. Lewis on December 1, 2013 and January 22, 2014, respectively. 
Unfortunately, it appears no further information was provided by Mr. Lewis. 
As we have discussed, Ms. Klem has now retained my office m an effort to reach a final 
resolution of her UIM claim. In your letter dated January 22, 2014 you indicate the last 
treatment information provided to you was from October 26, 2012. Accordingly, I am providing 
you with a copy of Ms. Klein's medical records and corresponding billing stateme1+ts from 
October 26, 2012 to the present. Please consider this information in support of Ms'. Klein's 






SUMMARY OF MEDICAL TREATMENT FROM OCTOBER 26, 2012 
On October 26, 2012, Ms. Klem was receiving pam management treatment with Dr. Amy 
Reid. -At.that time, she was still experiencing significant neck and back pain following the 
February 1, 2010 automobile accident Ms. Klein had previously undergone trigger point 
injections, physical therapy, acupuncture, and epidural steroid injections in both her thoracic and 
cervical spine in an attempt to address her pain complaints. Unfortunately, this treatment did not 
provide any permanent relief and Ms. Klein was only able to receive consistent pam relief from 
the use of pain medications which Dr. Reid was managing. · 
On March 13, 2013, Dr. Reid referred Ms. Klein to Dr. Jonathan Morgan for a surgical 
consultation. Ms. Klein saw Dr. Morgan on March 20, 2013. At that time Ms. Klein's chief 
complaint was noted as severe, burning neck pain and upper thoracic pain. Dr. Morgan 
conducted a physical exammation and reviewed Ms. Klein's prior cemcal and thoracic MRis 
The physical examination revealed an abnormal cervical range of motion in all directions. 
However, Dr. Morgan's did not see any pathology within the :tviR.Is that would warrant surgery. 
His belief was that Ms. Klein was still suffering from severe muscle spasm in the cervical spme 
and felt that she may benefit from Botox injections. He also recommended flexion/extension x-
rays of the cervical spme to determine whether there was any instability which should be 
considered in any further evaluation. 
Ms. Klein subsequently relocated to California for approximately three months. 
However, during this time she continued to see Dr. Reid for continuing pam management. Ms. 
Klein also became pregnant with her first child Although Ms. Klein's pregnancy was classified 
as a high risk pregnancy due to the pain medications she was taking for her mjury, she · 
fortunately suffered no complications and her son was born on . 
On Apnl 19, 2014, Ms. Klem was referred for additional trigger point injections which 
she underwent with Dr. Anthony Joseph at Pocatello Orthopaedic and Sports Medicine Clinic. 
Unfortunately, the trigger pomt mjections did not provide Ms. Klein with any significant lasting 
pain relief. 
Ms. Klein continued to treat with Dr. Reid until August 22, 2014. Her treatment was 
subsequently transferred to Dr. Jared Wagner after Dr. Reid moved her practice to Florida. 
DR. AMY REID - PORTNEUF NEUROSCIENCES AND REHABILITATION CLINIC 
DATE OF SERVICE CHIEF COMPLAINTffREATMENT SYNOPSIS CHARGES 
10/30/12 Neck and Mid-Back Pain; Letter from Dr. Reid $NIA 
Confirming Continued Pain Management 
Treatment 
03/19/13 Chronic Neck and Mid-Back Pain; Continued Pain $232.00 
Management; Medications; Referral to Dr. Morgan 




08/07/13 Chronic Neck and Mid-Back Pain, Contmued Pain $232.00 
Management; Medications; Possible Botox 
Iniections for Muscle Spasm 
10/31/13 Chronic Neck and Mid-Back Pain; Continued Pain $232.00 
Management; Medications; Home Exercises 
01/29/14 Chronic Neck and Mid-Back Pain; Continued Pain $232.00 
Management; Medications 
02/28/14 Chronic Neck and Mid-Back Pain; Continued Pain $156.00 
Management, Medications; Referral to Dr. Joseph 
for Other Treatment Options 
04/16/14 Chronic Neck and Mid-Back Pain; Continued Pam $156.00 
Management; Medications; Trigger Point Injections 
from Dr. Joseph Not Helpful 
06/26/14 Chronic Neck and Mid-Back Pain; Continued Pain $232.00 
Management; Medications; 
08/22/14 Chronic Neck and Mid-Back Pain; Continued Pain $156.00 
, 
Management; Medications; Referral to Dr. Wagner 
for Chronic Pam Management 
DR. JONATHAN MORGAN - PORTNEUF MEDICAL PRACTICE DMSION 
DATE OF SERVICE 
I 03120113 
CHIEF COMPLAINT/TREATMENT SYNOPSIS 
I Chronic Neck Pain/Surgical Consultation 
CHARGES 
1 $352.00 
Ms. Klein assumed care with Dr. Jared Wagner on September 13, 2014. Dr Wagner 
provided continued pain management through the use of pain medications with the goal of 
weaning Ms. Klein from the medications as much as possible. To this end, he required Ms. 
Klein to undergo a psychological assessment with Dr Donald Whitley, which was conducted on 
October 1, 2014. Dr. Whitley noted that Ms. Klein's injury and associated pain had caused 
significant changes in her lifestyle. He also noted that Ms. Klein was very conscientlous about 
her use of pain medication, particularly since she was employed as a nurse. Dr. Whitley arrived 
at a provisional diagnoses of generalized anxiety disorder and unspecified depressive disorder 
and advised Ms. Klein was only at a moderate risk for any further clinical problems. 
On March 26, 2015, Dr. Wagner prescribed a trial of Propanal to address Ms. Kl em's 
ongoing headaches. Unfortunately, Ms. Klein had a negative reaction to the medication and Dr. 
Wagner switcher her to Gabapentin which did provide some relief. For Ms. Klein's neck and 
back pain, Wagner recommended she undergo another series of trigger pomt injections which 
she did on October 22, 2015. Again, the trigger point injections only provided Ms Klein with 
some temporary pain relie¼ 
Ms. Klem treated with Dr. Wagner through April 14, 2016. She then transferred her 





DR. JARED WAGNER- BINGHAM MEMORIAL HOSPITAL IDAHO PAIN GROUP 
DATE OF SERVICE CHIEF COMPLAINT/TREATMENT SYNOPSIS CHARGES 
09/30/14 Neck and Back Pain; Asswnpti-0n.of Care; Pam $295.00 
Management; Medications 
10/30/14 Neck and Back Pain; Diagnostic Review; Pain $185.00 
Management, Medications 
11/25/14 Neck and Back Pain; Continued Pain Management; $185.00 
Medications 
01/20/15 Neck and Back Pain; Right Sided Headaches; Pain $185.00 
to Rismt Trapezius; Pain Management, Medications 
03/26/15 Neck and Back Pain; Right Sided Headaches; Pain $185.00 
Management; Medication; Tnal of Propranol for 
HA 
05/26/15 Neck and Back Pain; Headaches; Side Affects with $191.00 
Propranol; Pain Management; Medications 
06/25/15 Neck and Back Pain; Headaches; Pain $191.00 
Management; Trial of Gabaoentin for HA 
08/24/15 Neck and Back Pain, Improvement with $128.00 
Headaches; Pain Management; Medications 
10/22/15 . Neck and Back Pain; Trigger Points; Pain $301.40 
Management; Medications; Tri2:2:er Point Iniections 
12/10/15 Neck and Back Pain; Worsening with Cold $191.00 
Weather; Pain Management; Medication; 
Temporary Relief with Trigger Point Iniections 
02/11/16 Neck and Back Pain; Stable; Pain Management; $191.00 
Medications, Slight Reduction in Opioid 
Medication 
04/14/16 Neck and Back Pain; Anxiety with Use of $191.00 
Cymbalta; Pain Management; Medications, 
DONALD WHITLEY, PH.D. -IDAHO PHYSICIANS CLINIC 
DATE OF SERVICE 
10/01/14 
CHIEF COMPLAINT/TREATMENT SYNOPSIS 
Initial Psychological Assessment/Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder, Uns ecified De ressive Disorder 
CHARGES 
$291 00 
On April 26, 2016, Ms. Klein began her treatment at the Family Medical Clinic in 
Chubbuck. At that time, Ms. Klein's chief complaints were noted as chronic back and neck pain 
and "headaches from her neck pain and shooting pams down both anns from her back pam." 
The care plan was for continued opiate therapy until she could be seen by Brittany Strong, 
FNPC. 
· Ms. Klein was able to see Ms. Strong on May 17, 2016. Ms. Strong's treatment plan 
included contmued opiate therapy, as well as a referral for consideration of medical branch 
blocks, facet injections, and Botox injections. 
4 
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On June 14, 2016, Ms. Strong referred Ms. Klein for an additional cervical and thoracic 
MRl which were both done on June 28, 2016, at Teton Radiology. The thoracic MRI indicated 
mild diffuse disc bulge at T6-7 with no significant stenosis, a right paracentral disc protrusion at 
T7•8-that slightly flattens the ventral spinal cord with no significant resultmg spinal stenosis, and 
mild diffuse disc bulge at T7-8 and T8-9 without significant resulting spmal stenosis. The 
cervical MRI indicated mild disc desiccation with no disc herniations or significant resulting 
spinal stenosis and was otherwise unremarkable. 
Ms. Klein continues to receive pain management treatment from Ms. Strong and Family 
Medical Clinic of Chubbuck 
FAMILY MEDICAL CLINIC OF CHUBBUCK 








DATE OF SERVICE 
06/28/16 
Chronic Neck and Back Pain; Assumption of Pain 
Management; Medications 
Chronic Neck and Back Pain; Continued Pain 
Management, Medications; Possible Referral for 
Medial Branch Block 
Chronic Neck and Back Pain; Continued Pain 
Management; Medications; Referral for Cervical 
and Thoracic MRI 
Chrome Neck and Back Pain; Contmued Pain 
Management; Medications; Referral for Medial 
Branch Block 
Chronic Neck and Back Pain; Continued Pain 
Management; Medications; 
Chronic Neck and Back Pain; Continued Pam 
Management; Medications; Referral to Dr. Joseph 
for Medial Branch Block 
Chronic Neck and Back Pain; Continued Pain 
Management; Recommended Tnal Botox for 
Migrame 
DR. PETER VANCE-TETON RADIOLOGY 
CHIEF COMPLAINT/TREATMENT SYNOPSIS 












Additionally, Ms. Klein was subsequently referred again to Dr. Anthony Joseph at 
Pocatello Orthopaedic and Sports Medicine Institute for further evaluation of other treatment 
opbons. Ms Klein returned to Dr. Joseph on September 22, 2016. At that time, Dr. Joseph 
confirmed that Ms. Klein was not a candidate for surgical intervention. As an alternative, he 
recommended a medial bundle-branch block at C3-4, C4-5 bilaterally to determine whether Ms. 




On September 29, 2016, Ms Klein underwent the medial branch blocks and obtained 
some partial relief of her pain symptoms. Her response was significant enough for Dr. Joseph to 
then recommend the procedure at CS-6, C6-7. On October 20, 2016, Ms Klein underwent 
additional blocks at these levels with similar results. Accordingly, Dr. Joseph believes Ms. Klein 
is a good candidate for the rhizotomy procedure. 
DR.ANTHONY JOSEPH 
POCATELLO ORTHOPAEDIC AND SPORTS MEDICINE INSTITUTE 
DATE OF SERVICE CHIEF COMPLAINT/TREATMENT SYNOPSIS CHARGES 
04/19/14 Chronic Neck and Back Pain/Stiffness, Initial $340 00 
Evaluation; Trigger Point Injections; Various 
Treatment Options Discussed 
09/22/16 Chrome Neck Pain w/ Radiation; Recommended $410.00 
Medial Branch Block at C3-4; C4-5 
09/29/16 Medial Branch Block Procedure Bilaterally at C3- $1,542.00 
4, C4-5 
10/12/16 Chronic Neck Pam; Follow Up- Excellent Partial $110.00 
Relief from Block; Recommend Medial Branch 
Blocks at C5-6;C6-7 and radio frequency 
rhizotomy 
10/20/16 Chronic Neck Pain; Medial Branch Blocks $545.00 
Bilaterally at CS-6, C6-7 
ASSESSMENT OF PAST MEDICAL SPECIALS 
In addition to the provider charges, Ms. Klein has incurred costs associated with her 
medication. However, we are sttll attempting to obtain these specific charges. Nevertheless, a 
summary of the medical expenses incurred to date is as follows: 
PROVIDER DATES OF SERVICE TOTALBILL 
Dr. Amy Reid - PortneufNetµUsciences 10/30/12-08/22/14 $1,628.00 
and Rehabilitation Clinic 
Dr. Jonathan Morgan - Portneuf Medical 03/20/13 $352.00 
Practice Division 
Dr. Jared Wagner - Bingham Memorial 09/30/14 - 04/14/16 $2,419.40 
Hospital Idaho Pain Group 
Dr. Donald Whitley - Idaho Physicians 10/01/14 $291.00 
Clinic 
Family Medical Clinic of Chubbuck 04/26/16 - 10/11/16 $1,245.00 
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Dr. Peter Vance - Teton Rad10logy 06/28/16 $2,296.00 
Dr. Anthony Joseph - Pocatello 04/19/14; $2,947.00 
Orthopaedic and Sports Medicine 
09/22/ff,- 10/20/16 Institute 
-
Medications $ TBD 
TOTAL $11,187.40 
ASSESSMENT OF FUTURE MEDICAL SPECIALS 
Ms. Klein is currently evaluating her future treatment options. As noted above, she has 
been trying to find some consistent pain relief other than through the use of medication. Ms. 
Klein is advised that her best treatment options include the medial bundle-branch rhizotomy 
procedure and/or Botox injections as recommended by Dr. Joseph. However, neither of these 
options represent as a permanent solution to resolving Ms. Klem's pain complaints. Under either 
option Ms. Klein will be required to repeat the treatment mde:finitely so long as it continues to be 
effective. The goal 1s to afford Ms. Klem some extended periods of pain relief and allow her to 
reduce or potentially even eliminate the need for pain medication. 
I am working on getting an expense estimate for each procedure so that we have a better 
understandmg of the anticipated future medical expenses Ms. Klein is likely to incur. 
Nevertheless, it is anticipated this future expense will be significant and must therefore be 
considered in any final resolution of Ms. Klein's claim 
ASSESSMENT OF GENERAL DAMAGES 
The bulk of Ms. Klein's claim lies within her general damages. At this point she is seven 
years post-accident and continues to experience significant daily pain as a result of the February 
1, 2010 accident As noted m Dr. Whitley's psychological assessment, the physical and 
emotional impact has reached into every aspect of Ms. Klein's life. She is no longer the person 
she was prior to the accident, nor will she ever be. Indeed, it seems evident that her injuries are 
permanent in nature and it now becomes a matter of how to best address her ongoing daily pain 
Unfortunately, even if successful, the recommended treatment options will require Ms. Klem to 
undergo repeated rhizotomy procedures and/or Botox injections into the foreseeable future to 
manage her pain which means her life will continue to be indefinitely disrupted her injuries. 
DEMAND 
Based on the foregoing, there is sufficient information to warrant an evaluation of Ms. 
Klein's UIM claim beyond the remaining available benefits of$400,000. As such, we would 
make demand for the same. Should Farmers disagree with this assessment, I believe your 
suggestion to try to resolve this claim through mediation is appropriate so long as Farmers' 
evaluation reasonably takes into consideration the permanent nature of Ms. Klein' injury and 




I look forward to speaking with you further about this claim and the options available to 








2. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Ryan Lewis 
to Farmers Insurance dated December 14, 2010. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit 2 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Ryan Lewis 
to Farmers Insurance dated November 7, 2012. The more than 400 pages of 
supporting documents that were included with the original letter are not being 
produced as they are not relevant to the issue presented in this motion. 
4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 3 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Farmers 
Insurance to Ryan Lewis dated December 12, 2012. 
5. Attached hereto as Exhibit 4 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Farmers 
Insurance to Ryan Lewis dated December 13, 2012. 
6. Attached hereto as Exhibit 5 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Ryan S. Lewis 
to Farmers Insurance dated January 30, 2013. 
7. Attached hereto as Exhibit 6 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Farmers 
Insurance to Ryan Lewis's law firm dated July 7, 2013. 
8. Attached hereto as Exhibit 7 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Farmers 
Insurance to Ryan Lewis dated November 5, 2013. 
9. Attached hereto as Exhibit 8 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Farmers 
Insurance to Ryan Lewis dated December 1, 2013. 
10. Attached hereto as Exhibit 9 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Farmers 
Insurance to Ryan Lewis dated January 22, 2014. 
11. Attached hereto as Exhibit 10 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Kenneth E. 
Lyon, III to Farmers Insurance dated July 7, 2016. 
DECLARATION OF GARY L. COOPER IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT - PAGE 2 
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12. Attached hereto as Exhibit 11 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Farmers 
Insurance to Kenneth E. Lyon, III dated August 12, 2016. 
13. Attached hereto as Exhibit 12 is a true and correct copy of a letter from Kenneth E. 
Lyon, III to Farmers Insurance dated February 7, 2017. 
-,.s-t 
DATED this~ day of February, 2018. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
.Jf 
I hereby certify that on thel!..:.__ day of February, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to: 
Kenneth E. Lyon, III 
Attorney at Law 
10389 Double R Blvd 
Reno, NV 89521 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
5785 Rio Vista Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 
[4 U.S. mail 
[ ] 
[ ] 




[ ~ Electronic: ken@lyonlaw.net 





[ ] Facsimile: 
GARY L. COOPER 
!.com 







Law Offices of · · 
LOWELL N. HAWKES, CHARTERED 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 8320 I 
Licensed in Idaho and Utah (208) 235-1600 Fax (208) 235-4200-
December 14, 20 I 0 
VIA HAND-DELIVERY 
Mr. Michael D. Morrissey 
Farmers Insurance 
Claims Representative 
2520 South 5th Avenue 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204 
Re: Erica Klein 
Claim Number: 
Date of Crash: 
Dear Mr. Morrisey: 
l O l 5457772-1-5 
F~bruary 1, 2010 
This letter is sent in follow-up to our telephone discussions regarding the 
inj~ry of Erica Klein and your underinsured claim number 1015457772-1-5. Per your 
request I have included the documents which I recently forwarded to Allstate Insurance 
relative to her third-party claim against Seth Hale who crashed into her. 
Allstate has represented to me the minimum limit of $25,000 liability 
insurance coverage. Pursuant to our discussions, I told you that I had conveyed an offer 
of settlement for the policy limit subject to confirmation that it was in fact the limit. I 
have not yet heard back from Allstate. 
Enclosed with this letter are documents labeled. Kiein v. Hale-1 through 
176. 
As we discussed, Erica suffered significant injuries. MRI results show she 
suffered three disc protrusions, including a "Right paramedial disc protrusion T7-T8 and 
T8-T9 with localized impression on the ventral dural sac. At T7-T8 there is localized 
contact with the right ventral thoracic cord. No spinal stenosis or neuroforaminal 
narrowing" and "t11ild straightening of the cervical spine with sit allow cental disc bulge 





Mr. Mike Morrisey 
December 14, 2010 
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To date, Erica continues to live with the pain caused by the disc injuries 
including the nerve contact and which is well documented in the enclosed records. · 
T-bone Crash Facts 
On February 1, 2010, Erica was involved in a t-bohe crash, wherein Seth A. 
Hale failed to yield and crashed into Erica. See, Accident Report Insurance Information. 
Klein v. Hale~1- Mr. Hale was charged with violating Idaho Code§ 49-642, which states: 
49-642. Vehicle entering highway. The driver of a vehicle 
about to enter or cross a highway from any place other than 
another highway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles 
approaching on the highway to be entered or crossed. 
Mr. Hale pied guilty to that violation. Klein v. Hale-2 through 3. 
That failure to yield the right of way resulted in the "T-bone" crash which 
injured Erica and resulted in significant property damage as we discussed. 
Portneuf Medical Center • 
,On that same day, she was treated was first treated at PortneufMedical 
Center after the crash with Complaint of "Motorized Vehicle Injury." Klein v. Hale-11. 
The notes states: 
"Patient was involved in motor vehicle crash, was driver, 
speed of patient at time of accident was 15-25 mph, speed of 
other object was 15-25 mph, s~ruck on passenger side by 
another vehicle (t-boned), Patient was wear lap/shoulder belt. 
Severe amount of vehicular damage.'' 
- Klein v. Hale-13. 
She reported with "back pain, injury." Klein v. Hale-12. She was 
discharged with "acute back strain" and additional diagnosis "Motor vehicle accident," 
stating "You have suffered injuries in a car crash." Klein v. Hale-7, 11, 15. She was 
billed $209.00 by Rocky Mountain Emergency Physicians. Klein v. Hale-18-21. She was 




Mr. Mike Morrisey 
December 14, 2010 
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MRis-Three Disc Protrusions 
Subsequently, and as discussed below she received a Thoracic MRJ and 
Cervical MR1 which identified two thoracic and one cervical disc protrusions: 
Right paramedial disc protrusion T7-T8 and T8-T9 with 
localized impression on the ventral dural sac. At T7-T8 there 
is localized contact wit!, tlte rig!,t ventral tltoracic cord. No 
spina~ stenosiss or neuroforaminal narrowing." 
* * * 
"The cervical MRI shows mild straightening of the cervical 
spine with shallow cental disc bulge at C5-C6. No spinal 
stenosis or neuroforaminal narrowing." 
- Klein v. Hale-24 through 28. 
She incurred $3,882.00 for that MRis and $544.00 ($273.00 and $271.00) 
for reading those March 9, 2010 MRis. Klein v. Hale-22, 23, 134. 
Pocatello Family Medicine 
On February 4, 2010, four days after the crash she treated at Pocatello 
Family Medicine for "mva upper back pain" and presented with "stabbing aching" "upper 
back pain" which included "neck pain" and lower and extending "into the 
shoulderblades" with "pain overall" at 8-9 on a scale of 10. Klein v. Hale-32. She was 
prescribed "vicodin and robaxin for pain" but the medication "doesn't seem to help" but 
the pain is better laying on her back in bed with the heating pad on which lowers the pain 
to a 6-7 out of 10. Klein v. Hale-32. She was diagnosed with "Cervical Strain, Acute" 
and "Thoracic Strain" "secondary to MV A". and was prescribed skelaxin, percocet, and 
Naprosyn for pain and spasms. Klein v. Hale- 34. 
Among other things, she was ordered off work. Klein v. Hale-29 through 
31. Since the crash she has worked, but continues to suffer significant pain both at and 
away from work. 
On February 11, 20 I 0, she returned "in so much pain that they haven't been 
able to do a lot of the therapy that they would normally do" and t}lat even "the massage 
has ... been difficult because of the pain." Klein v. Hale-36. When she is not working 
"she manages her pain with the pain meds ~ prescribed." The pain remains "severe" and 
"in the upper thoracic region" and her blood pressure which is generally normal is 
elevated and she is now in "constant pain." ,:Klein v. Hale-36, 37. 
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On February 18, 2010 she returned for "throbbing" pain in her back and that 
there has been "some improvement" but she does not like being off of \Vork." Klein v. 
Hale-39. 
On February 22, 2010 she returned with continued "back pain" and that 
"today has been very tough" with pain at 7 out of l 0. She received trigger point 
injections for the thoracic strain and continued with elevated blood pressure like due to 
the pain. Klein v. Hale-42. 
On February 25, 2010 she was seen in follow-up for "back pain" and for 
medication refills. She went to physical therapy after trigger point injections and it 
helped but she still had pain that they were not able to resolved with massage or do other 
manipulation. She is feeling pain mainly in the left upper back and "it is still severe" with 
it "worse with pressure applied." Physical therapy electronic stimulus and ultrasound 
help, but only "a little" as do trigger point injections; however the relief "is very 
temporary" and the Naprosyn is making her sick, patient "has had extreme tenderness and 
tears during" the exam. Klein v. Hale-44, 45. · 
She was referred to a Pain Specialist. Klein v. Hale-45. 
For those visits, February 4, 11, 18, 22, 25 Ms. Klein incurred $989.00: 
Provider Date of Service Amount Documents 
Pocatello Family Medicine 2/4/10 $144.00 Klein v. Hale-134 
2/11/10 $98.00 Klein v. Hale-47 
2/18/10 $373.50 Klein v. Hale-134 
2/22/10 $275.50 Klein v. Hale-48 
2/25/10 $98.00 Klein v. Hale-49 
TOTAL $989.00 
Portneuf Pain Specialists 
Based on a referral from Pocatello Family Medicine, Ms. Klein began 
treating with Dr. Arny L. Reid, M.D. at Portneuf Pain Specialists on March 8, 2010. The 
history explains the crash of February I, 2010, wherein Ms. Klein was T-Boned and hit 
her door and developed back pain and was started on physical therapy. Klein v. Hale-50. 
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0 
Ms. Klein described her pain in midT,ack, neck and to her posterior left should" and that 
she has muscle spasms. Klein v. Hala-50. Also, that she has "aching, stabbing, burning-
type pain to her mid back which is more on the left than the right, and pain in her legs 
when she sits/stands for too long. Klein v. Hale-SO. She had a normal thoracic spine xray 
at Portneuf Medical. Kleln v. Hale-50. Physical therapy is helping but "many times she 
is unable to tolerate it because of the pain." Klein v. Hale-50. Ms. Klein also has had 
"trouble sleeping at night because of the pain." Kl~in v. Hale-51. 
Dr. Reid's initial assessment was "Cervical and thoracic spine pain and 
muscle spasms." Klein v. Hale-51. However, because Ms. Klein has not had "much 
relief from treatments with physical therapy and medications and rest, and she is having 
skin sensation disturbances", Dr. Reid ordered "a cervical and thoracic MRI." Klein v. 
Hale-51. 
After the MRis Ms. Klein returned to Dr. Reid on March 15, 2010. Dr. 
Reid discussed the cervical and thoracic MRI results as follows: 
"The cervical MRI shows mild straightening of the cervical 
spine with shallow centa/ disc bulge at C5-C6. No spinal 
stenosis or neuroforaminal narrowing." 
* * * 
"The thoracic MRI showed mild disc dessication and disc 
space narrowing at T6-T7 and T9-Tl O. Right paramedial disc 
protrusion T7-T8 and T8-T9 with localized impression on the 
ventral dural sac at T7-T8. There is localized contact with the 
right ventral thoracic cord. No spinal stenosiss or 
neuroforaminal narrowing." 
- Klein v. Hale-53; Klein v. Hale-24 through 28. 
•Erica returned to Dr. Reid on March 29, 2010 for "management of her mid 
back pain, neck pain", noting the "significant amount of tenderness to palpation over the 
thorasic paraspinal muscle." Klein v. Hare-56. She continued her on physical therapy 
with possible referral for epidural steroid injections. Klein v. Hale-56, 
Erica returned to Dr. Reid on April 23, 20 IO for "management of her mid 
back pain, neck pain", with "a little bit more pain in the upper thoracic spine area." Klein 
v. Hale-58. Dr. Klein referred her for evaluation "for transforaminal epidural steroid 
injections to her thoracic and cervical spine" and continued physical therapy. Klein v. 
Hale-58. Her assessment remained "mid back pain with thoracic disc protrusions", "neck 
pain" and "muscle spasm." Klein v. Hale-58. 
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Erica incurred $1,015.00 to date with Dr. Amy Reid: 
I Provider I Date of Service I Amount 
Portneuf Pain Specialists/ 3/8/10 $366.00' 
Portneuf Medical Practices/ 








Klein v. Hale-134 
Klein v. Hale-134 
Klein v. Hale-134 
Klein v. Hale-63 
Klein v. Hale-1 SO 
Klein v. Hale-151 
Portneuf Medical Center's Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 
Dr. Reid referred Ms. Klein for epidural steroid injection. Klein v. Hale• 
156. Dr. Traul diagnosed "T6 through T9 lterniated n~cleus pulposus secondary to 
motor vehicle accident." Klein v. Hale-168. 
Erica received thoracic epidural injections on April 30, 20 IO for herniated 
nucleus pulposus, based upon a motor vehicle crash in February 2010 where she 
experienced thoracic back pain, with disk protrusion at T7-8 and T8-9 with localized 
impression on the ventral dural sac, giving rise to "chronic thoracic back pain." Klein v. 
Hale-161. 
I 
She received a second injection on May 26, 2010, as well as trigger point 
injection. Kl~in v. Hale-175 through 176. She returned on June 14, 20 IO after IO days of 
relief from the prior injection for a third thoracic epidural steroid injection. Klein v. Hale-
168, 169. These injections provide relief only for weeks at a time. Klein v. Hala.168. 
Superior Physical Therap):'. 
As set forth above, Ms. Klein was prescribed and received, physical 
therapy. Kiel~ v. Hale-68. Her first treatment scheduled by Pocatello Family Medicine 
was February 5, 2010. Klein v. Hale-68. 
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Erica's first visit notes state that her chief complaint is pain, stiffness, 
decreased range of motion and decreased function which were "onset" on "2/1/1 O" and 
"Secondary to an MV A." Her current pain scale at rest is 7 out of 10 and with activity is 
10 out of l 0. The symptoms are aggravated by among other things either sitting or 
standing. Klein v. Hale-69. The assessment was "pain; impairment to functional 
activities and· other [activities of daily living]; impaired posture; impaired muscle 
performance; impaired joint mobility; impaired motor function; [ and] impaired range of 
motion." Kleln v. Hale-69 • 
.She continued to treat 2/5, 2/8, 2/10, 2/l 2, 2/16, 2/17, 2/18, 2/22, 2/24, 2/26, 
3/l, 3/3, 3/5, 3/8, 3/10, 3/15, 3/17, 3/19, 3/24, 3/26, 3/29, 3/31, 4/14. Klein v. Hale 69-81. 
Ms. Klein incurred $2,898.78 for these visits. Klein v. Hale 82-97. 
Additional Out-Of-Pocket Expenses 
Ms. Klein also incurred additional out-of-pocket expenses for prescriptions, 
massage, and comfort items and as follows: 
I Provider I Descri~tion I Date I Amount I Doc I 
Walgreen's Pharmacy Hydrocondone 2/1/10 0.33 Klein v. Hale-107, 
122,123 
Walgreen's Pharmacy Methocarbamol 2/1/10 0.41 Klein v. Hale-109, 
122,123 
Walgreen's Pharmacy Thermipaq (plus 2/1/10 13.77 Klein v. Hale-112, 
tax) 123 
Walgreen's Pharmacy Soma 2/3/10 19.94 Klein v. Hale-109, 
110,122 
Albertsons/Savon Prescription 2/6/10 57.03 Klein v. Hale-108, 
Pharmacy 114,122,124 
Albertsons/Savon Prescription 2/4/10 0.81 Klein v. Hale-111, 
Pharmacy 115,122,124 
Albertsons/Savon Prescription 2/4/10 1.95 Klein v. Hale-111, 
Pharmacy 115,122,124 
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I Descrietion I Date I Amount 
Prescription 2/11/10 1.95 
Massage 2/15/10 $65.00 
Prescription 2/17/10 21.85 
Prescriptions/ Icy 2/25/10 33.11 
Hot Back Patch 
Prescription 3/11/10 10.00 
Prescription 3/15/10 48.39 
' 
Prescription 3/29/10 5.00 
Prescription 4/9/10 10.00 
Prescription 5/9/10 5.00 
Prescription 5/13/10 5.00 
TOTAL $266.14 
Subro~ation Claims of $16,525.36 
I Doc 
Klein v. Hale-113 
Klein v. Hale-98 
Klein v. Hale-116, 
117 
Klein v. Hale-101, 
102,129,131 
Klein v. Hale-101, 
102,130,132 
Klein v. Hale-101, 
102,128,133 
Klein v. Hale-105, 
106, 127 
Klein v. Hale-103, 
104,127 
Klein v. Hale-120, 
121 
Klein v. Hale-118, 
119 
Farmers, and her health insurer UMR have asserted subrogation claims. 
Klein v. Hale;134 through 151. 
I 
Based upon all of the foregoing Erica requests written authorization to settle 
the underlying claim with Seth Hale for the represented $25,000 policy limit, in the event 
that Allstate accepts that offer. Additionally, please advise whether Farmers will waive 
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Finally, please also confirm that you made no property damage payments 
which would need to be reimbursed through Mr. Hale's insurance. 
Sincerely, 
RSL/ 
Enclosures: Supporting documents labeled Klein v. Hale-1 through 176 
cc: Erica Klein 
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VIA U.S. MAIL 
Mr.MichaelD.Morrissey 
Farmers Insurance 
National Document Center 
P.O. Box 268994 
Oklahoma City, OK 73126-8994 
Re: Erica Klein 
Claim Number: 
Date of Crash: 





2520 South 5th Avenue 
Pocatello, Idaho 83204 
1015457772-1-5 
February 1, 2010 
This letter is sent in follow-up to our recent telephone conversation and 
your prior letter requesting the documentation relative to Ms. Klein's UTh1 claim. This 
letter and attached supporting documents are Ms. Klein's Proof of Loss relative to her 
Underinsured Motorists claim and is being submitted pursuant to Idaho Code § 41-1839. 
Enclosed with this Proof of Loss is a CD which contains .pdf files of 
documents, medical records, medical records five years prior to the crash, and medical 
billings supporting Ms. Klein's claim and which are Bates Stamped KLElNUlM - 1 
through 431. You have requested Ms. Klein's medical records for the five years prior to 
the crash, which are enclosed as KLEINUIM 266 though 382. Also included is an 
Authorization for Release of Information that is left blank as to the provider so that should 
Farmers elect to request any medical records for Ms. Klein for up to five years prior to the 
crash through the present, it may expeditiously do so, subject to copying counsel on any 
request, and copying counsel on any documents/records received. See, KLEINUIM - 432. 
Please note that the medical records and Authorization for Release of 
Information are produced only for purposes of this claim and are not produced to 
Fann,ers for any other purpose, nor with permission to maintain them on a computer or 
database, in anyway, other than for purposes of this claim. We further object, and do not 
consent to, the review, release or disclosure of these records, or their contents to any 
person or entity, other than as required specifically for the limited' purpose of this case. If 
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You will note herein that lv1RI results show that Ms. Klein suffered disc 
protrusions, including a ''Right paramedial disc protrusion T7-T8 and T8-T9 with 
localized impression on the ventral dural sac. At T7-T8 there is localized contact witlt 
tlte rigltt ventral thoracic cord. No spinal stenosis or neuroforaniinal narrowing" and 
central disc bulge at C3-4 with "slight impression on the ventral thecal sac" and a central 
disc bulge at C5-6 and straightening of the cervical spine associated with muscular spasm. 
KLEINUIM • 24 through 28 and 212 through 213. 
The records produced herein evidence that less than three weeks prior to the 
crash, on January 15, 2010, Ms. Klein had an annual exam and that among other notes, 
the provider stated as to the muscliloskeletal portion of the exam, "denies joint pain and 
back pain" and that the exam showed "no deformity or scoliosis noted of thoracic or 
lumbar spine" nor was there any indication of any similar thoracic or cervical pains. 
KLEINUIM • 379 through 380. 
Erica suffered and continues to suffer with substantial pain caused by the 
disc injuries which is well documented in the enclosed records. Prior to the crash, Erica 
was historically a very active and outgoing person who loved to constantly be doing 
things and staying busy. However, since that crash, she has suffered daily chronic 
back/neck pain. While previously she felt she was a very strong person, with high pain 
tolerance, her chronic pain has made her feel vulnerable and weak. As is the case with 
chronic pain, it has changed her life for the worse; she cries frequently, and often feels 
depressed. 
T-bone Crash Facts 
On February I, 2010, Erica was involved in a T-bone crash, wherein Seth 
A. Hale failed to yield and crashed into Erica. See, Accident Report Insurance 
Infom1ation. KLEINUIM - 1. Mr. Hale was charged with violating Idaho Code § 49-642, 
which states: 
49-642.Vehicle entering highway. The driver of a vehicle 
about to enter or cross a highway from any place other than 
another highway shall yield the right-of-way to all vehicles 
approaching on the highway to be entered or crossed. 
:Mr. Hale pled guilty to that violation. KLEINUIM • 2 through 3. That 
failure to yield the right of way resulted in the "T-bone'' crash. 
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Acknowledgment of Liability 
ijy this letter we request that Farmers aclmowledge, in any response, that 
the crash was 100% caused by Seth Hale. 
IfFanners is making any contention that there is any contributory 
negligence or third~party negligence please provide the specific facts supporting that 
contention. 
PortneufMedical Center 
Ms. Klein treated at PortneufMedical Center after the crash with complaint 
of"Motorized Vehicle Injury." KLEINUIM -11. Her medical record states: 
''Patient was involved in motor vehicle crash, was driver, 
speed of patient at time of accident was 15-25 mph, speed of 
other object was 15-25 mph, struck on passenger side by 
another vehicle (t-boned), Patient was wear lap/shoulder belt. 
Severe amount of vehicular damage." 
- KLEINUIM - 13. 
She reported with "back pain, injury'' and "appears to be in pain'' and "is 
emotional and crying as she discusses the stress of the accident." KLEINUIM -12. The 
physical exam stated: "mid.line tenderness in the upper back area. There is paraspinal 
tenderness in the upper back. There is paraspinal tenderness in the mid-back." 
KLEINUIM - 13. The nursing notes state: "p[ atien ]t presents to the ed [ emergency 
department] c/o [ complaining ofJ mid to upper back pain after being in a MVC [motor 
vehicle crash]." KLEINUIM - 13. She was discharged with "acute back strain" and 
additional diagnosis "Motor vehicle accident," stating ''You have suffered injuries in a car 
crash." KLEINUIM - 7, 11, 15. She incurred $209 .00 with Rocky Mountain Emergency 
Physicians. KLEINUIM -18, 21. She also incurred $538.61 with PortneufMedical 
Center. KLEINUIM - 17, 19 through 20. 
MRis - Disc Protrusions 
Subsequently, on March 9, 2010, and as discussed below, Dr. Amy Reid 
ordered both a Thoracic :MRI and Cervieal :MRI which identified two thoracic and one 
cervical disc protrusions: 
' 
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"Right paramedial disc protrusion T7-T8 and T8-T9 with 
localized impression on the ventral dural sac. At T7-T8 there 
is localized contact witli tlte right ventral thoracic cord. No 
spinal stenosiss or neuroforaminal narrowing." 
*** 
"The cervical lv.1RI shows mild straightening of the cervical 
spine with shallow cental disc bulge at C5-C6. No spinal 
stenosis or neuroforaminal narrowing." 
- KLEINUIM - 24 through 28. 
Ms. Klein incurred $3,882.00 at Portneuf Medical Center for the iv1Rls and 
$544.00 ($273.00 and $271.00) for reading those March 9, 201011R.Is. KLEINUIM - 22, 
23,134. 
Pocatello Family Medicine 
On Februazy 4, 2010, four days after the crash Ms. Klein treated at 
Pocatello Family Medicine for "mva upper back pain" and presented with "stabbing 
aching'' "upper back pain" which included "neck pain,, and lower and extending "into the 
shoulderblades" with "pain overall" at 8-9 on a scale of 10. KLEINUIM - 32. She was 
prescribed "vicodin and robaxin for pain" but the medication "doesn't seem to help" but 
the pain is better laying on her back in bed with the heating pad on which lowers the pain 
to a 6-7 out of IO. KLEINUIM - 32. She was diagnosed with "Cervical Strain, Acute" and 
"Thoracic Strain" "secondary to "MY A" and was prescribed skelaxin, percocet, and 
Naprosyn for pain and spasms. KLEINUIM - 34. Among other things, she was ordered off 
work. KLEINUIM - 29 through 31. 
On Februazy 11, 2010, she returned "in so much pain that they haven't been 
able to do a lot of the therapy that they would normally do" and that even "the massage 
has ... been difficult because of the pain." KLEINUIM - 36. When she is not working 
"she manages her pain with the pain meds as prescribed." The pain remains "severe" and 
"in the upper thoracic region" and her blood pressure w.hich is generally normal is 
elevated and she is now in "constant pain." KLEINUIM - 36, 37. 
On February 18, 20 IO she returned for "throbbing" pain in her back and that 
there has been "some improvement" but "she does not like being off of work." 
KLElNU!M • 39. 
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On February 22, 2010 she returned with continued "back pain" and that 
"today has been very tough" with pain at 7 out of 10. She received trigger point 
injections for the thoracic strain and continued with elevated blood pressure likely due to 
the pain. KLEINUIM .. 42. 
On February 25, 2010 she was seen in follow-up for "back pain" and for 
medication refills. She went to physical therapy after trigger point injections and it 
helped but she still had pain that they were not able to resolve with massage or do other 
manipulation. She is feeling pain mainly in the left upper back and "it is still severe" with 
it "worse with pressure applied." Physical therapy electronic stimulus and ultrasound 
help, but only "a little" as do trigger point injections; however the relief "is very 
temporary" and the Naprosyn is malting her sick, patient ''has had extreme tenderness and 
tears during" the exam. KLEINUIM .. 44, 45. 
Ms. Klein was referred to Pain Specialist, Dr. Amy Reid, whose treatment 
is set forth below. KLEINUIM .. 45. 
Ms. Klein has incurred $989.00 to date with Pocatello Family Medicine: 
I Provider I Date of Service I Amount I Documents I 
Pocatello Family Medicine· 2/4/10 $144.00 KLEINUIM • 134 
Pocatello Family Medicine 2/11/10 $98.00 KLEINUIM • 47 
Pocatello Family Medicine 2/18/10 $373.50 KLEINUIM -134 
Pocatello Family Medicine 2/22/10 $275.50 KLEINUIM - 48 
Pocatello Family Medicine 2/25/10 $98.00 KLEINUIM - 49 
TOTAL $989.00 
Portneuf Pain Specialists - Dr. Amy Reid 
Based on a referral from Pocatello Family Medicine, Ms. Klein began 
treating with Dr. Amy Reid, M.D. at Portneuf Pain Specialists on March 8, 2010. Dr. 
Reid's medical history explains the crash of February 1, 2010, wherein Ms. Klein was T-
boned and hit her door and developed back pain and was started on physical therapy. 
KLEINUIM .. 50. Ms. Klein described her pain in "mid back, neck and to her posterior left 
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shoulder" and that she has muscle spasms. KLEINUIM-- 50. Also, that she has "aching, 
stabbing, burning-type pain to her mid back which is more on the left than the right, and 
pain in her legs when she sits/stands for too long." KLEINUIM • 50. She had a normal 
thoracic spine xray at Portneuf Medical. KLEINUIM - 50. Physical therapy is helping but 
"many times she is unable to tolerate it because of the pain." KLEINUIM - 50. Ms. Klein 
also has had "trouble sleeping at night because of the pam." KLEINUIM. 51. 
Dr. Reid's initial assessment was "Cervical and thoracic spine pain and 
muscle spasms." KLEINUIM - 51. Because Ms. Klein has not had "much relief from 
treatments with physical therapy and medications and rest, and she is having skin 
sensation disturbances" Dr. Reid ordered "a cervical and thoracic lv.llU." KLEINUIM - 51. 
After the 1v1R.Is Ms. Klein returned to Dr. Reid on March 15, 2010. Dr. 
Reid discussed the cervical and thoracic IvIRI results as foIIows: 
"The cervical lv.llU shows mild straightening of the cervical 
spine with shallow cental disc bulge at C5-C6. No spinal 
stenosis or neuroforaminal narrowing." 
* * * 
"The thoracic MRI showed mild disc dessication and disc 
space narrowing at T6-T7 and T9-T10. Right paramedial disc 
protrusion T7-T8 and T8-T9 with localized impression on the 
ventral dural sac at T7-T8. There is localized contact with the 
right ventral thoracic cord. No spinal stenosiss or 
neuroforaminal narrowing." 
- KLEINUIM - 53; 24 through 28. 
Ms. Klein returned to Dr. Reid on March 29, 2010 for "management of her 
mid back pain, neck pain" noting the "significant amount of tenderness to palpation over 
the thoracic paraspinal muscle." KLEINUIM - 56. She continues her on physical therapy 
with possible referral for epidural steroid injections. KLEINUIM - 56. 
Ms. Klein returned to Dr. Reid on April 23, 2010 for "management of her 
mid back pain, neck pain" with "a little bit more pain in the upper thoracic spine area.'' 
KLEINUIM - 58. Dr. Reid referred her for evaluation "for transforaminal epidural steroid 
injections to her thoracic and cervical spine" and continued physical therapy. KLEINUIM -
58. Her assessment remained "mid back pain with thoracic disc protrusions, "neck pain'' 
and "muscle spasm." KLEINUIM - 58. 
Page 73
"('' L 
Mr. Mike Morrissey 
November 7, 2012 
Page - 7 
On May 25, 2010, Ms. Klein returned to Dr. Reid after her first epidural 
injection for "followup today for management of her chronic mid back pain and neck 
pain. She has thoracic disc dessication and disc bulges of her cervical spine." KLEINUIM 
- 195. Dr. Reid referenced the one-week of pain relief: but then the pain returned. 
KLEINUIM • 195. She also referenced the followup epidural. KLEINUIM - 195. 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 
Dr. Reid referred Ms. Klein for epidural steroid injection. KLEINUIM -156. 
Dr. Traul diagnosed "T6 through T9 herniated nucleus pulposus secondary to motor 
velzicle accident." KLEINUIM - 168. 
Erica received thoracic epidural injections on April 30, 2010 for herniated 
nucleus pulposus, based upon a motor vehicle crash in Februacy 2010 where she 
experienced thoracic back pain, with disk protrusion at T7-8 and T8-9 with localized 
impression on the ventral dural sac, giving rise to "chronic thoracic back pain." 
KLEINUIM - 152 through 161, 177 through 178. 
She received a second epidural injection on May 26, 2010, as well as trigger 
point injection. KLEINUIM - 170 through 176, 179 through 180. She returned on June 
14, 2010 after 10 days of relief from the prior injection for a third thoracic epidural 
steroid injection. KLEINUIM -163 through 169, 181 through 182. 
These injections did not provide long-standing relief, with return to baseline 
pain levels. KLEINUIM - 179. 
Ms. Klein incurred $2,612.68 with the Rocky Mountain Surgery Center, and 
$4,196.00 with Anesthesia Associates for those injections: 
I Provider I Date of Service I Amount I Doc I 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 4/30/10 $50.00 KLEINUIM - 190 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 4/30/10 $87.00 KLEINUIM • 190 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 4/30/10 $498.56 KLEINUIM - 190 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 4/30/10 $75.00 KLEINUIM .. 190' 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 4/30/10 $75.00 KLEINUIM -190 
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I Provider 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 
Rocky Mountain Surgery Center 











I Date of Service I Amount I Doc I 
4/30/10 $128.00 KLEINUIM .. 190 
5/26/10 $498.56 KLEINUIM - 190 
5/26/10 $50.00 KLEINUIM -190 
5/26/10 $87.00 KLEINUIM - 191 
5/26/10 $75.00 KLEINUIM - 191 
5/26/10 $75.00 KLEINUIM - 191 
6/14/10 $50.00 KLEINUIM .. 191 
6/14/10 $87.00 KLEINUIM - 191 
6/14/10 $498.56 KLEINUIM - 191 
6/14/10 $75.00 KLEINUIM .. 191 
6/14/10 $75.00 KLEINUIM - 191 
6/14/10 $128.00 KLEINUIM - 192 
$2,612.68 
I Date of Service I Amount I Doc I 
4/30/10 $80.00 KLEINUIM - 193 
4/30/10 $612.00 KLEINUIM - 193 
4/30/10 $204.00 KLEINUIM - 193 
4/30/10 $80.00 KLEINUIM - 193 
5/26/10 $1,224.00 KLEINUIM - 193 
5/26/10 $1,020.00 KLEINUIM - 193 
5/26/10 $80.00 KLEINUlM - 194 
6/14/10 $612.00 KLEINUIM - 194 
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Provider 
. Anesthesia Associates 
Anesthesia Associates 
TOTAL 




Portneuf Pain Specialists - Dr. Amy Reid 
Doc 
KLEINUIM .. 194 
KLEINUIM ~ 194 
On October 8, 2010, Ms. Klein returned for on-going pain management to 
Dr. Reid with ongoing pain and worried that the pain "is going to continue" and that it 
may be a pain that does not resolve at all. KLEINUIM .. 196. Dr. Reid referred Ms. Klein 
for acupuncture and advised to follow-up with her again in two months. KLEINUIM -196. 
Ms. Klein returned to Dr. Reid on January 28, 2011, for followup of her 
"chronic mid back pain and neck pain" and "disc bulges of her cervical spine and thoracic 
disc dessication'' and "has had steroid injections in the past which have not provided 
relief." KLEINUIM -198. 
Ms. Klein returned on April 8, 2011, "developing more headaches she says 
in the back of her head when she wakes up" that Dr. Reid stated "may be related to tight 
neck muscles/' KLEINUIM - 200. Pain is seven out of ten. KLEINUIM - 200. 
·· Ms. Klein returned on May 6, 2011, with "neck pain with disc bulges, 
muscles spasms, and headaches related to muscle spasms" and in followup to the 
beginning ofneurontin. KLEINUIM .. 200. Pain is seven out often. KLEINUIM .. 202. 
Ms. Klein returned to Dr. Reid on August 5, 2011, with thoracic disk 
protrusions, burning pain, headaches related to muscle spasms." KLEINUIM •, 204. Pain 
is still seven out often. KLEINUIM • 204. 
Ms. Klein returned to Dr. Reid on November 4, 2011, with thoracic disk 
protrusions, burning pain, headaches related to muscle spasms" and she "continues to get 
the burning in her mid back and site is getting radiati1tg pain to lter rigltt upper 
extremity." KLEINUIM -206. Dr. Reid "offer[ed] to refer for surgical evaluation." 
KLEINUIM -207. 
Page 76
Mr. Mike Morrissey 
November 7, 2012 
Page-10 
Ms. Klein returned to Dr. Reid on December 5, 2011, and discussed 
medication changes, including lidocaine cream which did not help much, morphine, and 
gabapentin. KLElNUIM - 20s. Her pain was at a 9/10 in her mid back and neck, with a lot 
more pain without the use of medication. KLEINUIM - 208. 
Ms. Klein returned on January 16, 2012. Dr. Reid noted that Ms. Klein get 
"headaches daily" and "radiating pain down her right upper extremity'' and while the 
medication helps with some of her pain "She is getting very frustrated with this and it is 
depressing." KLEINUIM • 210. Dr. Reid ordered a follow-up cervical MRI. KLEINUIM -
210. 
That cervical MRI was performed on January 19, 2012, because of 
"Increasing neck pain. Car accident 2010." KLElNUIM - 212. This MRI showed a 
central disc bulge at C3-4 with "slight impression on the ventral thecal sac" and a central 
disc bulge at CS-6 and straightening of the cervical spine associated with muscular spasm. 
KLEINUIM - 212 through 213. 
Ms. Klein incurred $2,568.00 with PortneufMedical Center for that January 
19, 2012 cervical MRI. KLEINUIM - 241. She also incurred $271.00 with Pocatello 
Radiology for reading the cervical MRI. KLEINUIM - 242. 
On February 10, 2012, Ms. Klein returned to Dr. Reid for followup from 
the cervical :MRI and cervical epidural injection by Dr. Leon. KLEINUIM - 214. Dr. 
Leon's treatment is discussed below. Her neck pain is at an 8 and she continues getting 
headaches and muscle tightness; Ms. Klein will have another injection in the series in a 
couple of weeks. KLEINUJM • 214. 
Ms. Klein returned to Dr. Reid on March 5, 2012, for management of her 
chronic neck pain, mid back pain. KLEINUIM • 216. She had her second cervical 
epidural in the series, which was very painful, but did help a little bit. Her pain was down 
to a seven. KLEINUIM • 216. 
Ms. Klein returned on April 2, 2012, for continued and on-going 
management of her chronic neck pair4 mid back pain. KLEINUIM • 383. Dr. Reid's 
continued assessment was ''Neck pain with history of cervical disk bulge, mid back pain 
with thoracic disk protrusion ... Muscle spasms ... [and] Headaches." KLEINUIM - 383. 
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Ms. Klein returned on July 9, 2012, for management of her chronic neck 
pain, mid back pain. KLEINUIM - 385. She had her third cervical epidural in the series, 
which "helped for about 2 weeks." KLEINUIM - 385. 
Ms. Klein's most recent visit to Dr. Reid was on October 26, 2012, for 
management of her chronic neck pain, mid back pain. KLEINUIM - 387. She continues 
with the same pain, 7/10 and does her home exercises. KLEINUIM - 387. 
Erica incurred $3,240.00 to date with Dr. Amy Reid as follows: 
I Provider I Date of Service I Amount I Doc 
Amy Reid, MD 3/8/10 $366.00 KLEINUIM -134, 225 
Amy Reid, MD 3/15/10 $120.00 KLEINUIM -134, 225 
Amy Reid, MD 3/29/10 $120.00 KLEINUIM-134, 225 
Amy Reid, MD 4/23/10 $120.00 KLEINUIM • 63, 225 
Amy Reid, :MD 5/25/10 $72.00 KLEINUIM - 150, 225 
Amy Reid, :MD 10/8/10 $217.00 KLEINUIM • 151, 226 
Amy Reid, :MD 1/28/11 $221.00 KLEINUIM • 226 
Amy Reid, :MD 4/8/11 $221.00 KLEINUIM - 226 
AmyReid,MD 5/6/11 $149.00 KLEINUIM - 226 
Amy Reid, :MD 8/5/11 $221.00 KLEINUIM - 227 
Amy Reid, MD 11/4/11 $232.00 KLEINUIM - 227 
Amy Reid, MD 12/5/11 $156.00 KLEINUIM • 221 
AmyReid,MD 1/16/12 $156.00 KLEINUIM - 221 
AmyReid,MD 2/10/12 $156.00 KLEINUIM - 221 . 
Amy Reid, MD 3/5/12 $156.00 KLEINUIM - 221 
Amy Reid, :MD 4/2/12 $93.00 KLEINUIM - 221 
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Provider 
Amy Reid, Iv.ID 




$232.00 KLEINUIM- 222 
$3,240.00 
Dr. Juan J. Leon/Portneuf Medical Center Cervical Epidural Injections 
On January 27, 2012, Ms. Klein received the first of her cervical epidural 
injections from Dr. Juan J. Leon at the PortneufMedical Center, who noted: 
Erica Klein is a  female who ha[s] no medical 
history other than a car accident in 2010, that produced ... 
severe back pain and ... cervical radiculopathy and ... disk 
herniated at the levels C3-C4 and C5-C6 that is producing her 
neck pain with radiation to her right leg and left upper 
extremity. 
- KLEINUIM • 229 (see also KLEINUIM .. 230 through 235) 
On March 1, 2012, Ms. Klein returned for the second cervical epidural 
injection from Dr. Leon who stated that Ms. Klein "has a history cervical radiculopathy 
with neck pain due to herniated disc in the cervical area. She is coming in for her second 
epidural steroid injection." KLEINUIM - 236 (see also KLEINUIM • 237 through 239). 
Finally, April 9, 2012, Ms. Klein returned for the third cervical epidural 
injection in the series. Dr. Leon stated that Ms. Klein "has cervical radiculopatb.y for 
which I have done 2 cervical epidural steroid injections" and "she would like to have her 
3rd shot to see if she can improve a little bit more in range of motion ... " KLEINUIM - 240. 
The epidurals provided transitory, but not permanent relief. Ms. Klein 
continues to suffer the pain and noted radiculopathy. 
Ms. Klein incurred $13,155.38 witb.PortneufMedical Center, and 
$2,181.00 with Dr. Juan Leon Associates for those cervical epidurals: 
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I Provider 
Portneuf Medical Center 
Portneuf Medical Center 
Portneuf Medical Center 
TOTAL 
I Provider 
Dr. Juan Leon 
Dr. Juan Leon 
Dr. Juan Leon 
Dr. Juan Leon 
Dr. Juan Leon 
Dr. Juan Leon 
TOTAL 













Superior Physical Therapy 
I Doc 
KLEINUIM .. 243 
KLEINUIM .. 244 
KLEINUIM • 245 
I Doc 
KLEINUIM - 221 
KLEINUIM • 221 
KLEINUIM • 221 
KLEINUIM .. 221 
KLEINUIM • 221 
KLEINUIM - 221 
Soon after the crash, and as previously set forth above, Ms. Klein was 
prescribed physical therapy. Her first treatment was February 5, 2010. KLEINUIM - 68. 
Erica's first visit notes state that her chief complaint was pain, stiffness, 
decreased range of motion and decreased function which were "onset" on "2/1/1 O" and 
"Secondary to an NIV A." Her current pain scale at rest is 7 out of 10 and with activity is 
10 out of 10. The symptoms are aggravated by, among other things, either sitting or 
standing. KLEINUIM - 69 and 390■- The assessment was "pain; impairment to functional 
activities and other [ activities of daily living]; impaired posture; impaired muscle 
performance; impaired joint mobility; impaired motor function; [ and] impaired range of 
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Despite the physical therapy, her notes overtime evidence little 
improvement, but primarily continued pain as she: 
o is "very sore and tender in the upper back and neck"; 
o has "continued pain in neck and back minimal changes 
(headaches)"; 
o is "very tender''; 
o has "little improvement"; 
o is"still having headaches and muscle tightness", 
o is "still quite sore in the upper back"; 
o reports "headache pain 8/10"; 
o "added cervical traction" after J\.1RI revealed herniated 
discs; 
o "increased pain"; 
o is "reporting continued pain in I. scap. Frustrated with 
persistent pain and ache"; 
o has "increased pain in shoulder blade area"; 
o has "neck pain higher today"; 
o is "still reporting muscle soreness, slight progress with 
spasms and knots near shoulder blades." 
o "returned from road trip very sore and stiff, increased pain 
noted"· 
' o "reporting increased pain today, not sure why, neck and mid 
thoracic in spasm and painful" 
-KLEINUIM - 69 through 81 and 390 through 401. 
Ms. Klein incurred $6,270.88 for physical therapy at Superior Physical 
Therapy. KLEINUIM .. 246 through 248. 
Rehab Authority 
Approximately one year later, April 11, 2011, Ms. Klein was prescribed 
physical therapy by Dr. Reid. KLEINUIM • 200 and 402. See generally, KLEINUIM - 402 
through 417. She treated at Rehab Authority, and her initial evaluation states onset of 
"February 201 0)' and the "mechanism of injury: MV A, T-boned)' with her current 
symptoms being "Upper back and neck pain, burning deep behind the shoulder blades." 
KLEINUIM - 403. The "clinical impression" was that Ms. Klein presented with "signs and 
symptoms consistent with chronic cervical pain, soft tissue dysfunction and disuse 
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V 
atrophy of the cervical extensors" and prior to the crash injury she "was independent in all 
activities" and is "otherwise in good health.'' KLEINUIM -404. Ms. Klein received 
therapy for about a month, but she was not getting relief and therefore Dr. Reid 
discontinued the therapy. KLEINUIM ~ 407. 
Ms. Klein incurred $739 .00 for physical therapy at Rehab Authority. 
KLEINUIM • 249 through 250. 
PortneufPhysical Therapy 
Ms. Klein has treated three times at Porfneuf Physical Therapy, after she 
developed an allergy to the adhesives from her TENS unit. She incurred $230.00 with 
Porfneuf Physical for physical therapy at Rehab Authority. KLEINUIM - 418. 
Ethan Fisher, LAC 
Dr. Reid also referred Ms. Klein for acupuncture. KLEINUIM - 196. Ms. 
Klein treated with Ethan Fisher, LAC, of Stillwaters Acupuncture. She treated on 
November 22, 2010, November 24, 2010, and December 6, 2010, incurring $180.00 in 
expenses. KLEINUIM - 253 through 255. 
Additional Damages and Expenses 
Through the course of Ms. Klein's attempts to resolve the chronic pain, Ms. 
Klein also incurred additional out-of-pocket expenses for prescriptions and comfort items 
($774.38 - see the following two tables)~ and massage ($1,870.00) as follows: 
I Provider I Descri~tion I Date I Amount I Doc I 
Walgreen's Pharmacy Hydro condone 2/1/10 0.33 KLEINUIM - 107, 
122,123,138 
Walgreen's Pharmacy Metb.ocarbamol 2/1/10 0.41 KLEINUIM-109, 
122,123,138 
Walgreen's Pharmacy Thermipaq (plus 2/1/10 13.77 KLEINUIM • 112, 
tax) 123 
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CASE NO. CV-2017-4584-OC 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
COMES NOW the Defendant Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho ("Farmers"), by and 
through counsel, and does hereby file this Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated more fully below, Farmers requests that the Court 
dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as a matter oflaw. 
INTRODUCTION 
Erica Klein filed a Complaint against Farmers on November 22, 2017. The Complaint 
requests that the Court order Farmers to participate in arbitration regarding an under-insured 
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motorist ("UIM") claim submitted by Klein to Farmers. Klein was injured in an automobile 
accident February 1, 2010. The party responsible for the accident was insured by Allstate and 
only had limited liability insurance coverage in the amount of $25,000. Klein settled with 
Allstate for the $25,000 on April 25, 2011. Farmers thereafter paid Klein an additional $75,000 
in UIM benefits on December 13, 2012. Farmers respectfully requests that this case be dismissed 
in its entirety because the five-year statute oflimitations started to run on or before April 25, 
2011, and Klein did not submit an additional demand nor file the Complaint in this case until 
after April 25, 2016, more than five years after the statute oflimitations accrued. Thus, the 
Complaint filed by Klein is barred by the statute of limitations and should be dismissed. 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Klein was involved in a motor vehicle accident on February 1, 2010, that was caused by a 
driver insured by Allstate. Complaint, ,r,r 9-10. On December 14, 2010, attorney Ryan Lewis sent 
a detailed and extensively documented demand letter to Allstate demanding the $25,000 policy 
limits from its insured and a virtually identical letter to Farmers notifying Farmers that he 
believed there was a UIM claim under Ms. Klein's Farmers' policy (Policy Number 75 17608-
01-97). Cooper Declaration, Ex 1; Complaint, ,r 4. In December 2010, Michael Morrissey was 
the adjuster for Farmers that was assigned to handle Klein's claim. Klein subsequently settled 
with Allstate and its insured for the $25,000 liability limits under the Allstate policy on April 25, 
2011. Complaint, ,r 20. 
Thereafter, by letter dated November 7, 2012, Ryan Lewis submitted a Proof of Loss with 
some 432 pages of medical records to support the UIM claim and requested payment of 
$250,000.00. Cooper Declaration, Ex 2. On December 12, 2012, after Farmers analyzed the 
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medical records submitted on behalf of Klein, Morrissey notified Ryan Lewis that Farmers 
considered $75,000 as the "amount justly due" and advised that a check for $75,000 would be 
printed and delivered the next day. Cooper Declaration, Ex 3. The letter specifically stated: 
Based on the information in hand, I am in a position to offer $75,000 (Seventy Five 
Thousand Dollars) to resolve your client's uninsured motorist claim, inclusive of all 
subrogation and/or liens. Per our conversation I [ will] have the check cut for the 
$75,000 as the amount justly due as soon as our printer in the Pocatello office is 
repaired. 
Cooper Declaration, Ex 3. By letter dated December 13, 2012, the $75,000 check was forwarded 
to Ryan Lewis and it was cashed. Cooper Declaration, Ex 4; Complaint, ,r 16. 
In January 2013 Dan Emerson assumed handling of the claim on behalf of Farmers and 
had some communications with Ryan Lewis. Cooper Declaration, Ex 5. On July 7, 2013 
Emerson wrote a letter to Ryan Lewis's law firm and asked if "you want us to keep her 
Underinsured Motorist claim open." Cooper Declaration, Ex 6. There was no response. Dan 
Surmelis took over the claim in November of 2013 and sent Ryan Lewis a letter dated November 
5, 2013, asking him to call to discuss options to resolve the claim including mediation. Cooper 
Declaration, Ex 7. Follow up letters of December 1, 2013 and January 22, 2014 reflect that Dan 
Surmelis talked to Ryan Lewis and asked that he contact him to discuss possibly moving the 
claim towards a final resolution. Cooper Declaration, Exs 8 and 9. 
February 1, 2015, the five year anniversary of the accident came and went without a 
response from Lewis. April 25, 2016, the five year anniversary of the settlement with Allstate 
came and went without a response from Lewis. It was not until July 7, 2016, that Klein or 
anybody on her behalf did anything to further pursue Klein's UIM claim. By letter of that date 
Kenneth Lyon, III, Klein's new attorney, sent a letter to Dan Surmelis advising him that he was 
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now representing Klein. Cooper Declaration, Ex. 10. Surmelis responded in a letter dated August 
12, 2016, and informed Lyon that Farmers would respond to any additional demand within sixty 
days. Cooper Declaration, Ex. 11. It was not, however, until February 7, 2017, that Klein 
actually updated the medical history with a supplemental demand packet. Cooper Declaration, 
Ex. 12. In Lyon's February 7, 2017 letter he acknowledged that communications from Ryan 
Lewis in 2013 and 2014 were the last communications on behalf of Klein to Farmers about her 
UIM claim. Cooper Declaration, Ex 12. It is also acknowledged that "no further information was 
provided by Mr. Lewis"after his submission dated November 7, 2012. Cooper Declaration, Ex 
12. 
ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT 
I. The Complaint should be dismissed because the applicable five-year statute of 
limitations bars any claim by Klein to further UIM benefits. 
The statute of limitations on insurance contracts is the written contract five (5) year 
statute oflimitations contained in I. C. Section 5-216. Sunshine Min. Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. 
Co., 107 Idaho 25, 684 P.2d 1002 (1984). That is not disputed by the parties. The issue to be 
decided is when did the statute of limitations start to run. This issue has not been decided by any 
Idaho appellate court. Thus, this is an issue of first impression in Idaho. There are three different 
approaches to when a UIM claim accrues and the statute oflimitations starts to run in other 
jurisdictions. The first is that the statute oflimitations starts to run on the date of the accident, or 
the "date of accident rule." The second is that the statute does not start to run until there has been 
a breach of the insurance contract. This is called the "breach of contract rule." Finally, other 
jurisdictions have held that the statute starts to run when the insured settles with, or obtains a 
judgment against, the third-party tortfeasor. This rule is referred to as the "settlement/judgment 
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rule." Each of these will be discussed below. 
A. Date of the Accident Rule - The claim accrues and the statute of limitations 
starts to run on the date of the accident. This rule is the most consistent with 
rulings by the Idaho Supreme Court. Based on this rule, the statute of 
limitations expired in February 2015, five years after the accident. 
Some courts have held that the statute of limitations on UIM claims accrues on the date of 
the accident. The advantage to this rule is that the accrual date is objectively certain. Woodall v. 
Travelers Indem. Co., 699 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1997) (Injured parties' cause of action against its 
underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier for UIM benefits accrues on date of accident, even if injured 
parties' policy contains provision that payment will be made only after limits of liability have 
been used up under all applicable bodily injury liability policies); Green v. Selective Ins. Co. of 
Am., 144 N.J. 344,676 A.2d 1074 (1996) (Statute oflimitations on claims for uninsured motorist 
and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits runs from date of accident, rather than breach of 
policy). The "date of accident" rule has admittedly not caught on with a majority of courts. 
However, this rule is consistent with the philosophy adopted by the Idaho Supreme Court 
in Hill v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619,249 P.3d 812 (2011) that an insured has a 
UIM claim immediately following an injury accident and the insured is not required to exhaust 
the insured's right against the responsible parties before making a claim for the first-party UIM 
benefits. 
Before Ryan Lewis, on behalf of Klein, settled with Allstate on April 25, 2011, the Idaho 
Supreme Court changed longstanding law in Idaho by holding that an exhaustion clause in an 
UIM automobile insurance policy, requiring the insured to recover by settlement or judgment all 
of the tortfeasor's bodily injury liability limits before collecting UIM benefits, is void, 
unenforceable, and severable. Hill 150 Idaho 619,249 P.3d 812. Thus, an insured with a UIM 
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motorist benefit claim was permitted to make a claim for and collect UIM benefits against his/her 
own insurer immediately following an accident. This change in the law also imposed a 
corresponding obligation on the insurer to investigate and attempt to resolve the claim in good 
faith regardless of whether, when or how much the UIM insured collected from the responsible 
party's liability insurance. Hill, 150 Idaho 619,249 P.3d 812. The decision in Hill is most 
consistent with a rule that the statute of limitations for a UIM benefit claim accrues on the date of 
the accident, because that is when the insured is allowed to pursue the claim for UIM benefits. 
Thus, the rule most consistent with Idaho law and the rule that provides the most objectively 
certain date for the accrual of the statute of limitations is the date of accident rule. 
The accident in this case occurred on February 1, 2010. The claim for additional UIM 
benefits was not made until July 7, 2016. Based on the "date of accident" rule, the statute of 
limitations started to run on February 1, 2010 and expired on February 1, 2015, more than a year 
before Mr. Lyon became involved in the case and gave notice on July 7, 2016 that Klein 
intended to make an additional claim. 
B. Breach of Contract Rule - The claim does not accrue until the insurer 
breaches the insurance contract by denying payment or making only a 
partial payment. This rule allows an insured to indefmitely extend the statute 
of limitations by waiting to me a UIM claim. This rule circumvents the intent 
and purpose for a statute of limitations. 
Some courts have held that the statute of limitations for UIM claims does not start to run 
until the contract is breached, either by partial payment or denial of benefits. However, this is 
not the majority rule today, even if it was at one time. Such a rule has proven to be unworkable 
because it indefinitely extends the time within which to make UIM claims. After years of 
hearing arguments about when the statute of limitations accrued under this rule, Courts in 
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numerous jurisdictions have sought a better reasoned and more objectively certain rule for 
determining the "accrual" date that marks the start of the running of the statute of limitations. 
The decision in Hill, as explained above, is inconsistent with the "breach of contract" rule that 
allows claims to remain in limbo indefinitely. If an insured can now make a UIM claim 
immediately following an accident, there is no reason to delay the accrual of the statute of 
limitations on pursuing UIM claims. 
As applied to this case, it is unclear when Klein claims that Farmers breached the 
insurance contract with Klein. She alleges that Farmers paid the undisputed amount to which she 
was entitled under her UIM policy based on her November 7, 2012 demand, as it was required to 
do within "sixty (60) days if the proof ofloss pertains to uninsured motorist or underinsured 
motorist coverage benefits" pursuant to Idaho Code§ 41-1839. Complaint, ,r ,r 15 - 16. It does 
not appear that Klein considered this compliance with the statutory framework for responding to 
UM/UIM claims to have been a breach of contract by Farmers. Rather, the allegations at 
paragraphs 20 and 21 appear to be the basis for Klein's claim that Farmers breached its contract 
with her. In those paragraphs Klein alleges that she made a supplemental demand for UIM 
benefits on February 7, 2017 and Farmers failed to respond as required by I. C. 41-1839. 
Notwithstanding the fact that this supplemental demand came more than seven (7) years after her 
accident; more than five (5) years, nine (9) months after she settled with Allstate; and that there 
is no statutory requirement to respond to a supplemental demand for UIM benefits, it is this 
failure to respond to her February 7, 2017 claim that appears to form the basis for her claim that 
Farmers breached its contract with her. If that is the case, the statute oflimitations on her claim 
for UIM benefits did not accrue until approximately April 2017 and will not expire until April 
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2022, more than twelve (12) years after her accident. It is this kind ofresult that has caused the 
breach of contract rule to fall out of favor. 
C. Settlement/Judgment Rule - The UIM claim accrues on the date of settlement 
with, or judgment against, the third-party tortfeasor. While not as certain as 
the date of accident rule, this rule provides more certainty than the breach of 
contract rule and is more consistent with the purpose behind the statute of 
limitations. Klein settled with the third-party tortfeasor on April 25, 2011. 
Under the Settlement/Judgment Rule the statute of limitations expired five 
years later on April 25, 2016, before Lyon become involved and sent the July 
7, 2016 letter. 
The settlement/judgment rule has been adopted by a considerable number of courts. This 
rule holds that the statute of limitations accrues on the date of settlement with, or judgment 
against, the third-party tortfeasor. See Danes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401,407 (Minn. 
2000) (Designating the date of settlement with or judgment against the tortfeasor as the accrual 
date for UIM claims protects both the insured's and the insurer's rights by insuring that the 
claimant will not be enabled to forestall the commencement of the limitations period indefinitely 
by failing to assert the UIM claim); Brown v. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 989 P.2d 196, 198 (Colo. 
App. 1999) (if we were to hold that the statute is triggered only when the carrier refuses payment, 
such would allow the claimant to present his demand at any time after the settlement and would 
effectively eliminate the statute oflimitations and frustrate its purpose); Consiglio v. 
Transamerica Ins. Grp., 55 Conn. App. 134, 737 A.2d 969 (1999) (six-year statute oflimitations 
for breach of contract began to run when the action against the tort-feasor was settled, not when 
the accident occurred); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Rosenthal, 484 F.3d 251,257 (3d Cir. 
2007) (we hold that the four-year statute oflimitations begins to run when the insured settles his 
claim with or obtains an award :from the underinsured driver); Brittain v. Nat'/ Cas. Co., 997 F. 
Supp. 2d 300 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (Under Pennsylvania law, a statute oflimitations on a 
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underinsured motorist (UIM) claim accrues on the date of settlement with the underinsured 
driver); Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. v. Perez-Henderson, 49 Conn. App. 653, 714 A.2d 
1281 (1998) (Six-year statute oflimitations applicable to contract claim for underinsured 
motorist (UIM) benefits began to run on the date of the insured's settlement with the tort-feasor); 
Wheeler v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 749 F.Supp. 660,662 (E.D.Pa.1990); Boyle v. State Farm 
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 310 Pa.Super. 10,456 A.2d 156, 162 (1983)); and North Carolina Ins. Guar. 
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 115 N.C.App. 666,446 S.E.2d 364,369 (1994); 
Yocherer v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 252 Wis.2d 114,643 N.W.2d 457, 463-64 (2002) 
("or claims seeking underinsured motorist coverage, the date on which a presentable claim exists 
is the date on which the insured resolves his or her claims against the tortfeasors, whether it was 
by settlement or judgment...); Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 880 
So.2d 336, 343 (Miss. 2004) ("[T]he Jacksons added State Farm to the suit more than three years 
after they knew the extent of Rebecca's injuries and knew the amount of [the tortfeasor's] 
insurance coverage. Accordingly, their claims against State Farm are barred by the three-year 
statute of limitations."). 
The reasoning for adopting the settlement/judgment rule was explained by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co. held: 
... if the accrual date was the date of the breach of the insurance contract, that is, the 
date the claim was denied, the insured would be able to postpone the operation of the 
statute oflimitations indefinitely. Consistent with this concern, we again decline to 
adopt the rule that commences the statute of limitations when the contract is 
breached. 
We instead adopt a third option for the time a UIM claim accrues and the statute of 
limitations begins to run. This option is the date of settlement with or judgment 
againstthetortfeasor. See Wheelerv. NationwideMut. Ins. Co., 749 F.Supp. 660,662 
(E.D.Pa.1990) (holding that a UIM claim accrues when insured's rights have vested, 
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which does not occur until the insured knows that the tortfeasor was an underinsured 
motorist; citing similar holding with regard to UM claim in Boyle v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 3 l0Pa.Super. 10,456A.2d 156, 162 (l983));seealsoNorth Carolina 
Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 115 N.C.App. 666,446 S.E.2d 
364, 369 (1994) (holding that the statute of limitations did not commence on UM 
claim until the tortfeasor's insurance company was declared insolvent and the UM 
claimant was then "at liberty to sue"). 
Using the date of settlement with or judgment against the tortfeasor as the accrual 
date for UIM claims is consistent with our Nordstrom decision. The UIM claim will 
accrue when the condition precedent to raising the UIM claim that we identified in 
Nordstrom has been satisfied, not before. The statute of limitations will not be 
triggered until the UIM claim becomes ripe, eliminating the possibility that the 
limitations period will have run before the claim could be brought. 
Designating the date of settlement with or judgment against the tortfeasor as the 
accrual date for UIM claims is also consonant with our concern expressed in O'Neill 
and Weeks that the claimant not be enabled to forestall the commencement of the 
limitations period indefinitely by failing to assert the UIM claim. With the date of 
settlement or judgment as the accrual date, that cannot happen. 
Adopting the date of settlement or judgment as the accrual date protects the interests 
of both the insured and the insurer. 
Danes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 406-07 (Minn. 2000). 
In this case, Klein settled the third-party tortfeasor claim on April 25, 2011, more than 
five (5) years before the July 7, 2016 letter from Kenneth Lyon, III to Dan Surmelis which 
notified Farmers that Klein wished to submit a supplemental claim for the remaining limits of her 
UIM benefit. Based on the forgoing, Klein's UIM claim accrued on April 25, 2011, when her 
claim against the third-party tortfeasor was settled. Thus, the statute of limitations started to run 
on April 25, 2011 and expired on April 25, 2016. Klein did not notify Farmers she intended to 
make a supplemental claim nor actually make a supplemental claim nor file this Complaint until 
November 22, 2017, more than five years after the UIM claim accrued. The statute oflimitations 
had clearly expired prior to the filing of the Complaint. As such, the Complaint should be 
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dismissed in its entirety. 
II. Farmers has not waived the statute of limitations defense by its communications in 
response to Klein's communications regarding her intention to make a supplemental 
claim 
It is anticipated that Klein will argue that Farmers waived the statute of limitations 
defense when Dan Surmelis stated in the letter dated August 12, 2016, that the investigation into 
the insured's claim was ongoing. The law governing waiver is clearly established in Seaport 
Citizens Bank v. Dippel, 112 Idaho 736, 739, 735 P.2d 1047, 1050 (Ct. App. 1987), where the 
Idaho Court of Appeals stated: 
Waiver is a voluntary, intentional relinquishment of a known right or advantage. 
Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 731,639 P.2d 429 (1981); Crouch v. Bischoff, 78 
Idaho 364,304 P.2d 646 (1956). Waiver is foremost a question of intent. To establish 
a waiver, the intention to waive must clearly appear. Riverside Development Co. v. 
Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515, 650 P .2d 657 (1982). Moreover, waiver is a mixed question 
oflaw and fact. First, a court must find whether the facts alleged to constitute a waiver 
are true. Second, the court must decide whether, if true, these facts suffice as a matter 
oflaw to show waiver. Jones v. Maestas, 108 Idaho 69, 696 P .2d 920 (Ct.App.1985). 
The doctrine of implied waiver by silence is disfavored. Id. Waiver will not be 
inferred except from a clear and unequivocal act manifesting an intent to waive, or 
from conduct amounting to estoppel. Id. 
Id. There was no intentional relinquishment of the statute oflimitations defense by Farmers. The 
communications between Lyon and Surmelis do not even address the statute oflimitations. 
There is no clear intent to waive the statute oflimitations defense on the part of Farmers and 
there is no clear an unequivocal act on the part of Farmers that manifests an intent to waive the 
statute of limitations defense. Thus, Klein cannot show that there is any evidence in the record 
that would constitute a waiver as a matter oflaw. Again, Klein did not actually make her 
supplemental claim until February 7, 2017, six months after the July 7, 2016 letter and five 
months after Dan Surmelis's letter dated August 12, 2016. 
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Additionally, based on either the date ofloss rule or the settlement/judgment rule, the 
claim was already time-barred no later than April 25, 2016. There is no evidence in the record 
that Farmers intentionally waived the statute of limitations defense which is a complete defense 
to the supplemental claim submitted by Klein and the lawsuit that has now been filed. As such, 
the waiver defense fails as a matter oflaw. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the undisputed evidence in the record, the supplemental claim submitted by 
Klein on July 7, 2016 and the Complaint that was filed on November 22, 2017 were made more 
than five years after her UIM claim against Farmers accrued. Thus, the Complaint should be 
dismissed with prejudice. -/ 
DATED this) f 5 day of February, 2018. 
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CASE NO. CV-2017-4584-OC 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW Defendant Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho, and pursuant to Rule 56 
of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure moves for summary judgment on the grounds and for the 
reason that there are no genuine issues of material fact and Defendant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. 
This motion is supported by the pleadings, Declaration of Gary L. Cooper and supporting 
memorandum filed herewith. 
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FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
OFIDAHb, 
AFFIDAVIT OF RYAN LEWIS IN 
SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT Defendant. 
I, Ryan Lewis, under penalty of perjury and upon personal knowledge state and affirm as 
follows: 
II/ 
1. I am a duly licensed Idaho attorney. 
2. I was previously retained to represent Plaintiff Erica Klein for injuries she sustained in 
an automobile accident which occurred on February 1, 2010. 
3. As part of my representation of Plaintiff, I corresponded via email with Michael 





















4. Attached hereto as Exhibit 1 is a true and correct copy of email correspondence 
between myself and Mr. Morrisey concerning Plaintiff's UIM Claim. 
FURTHER AFFIANT SA YETH NOT. 
DATED this _f_ day of March, 2018. 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me 
this _g_ day of MA.r&,, , 2018. 
~~
NOTARY PUBLIC in and for said 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this date, I served the foregoing Affidavit of Ryan Lewis in 
Support of Plaintifrs Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
party(ies) set forth below by: 
addressed as follows: 
✓ 
Placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope placed for 
collecting and mailing in the United States mail, at Reno, Nevada, postage 
prepaid, following ordinary business practices. 
Gary L. Cooper - Attorney at Law 
J.D. Oborn -Attorney at Law 
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Electronic: gary@cooper-larsen.com 
jd@cooper-larsen.com 































LIST OF EXHIBITS 
Exhibit No.: 
1. Copy of email correspondence between Affiant and 
Michael Morrissey. 
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subject Re: extension 
From: ryanlewislaw@yahoo.com 
To: mike.morrissey@hpcs.com 
· . _ Date: Thursday, December 13, 2012, 12:55:06 PM MST - -· ·--·. . .... ____ .. ...--··· --.... 
1 of3 
Mike: 
Thanks for you email a few minutes ago regarding cutting the check today and ordering the policy. 
Would you please address the concerns of my two prior emails. Thanks. 
RYAN 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 E. Center Street 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
(208) 235-1600 (tel) 
(208) 235-4200 (fax) 
This message and attached files or documents are intended only for the use of the person or entity addressed 
and may contain confidential information belonging to the sender that is protecled by the Electronic 
Communications P1ivacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 and 2521. 
---·. . . ---•··• .... 
From: R Lewis <ryanfewlslaw@yahoo.com> 
To: Mike Morrissey <mlke.morrissey@hpcs.com> 
Sent: Thursday, December 13, 2012 11:54 AM 
Subject: Re: extension 
Mike: 
This email is sent in follow-up to my email sent last night, which is set forth below. 
I subsequently received your email from you stating "Based on tl1e information in hand, r am in a position lo 
offer $75,000.00 (Seventy Five Thousand Dollars) to resolve your client's uninsured motorist claim, inclusive 
of all subogation and/or liens." 
As we have discussed, this is a 1st party case tl1at we are not "resolving" or "settling11 or "closing" and that 
Farmers had a duty to pay the amount it contends is justly due. I am concerned that Farmers is attempting to 
require a "settlement" as a condition of paying the amount presently justly due. 
Would you please confirm for me that Fanners is paying $75,000 and waiving subrogation as the amount thot is 
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justly due, and.that it is not presenting an "offer" or a proposed "settlement." lf you are contending this is an 
offer as stated tn your letter last night, please let me know immediately. 
Many thanks, 
RYAN 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N, Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 E. Center Street 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
(208) 235-1600 (tel) 
(208) 235-4200 (fax) 
This message and attached files or documents are intended only for the use of the person or entity addressed 
and may contain confidential information belonging to the sender that is protected by the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 25IO and 2521. 
---··· -----· ··--··· . 
From: R Lewis <ryanlewlslaw@yahoo.com> 
To: Mike Morrissey <mike.morrissey@hpcs.com> 
Sent: Wednesday, December 12, 2012 5:14 PM 
Subject: Re: extension 
Mike: 
I have not yet received an email confirmation of our conversations today that you were going to send. 
TI1erefore, in follow-up to our two telephone ~onversations today regarding the UIM claim of Erica Klein, this 
I 
email is to confirm: 
l) Fa11ners is going to pay to the Lowell N. Hawkes, T111st Account $75,000, and waive its$ 10,000 
subrogation claim based on the amount it contends is 11justly due". This is in addition to the $25,000 paid by 
Allstate. Inasmuch as I provided an extension to pay that amount until today, you stated that the check printer 
in Pocatello is broken but that it is fixed quickly when this happens. Will you let me know tomorrow morning 
the status of the check. Ifl am not available you may speak with Lowell to facilitate the delivery or pickup of' 
the check; he will even be in Idaho Falls tomorrow afternoon. 
2) In our discussion you stated that you would get me a copy of Erica1s policy, in light of your statement 
regarding arbitration if the patties disagreed as to the amount '1ustly due". 
3) Finally, please confirm, as we discussed that Farmer's payment, is not to be construed as a "settlement", 
rather merely payment of the amount justly due under I.C. 41-1839, and that Erica's UIM claim will be kept 
open, subject to Erica's future medical needs. 
Many thanks, 
RYAN 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
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1322 E. Center Street 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
(208) 235-1600 (tel) 
(208) 235-4200 (fax) 
This message and attached files or documents are intended only for the use of the person or entity addressed 
and may contain confidential information belonging to the sender that is protected by the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 and 2521. 
--- ---- -------- ----· ·----·· . ------
From: Mike Morrissey <mike.morrissey@hpcs.com> 
To: ryanlewislaw@yahoo.com 
Sent: Thursday, December 6, 2012 11:01 AM 
Subject: extension 
Ryan; 





Subject Re: extension 
From: ryanlewislaw@yahoo.com 
To: mlke.morrissey@hpcs.com 
Date: Thursday, December 13, 2012, 4:10:35 PM MST - - .. ----- ----· ·•·--· ··-·• ·---· . . . ··-
Mike: 
Many thanks for the confirmation. 
RYAN 
Ryan S. Lewis 
Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered 
1322 E. Center Street 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
(208) 235-1600 (tel) 
(208) 235-4200 (fax) 
This message and attached files or documents are intended only for the use of the person or entity addressed 
and may contain confidential info1mation belonging to the sender that is protected by the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 and 2521. 
From: Mike Morrissey <mlke.morrissey@hpcs.com> 
To: R Lewis <ryanlewlslaw@yahoo.com> 
Sent: Thursday, December 13, 2012 3:14 PM 
Subject: Re: extension 
Ryan, 
I run confi1n1ing based on our prior conversation that Farmers is paying 
$75,000 for the amount justly due. I recognize this does not resolve the 
UIM claim. I did make this offe1· to resolve the claim but there has not 
been any signed release from your client and I will be keeping the' claim 
open. As to subrogation, I took the ammmt paid by Fam1ers Med pay as an 
offset 011 the UIM evaluation and we will not be pursuing subrogation for 
the $10,000 paid on our Med Pay coverage. 
I have sent for a copy of Ms. Klein's policy and will send it when I 
recieve it. 
Mike Morrissey, GCA 
Special Claims Representative 
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KENNETH E. LYON, III 
ISB # 4431 
10389 Double R Blvd 
Reno, Nevada 89521 
Phone: (775) 398-5800 
Fax: (775) 398-5801 
Email: ken@lyonlaw.net 
KENNETH E. LYON, JR. 
ISB # 1117 
5785 Rio Vista Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 
Phone: (208) 251-2124 
Email: ken.lyon21@gmail.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Erica Klein 
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AFFIDAVIT OF KENNETH E. LYON, 
III IN SUPPORT OF PLAINTIFF'S 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
I, Kenneth E. Lyon, III, under penalty of perjury and upon personal knowledge state and 
affirm as follows: 
Ill 
Ill 
I. I am a duly licensed Idaho attorney retained to represent Plaintiff Erica Klein in the 
above referenced matter. 
2. As part of my representation of Plaintiff, I received and personally reviewed her file 
obtained from her prior attorney, Ryan Lewis. 
1 
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MUTUAL RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT 
This Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement is between ERICA KLEIN, 
individually, hereinafter referred to as "KLEIN," and SETH HALE and ALLSTAIB 
INSURANCE COMP ANY, hereinafter collectively referred to as "RELEASEES" for 
themselves, their heirs , administrators, executors, personal representatives, successors, 
and assigns for and in consideratj.on of the payment of the total amount of Twenty-Five 
Thousand and No/100 Dollars ($25,000.00), to be forthwith paid to KLEIN and her 
attorneys at Lowell N. Hawkes, Chartered. The payments herein to be made by 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE COMP ANY for and on behalf of its insured, SETH HALE 
as payment in compromise and settlement for all injuries, losses, medical expenses, 
damages, disability, suffering, or loss, as the result thereof, which heretofore have been 
or hereafter may be sustained by KLEIN as a result of or in any way connected with or 
arising out of that certain automobile crash occurring on or about February 1, 2010 at or 
near Benton Street in Pocatello, Idaho. It is understood and agreed that all of the 
settlement funds are payment for personal injuries and sickness whether known or 
unknown. 
The settlement is a mutual compromise, settlement and release of all claims 
between the parties both as to liability and damages. It is understood and agreed that 
KLEIN and RELEASEES (jointly referred to herein as "PARTIES") have relied on 
their own beliefs and knowledge in effecting this settlement. 
No representation by a party as to injury, disability, or damages, nor any 
representation by a party regarding the nature and extent of legal liability or financial 
responsibility of any of the parties has induced any party to enter into this settlement. In 
determining to settle, the parties have respectively considered not only their own injuries, 
disabilities and damages, but also the possibility that the injuries sustained may be 
permanent and progressive and recovery therefrom uncertain and indefinite, so that 
consequences not now anticipated may result from the crash. 
It is understood and agreed that this settlement is a compromise and settlement of 
a disputed claim by all parties both as to liability and damages. The payment made is not 
to be construed as an admission of liability on the part of the RELEASEES nor an 
acknowledgment by KLEIN that she has been made whole by the settlement payment 
made herein; the parties have each determined for their own reasons to compromise and 
settle this claim and avoid further litigation and buy their peace. Both RELEASEES 
and the KLEIN agree that no further claim of any kind or nature can be asserted against 
the other for injuries or damages arising from the accident herein identified. 
MUTUAL RELEASE AND SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT - Page 1 
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KLEIN further hereby agrees to protect and defend RELEASEES from any 
claim or demand of any other person or entity claiming some right or entitlement to any 
settlement proceeds, whether by claim of subrogation, lien, payment or settlement 
proceeds resulting from the above-described loss. To that end, if ALLSTATE 
INSURANCE or any of the other Released Parties receives any demand in the nature of 
subrogation, lien, or reimbursement entitlement such Released Party shall forthwith 
tender the defense of that demand to KLEIN and her counsel who shall defend or pay 
the claim and pay any finally adjudicated liability resulting therefrom and HALE and 
ALLSTATE INSURANCE and ITS COUNSEL shall fully cooperate in good faith 
with KLEIN and her counsel in the defense or resolution of any such claim at no 
additional expense to KLEIN. Provided, however, KLEIN shall have no liability or 
responsibility for any claim based upon promises or assurances of a Released Party to 
which KLEIN was not a party. This Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement is not 
intended to be nor shall be claimed or construed to be a Third-Party Beneficiary 
Agreement or Contract or to make KLEIN the insurer of the conduct or agreements of 
other persons or entities as opposed to a compromise settlement of a disputed claim both 
as to liability and damages. Additionally, this is not a release or settlement or waiver of 
any claim or defense which KLEIN may have against anyone else, including any 
potential underinsurance policy. 
KLEIN and RELEASEES further declare and represent that no promise, 
inducement, or agreement not herein expressed has been made between them, this 
Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement contains the entire agreement between the 
parties hereto, and the terms of this Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement are 
contractual and not a mere recital. 
KLEIN and RELEASEES further represent and declare that they have been or 
have had the opportunity to be represented by legal counsel and are executing this 
Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement recognizing the legal significance of the 
same. 
Effective this 25th day of April, 2011 















Tuesday, April 04, 2017 3:35 PM 
'dan.surmelis@farmersinsurance.com' 
Erica Klein - Claim #1015457772-1-5 
Opinion letter from Scott Barlow.pdf 
Please allow this email to confirm our discussions in reference to the above matter and the fact that Ms. Klein has 
granted Farmers a two week extension to respond to her supplemental UIM demand. I am also attaching a copy of the 
letter my office received from Brittany Strong FNP-C concerning her recommendation for Botox injections. You will note 
her office is unable to provide us with the anticipated cost of the recommended injections. However, I will continue to 
work on getting this information and will provide it to you for your review once it is been obtained. 
Thank you for your assistance. Please let me know if you have any further questions. 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Ill 
Law Offices of Kenneth E. Lyon, Ill 
10389 Double R Blvd. 
Reno, NV 89521 
Phone(775)398-5800 
Fax (775) 398-5801 
This email transmission is intended for the exclusive use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed, and may 
contain privileged and confidential information that is protected by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC 
Section 2701 ET.SEQ., and NRS Sections 179.425-179.450 and 205.320, and may also be protected under the attorney 
client, work product or other privilege. If you are not the intended recipient of this communication, you are hereby 
notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strickly prohibited. If you have 
received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately by telephone {775-398-5800) or fax (775-398-5801), or 















Wednesday, May 17, 2017 4:44 PM 
'dan.surmelis@farmersinsurance.com' 
Erica Klein - Claim No. 1015457772-1-5 
I have tried calling a couple of times and have left voice messages concerning the status of the above matter. Please 
advise. 
Thanks, 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Ill 
Law Offices of Kenneth E. Lyon, Ill 
10389 Double R Blvd. 
Reno, NV 89521 
Phone(775)398-5800 
Fax (775) 398-5801 
This email transmission is intended for the exclusive use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed, and may 
contain privileged and confidential information that is protected by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC 
Section 2701 ET.SEQ., and NRS Sections 179.425-179.450 and 205.320, and may also be protected under the attorney 
client, work product or other privilege. If you are not the intended recipient of this communication, you are hereby 
notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strickly prohibited. If you have 
received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately by telephone (775-398-5800) or fax (775-398-5801), or 








NEVADA AND IDAHO 
LAW OFFICES OF 
KENNETH E. LYON, III 
I 0389 Double R Blvd. 
Reno, Nevada 89521 
TELEPHONE: (775) 398-5800 
FACSIMILE: (775) 398•5801 
June 26, 2017 
VIA EMAIL: gary@cooper-larsen.com 
ORIGINAL BY U.S. MAIL 
Gary Cooper 
Cooper & Larsen, Chtd. 
I 51 North Third A venue 
Suite 210 -Second Floor 
Pocatello, Idaho 83201 
RE: Erica M. Klein 
Farmers Claim No. 1015457772-1-S 
Dear Gary: 
This letter follows our prior discussion in reference to the above matter. I appreciate the 
opportunity to respond to Farmers' argument that Ms. Klein's UIM claim is now barred by a 
statute of limitations defense. My assessment of this issue is as follows: 
Factual History 
Although I do not believe there is necessarily any factual dispute concerning Ms. Klein's 
accident and the history of this claim, I believe the following facts are relevant to the discussion 
and form the basis for my inquiry: 
On February 1, 2010, Ms. Klein was involved in a motor vehicle accident. Her vehicle 
wast-boned by a vehicle driven by Seth Hale who failed to yield the right of way. Mr. Hale's 
negligence was the sole cause of the collision with Ms. Klein's vehicle. 
At the time of the accident, Mr. Hale carried a liability policy with Allstate in the amount 
of $25,000. On December 9, 20 I 0, Ms. Klein issued her demand to Allstate for tender of the full 
liability limits. At or near this time, Ms. Klein also notified Farmers of her intent to pursue an 
underinsured motorist claim. On December 13, 2010, Farmers confirmed receipt of the notice of 
the UIM claim. 
1 
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Allstate subsequentJy tendered its policy limits. On January 4, 2011, Farmers confirmed 
its pennission to resolve the third party claim. On January 6, 2011, Allstate provided Ms. Klein 
with a copy of its declaration page confirming the policy limits of $25,000. Ms. Klein executed 
the Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement on April 25, 201 1. 
On November 7, 2012, Ms. Klein submitted her UIM demand to Farmers in the amount 
of$250,000. On December 12, 2012, Farmers issued a check for the undisputed UIM benefits in 
the amount of $75,000. 
On July 7, 2013, Farmers confirmed it had discussed Ms. Klein's ongoing UIM claim 
with her attorney. At that time, Ms. Klein had not obtained her anticipated surgical opinion. 
Farmers requested any additional documentation and asked whether the UIM claim should be 
kept open. ' 
On November 5, 20 l 3, Fanners advised Ms. Klein her claim had been reassigned to Dan 
Surmelis. Mr. Surmelis noted the parties had discussed the possibility of mediation to reach a 
final resolution of Ms. Klein's UIM claim. A similar notice was sent on December I, 2013. 
On January 22, 2014, Farmers again confirmed it had discussed Ms. Klein's UIM claim 
with her attorney. Farmers requested any updated information and again referenced possible 
mediation as a means of resolving Ms. Klein's UIM claim. 
On July 7, 2016, my·office provided notice to Mr. Sunnelis that we were now 
representing Ms. Klein concerning her open UIM claim and that we were working on getting 
additional medical records and billings to assist in a final resolution. 
On August 12, 2016, Farmers confirmed receipt of our representation and requested any 
proof of loss be accompanied by related medical records and bills. 
A supplemental demand was presented to Farmers on February 7, 2017. The 
supplemental demand was supported with updated medical records and bills related to the 
February 1, 2010 accident which were incurred subsequent to the initial demand. The 
supplemental demand requested tender of the remaining benefits under Ms. Klein's UIM policy 
in the amount of $400,000. 
On March 6, 2017, Ms. Klein provided additional information in support of her 
supplemental demand. Specifically, Farmers was provided an opinion letter from Dr. Benjamin 







Contract of Insurance 
The policy is silent as to any time period a UIM claim must be submitted for 
determination. Rather, the policy only speaks as to how a determination will be made. 
Specifically, the policy provides: 
Determination as to whether an insured person is legally entitled to recover 
damages or the amount of damages shall be made by agreement between the 
insured person and us. If no agreement is reached, the decision will be made by 
arbitration. 
Under the terms of the policy, formal demand for arbitration can be made by either filing 
a request for arbitration with the court, or by sending a certified letter to the party against whom 
arbitration is sought. The policy is silent on when demand for arbitration must be made. 
Applicable Statute of Limltafions and Time of Accrual of Claim 
' . 
I could find no specific Idaho statute which limits the time for filing a claim for UIM 
benefits. Nor could I find ~y specific Idaho case law on this issue. 
However, a majority of the other jurisdictions dealing with this question have held that a 
cause of action against an insurer for UIM benefits is in contract, not tort, and therefore the 
statute of limitations based on a written contract is applicable. See, 2 Auto. Liability Ins. 4th § 
32:2. Since the action is Qased on contract, the statute of limitations·commences to run only on 
the earliest date the contract was breached. See, 2 Auto. Liability Ins. 4th § 32; 11. The 
underlying consensus being that tfte statute should not begin to run until a justiciable claim for 
breach of contract exists. Id. · 
See also, Grayson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, 971 P.2d 798 (Nev. 
1998)(claim for UIM benefits was l)Ot barred by six-year statute of limitations when made more 
than six years after accident. as limitations period ran from insurer's refusal to pay claim}; Wille 
v. Geico Casualty Company. 2 P.3d 888 (OK 2000)(a claim for recovery ofUIM benefits 
accrues and the statute of limitations begins to run when a breach of the insurance contract 
occurs, rather than the date of the accident); Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Oregon, 918 P.2d 95 
(Or. 1996)(superceded by st~tute on other grounds}(unless the insurance policy provides 
otherwise, the statute of limitations for an action to enforce an insurer's contractual obligation to 
pay UM/UIM benefits begins to run when the insurer breaches the contract which will generally 
occur when the insurer denies the claim); Bluetreich v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company. 826 
P.2d 1167 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1991 }(limitations period for action to recover benefits under 
underinsured motorist provision began to run when insurer breached contract; date of accident 
not starting point for limitations period}. 
Similarly, because there is generally no statutory periods of limitation or policy 
provisions which specify a time period in which the insured is required to demand or initiate 
arbitration, most courts hold' that the limitations period for initiating an arbitration proceeding is 
the same as that for bringing an action under the policy since arbitration arises out of the 
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insurance contract. See, 2 Auto. Liability Ins. 4th § 32:6. See also, Spear v. California State 
Automobile Association. 831 P.2d 821 (Ca. 1992)(an insured's cause of action against an 
insurance company to compel arbitration of uninsured motorist benefits does not accrue, and the 
statute of limitations based on a written agreement does not begin to run, until the insurance 
company refuses to arbitrate). 
Although it does not appear that Idaho has specifically addressed the issue, prior case law 
suggests it would follow the majority rule. For example, Idaho recognizes that an action on an 
insurance policy is in contract and has therefore found any policy provisions which seeks to limit 
the five year statute of limitations set forth in LC.§ 5-216 to be unconstitutional. See, Sunshine 
Min. Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 25,684 P.2d 1002 (1984). Furthennore, it is well 
established that the statute of limitations on a contract claim does not begin to run until the claim 
accrues upon a breach of the contract. See, Spence v. HowelJ, 126 Idaho 763,890 P.2d 714 
(1995)(statute of limitations on contract claim does not begin to run until claim accrues upon 
breach of contract). · : 
Based on this authority it is doubtful the Idaho Supreme Court would adopt the view that 
the limitations period for bringing a claim against an insurer for UIM benefits begins to run on 
the date of the accident. Although this is the law in some jurisdictions, it is considered the 
minority view and is premised on state law that a cause of action for UM/UIM benefits stems 
from the insured's right of action against the tortfeasor. See, Shelton v. Country Mut. Inc. Co., 
515 N.E.2d 235 (Ill.App. 1987); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Kilbreath, 419 S.2d 632 (Fla. 
1982). " 
Idaho case law has ~t adopted any similar reasoning. To the contrary, in Sullivan v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 111 Idaho 304, 723 P.2d 848 (1986), the Idaho Supreme Court specifically 
stated that it does not agree with those jurisdictions which find that the insurance carrier steps 
into the shoes of the uninsured motorist and becomes an adversary of its own insured 
notwithstanding the premiums that have been paid for coverage. The Court strengthened this 
position in Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,233 P.3d 1221 
(2010), finding that an insurance company has a duty to act in good faith even when its insured 
makes a claim under the UM coverage of the policy because "[t]he covenant requires the parties 
to perform, in good faith, the obligations contained in their agreement." 149 Idaho at 317, citing 
Van v. PortneufMed. ttr., 147 Idaho 552,212 P.3d 982 (2009)(emphasis added). 
Likewise, in Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co .• 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 
(2006), the Idaho Supreme Court.overruled prior case law which allowed prejudgment interest 
for UM/UIM claims to accrue from the date of the accident. In doing so, the Court found that 
the money comes due as provided under the express tenns of the insurance contract. Therefore 







Application'to the Facts of Ms. Klein's Claim 
It is Ms. Klein's position J.C.§ 5-216 is the applicable statute of limitations which 
accrues upon a breach of the insurance contract. Further,'it is Ms. Klein's position there has 
been no breach of her insurance contract which would have started the clock on the five year 
statute of limitations. Ms. Klein's position is supported by the Idaho Supreme Court's decision 
in Walden v. Nationwide Insurance Company. 131 Idaho 18,951 P.2d 949 (1998). 
Walden involved claims for breach of contract and bad faith brought by the insured based 
on the carrier's failure to pay UM benefits. The insured maintained the UM carrier had breached 
the insurance contract by failing to pay benefits and demanding arbitration to determine the 
insured's right ofrecovery. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the UM 
carrier finding the UM carrier had complied with the terms of the policy and therefore was not in 
breach. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Of note is 
the fact the language of the insurance policy at issue in Walden is similar to Ms. Klein's policy 
in that it required an agreement between the insurer and the insured as to what UM/UIM 
damages would be paid. If no agreement could be reached the matter was to be determined 
through arbitration. In affirming, the Court found that the UM carrier properly exercised its right 
to demand arbitration and that it had properly designated an arbitrator pursuant to the terms of 
the policy. Importantly, because the policy required the payment of UM benefits to occur either 
by way of agreement or through arbitration, the UM carrier did not breach its obligations by 
demanding arbitration to resolve the dispute once it determined an agreement could not be 
reached. 
Walden is therefore instructive as to how Ms. Klein's policy should be interpreted. In 
this case, the amount of damages Ms. Klein is entitled to recover is to be determined by 
agreement. As documented above, Farmers agreed to pay the undisputed amount of$75,000 
which Ms. Klein accepted. Thereafter, both Farmers and Ms. Klein discussed the need to resolve 
the disputed portion of her claim, including the possibility of mediation to assist in reaching a 
final agreement. However, no final agreement has been made. More importantly, there has not 
been any disagreement between Ms. Klein and Farmers prompting the need for either Farmers or 
Ms. Klein to demand arbitration. Because there has been no disagreement there has been no 
breach of the policy and the statute of limitations has not begun to accrue. 
As an aside, even assuming the parties' inability to reach a final resolution at the time the 
$75,000 was tendered could be construed as a breach, the $75,000 was tendered on December 
12, 2012. As such, Ms. Klein •s breach of contract claim would not be barred under I.C. § 5-216 







As recognized in Weinstein, a carrier has a duty to act in good faith even when its insured 
makes a claim under the UM/UIM coverage of the policy. "The covenant requires the parties to 
perform, in good faith, the obligatjons contained in their agreement." 149 Idaho at 317. Farmers 
has been acting in good faith up to this point in working towards an agreement to reach a final 
resolution of Ms. Klein's UIM claim. However, should Farmers now attempt to avoid reaching 
such an agreement by arguing her claim is barred by the statute of limitations, such action would 
be in bad faith. This is particularly true in light of the authority discussed above and in light of 
Fanners' representations, both verbally and in writing, concerning Ms. Klein's right to provide 
additional infonnation for its consideration in reaching a final agreement. 
Conclusion 
. Based on the foregoing, Ms. Klein does not believe her claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations. Certainly, if you have any authority to the contrary, I would be happy to consider the 
same. In any event, Ms. Kl~in hereby respectfully requests a fonnal response to her 
supplemental demand including Farmers' assessment of the undisputed amounts now owed to 
Ms. Klein and the amount Fanners still believes is in dispute. Based on my prior discussions 
with Mr. Surmelis, it is my understanding he has already provided his assessment to the 
reviewing committee. As such, I would appreciate a response by July 7, 2017. 
If an agreement cannot be reached concerning the final undisputed amounts, my hope is 
we can then discuss the pathway to reach such a final resolution and whether mediation is a 
viable option as opposed to simply proceeding with arbitration. 
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www.cooper-larsen.com 
Thank you for your letter ofJune 26, 2017. I do, however, continue to believe that Ms. Klein's 
claim is barred by the applicable statute oflimitations. This claim is now more than seven (7) years 
old. More than five (5) years has elapsed since Ms. Klein settled with the at-fault driver who was 
insured by Allstate and more than four ( 4) years elapsed between payment of the "amount justly due" · 
by Farmers and the forwarding of any additional medical docwnentation by your office to support a 
further award. We recognize that the delay is not your fault as you did not become involved until 
some six (6) years after the accident and five (5) years after the settlement with Allstate. 
IMPORTANT TIME LINE FACTS 
Ryan Lewis was apparently representing Ms. Klein soon after the accident on February 1, 
201 O, because on December 14, 201 O, he sent a detailed and extensively documented demand letter 
to Allstate demanding the $25,000 policy limits from its insured and a similarly well documented 
letter to Farmers notifying Farmers that he believed there was a U1M claim under Ms. Klein's 
Farmers' policy. Klein subsequently settled with Allstate and its insured for the $25,000 liability 
limits under the Allstate policy on April 25, 2011. 
Thereafter, by letter dated November 7, 2012, Ryan Lewis submitted a Proof of Loss with 
some 432 pages of medical records to support the U1M claim. On December 12, 2012, Farmers 
notified Ryan Lewis that Farmers considered $75,000 as the "amount justly due" and advised that a 
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check for $75,000 would be printed and delivered the following day. By letter dated December 13, 
2012, the $75,000 check was forwarded to Ryan Lewis and it was cashed. 
In January 2013 Dan Emerson assumed handling of the claim and had some communications 
with Ryan Lewis and on July 7, 2013 Emerson wrote Lewis and asked if "you want us to keep her 
Underinsured Motorist claim open." There was no response. Dan Sunnelis took over the claim in 
Novemberof2013 and sent Ryan Lewis aletterdatedNovemberS, 2013, asking him to call to discuss 
options to resolve the claim including mediation. Follow up letters of December 1, 2013 and January 
22, 2014 reflect that Dan Surmelis talked to Ryan Lewis and asked that he contact him to discuss 
possibly moving this claim towards a final resolution. 
It appears all communication went dark thereafter until July 7, 2016 when you sent a letter of 
that date to Dan Sunnelis advising him that you were now representing Ms. Klein. It was not, 
however, until February 7, 2017, that you actually updated the medical history with a supplemental 
demand packet. You noted in your letter ofF ebruary 7, 2017, that the last communications to Farmers 
about this case were from Ryan Lewis in 2013 and 2014 and you acknowledged the fact that "no 
further information was provided by Mr. Lewis"after his submission dated November 7, 2012. 
DISCUSSION OF LAW ON ACCRUAL OF CLAIM FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT 
I agree with you that the policy is silent as to when a UIM claim must be submitted, but I do 
not agree that this somehow extends indefinitely the time within which to demand arbitration under 
the policy provisions. I think that we both agree that statute oflimitations on insurance contracts is 
the written contract five (5) year statute of limitations contained in I.C. Section 5-216. Sunshine Min. 
Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 25,684 P.2d 1002 (1984). The question is when did the 
statute of limitations accrue for purposes of starting the clock running. 
I also agree that some courts have held that the statute oflimitations for UIM claims accrues 
when the contract is breached, either by partial payment or denial ofbenefits. However, I do not agree 
with our assertion that this is the majority rule today, even if it was at one time. It has proven to be 
an unworkable rule which has extended the time within which to make UIM claims nearly indefinitely. 
After years of hearing arguments about when the statute oflimitations accrued under this rule, the 
Courts have sought a better reasoned and faier rule for determining the "accrual" date. 
Some courts have held that the statute of limitations on UIM claims accrues on the date of the 
accident. The advantage to this rule is that it gives certainty to the "accrual" date and that leaves no 
uncertainty. Woodall v. Travelers Indem. Co., 699 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1997) (Injured parties' cause of 
action against its underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier for UIM benefits accrues on date of accident, ' 
even if injured parties'policycontains provision that payment will be made only after limits ofliability 
have been used up under all applicable bodily injury liability policies); Green v. Selective Ins. Co. of 
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Am., 144 N .J. 344, 676 A.2d 1074 ( 1996) (Statute oflimitations on claims for uninsured motorist and 
underinsured motorist (UM/U1M) benefits runs from date of accident, rather than breach of policy). 
However, the "date of accident" rule has admittedly not caught on with a majority of courts. 
But, the emerging and better reasoned rule which has been adopted by a considerable number of other 
courts concludes that the statute of limitations accrues on the date of settlement with or judgment 
against the tortfeasor. In this case that was on April 25, 2011, more than five (5) years before you 
became involved. in the case and notified Dan Surmelis that you were representing Ms. Klein and 
wished to submit a supplemental claim for the remaining limits of her UIM benefit. Your analysis has 
ignored this line of cases. See Danes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 407 (Minn. 2000) 
(Designating the date of settlement with or judgment against the tortfeasor as the accrual date for UIM 
claims protects both the insured's and the insurer's rights by insuring that the claimant will not be 
enabled to forestall the commencement of the limitations period indefinitely by failing to assert the 
U1M claim); Brown v. Am. Family Ins. Grp., 989 P .2d 196, 198 (Colo. App. 1999) (if we were to hold 
that the statute is triggered only when the carrier refuses payment, such would allow the claimant to 
present his demand at any time after the settlement and would effectively eliminate the statute of 
limitations and frustrate its purpose); Consiglio v. Transamerica Ins. Grp., 55 Conn. App. 134, 737 
A.2d 969 (1999) (six-year statute of limitations for breach of contract began to run when the action 
against the tort-feasor was settled, not when the accident occurred); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. 
v. Rosenthal, 484 F.3d 251,257 (3d Cir. 2007) (we hold that the four-year statute oflimitations begins 
to run when the insured settles his claim with or obtains an award from the underinsured driver); 
Brittain v. Nat'l Cas. Co., 997 F. Supp. 2d 300 (W.D. Pa. 2014) (Under Pennsylvania law, a statute 
of limitations on a underinsured motorist (UIM) claim accrues on the date of settlement with the 
underinsured driver); Prudential Prop. & Gas. Ins. Co. v. Perez-Henderson, 49 Conn. App. 653, 714 
A.2d 1281 (1998) (Six-year statute of limitations applicable to contract claim for underinsured 
motorist (UIM) benefits began to run on the date of the insured's settlement with the tort-feasor); 
Wheeler v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 749 F.Supp. 660, 662 (E.D.Pa.1990); Boyle v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 310 Pa.Super. 10,456 A.2d 156,162 (1983)); and North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 115 N.C.App. 666, 446 S.E.2d 364, 369 (1994). 
I do not agree with your assertion that the Idaho appellate courts are likely to adopt the rule you 
are advocating. Before Ryan Lewis and Ms. Klein settled with Allstate on April 25, 2011, the Idaho 
Supreme Court changed the law in Idaho by holding that an exhaustion clause in an underinsured 
motorist (UIM) automobile insurance policy, requiring the insured to deplete all of the tortfeasor's 
bodily injury insurance before collecting UIM benefits, is void, unenforceable, and severable. From 
that point forward the claimant with an underinsured motorist benefit claim was pennitted to make 
claim for and collect UIM benefits against his/her own insurer immediately following an accident 
which imposed a corresponding obligation on the insurer to investigate and attempt to resolve the 
claim in good faith regardless of whether or when the insured settled with the tortfeasor's insurer or, 
if so, for how much. Hill v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619,249 P.3d 812 (2011). It is my 
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belief that the decision in Hill makes it extremely likely that the Idaho appellate courts will now hold 
that the statute oflimitations for UIM benefit claims accrues on the date of the accident, because that 
is when the insured is allowed to pursue the claim for UIM benefits. In my opinion, in the wake of 
Hill, it is unlikely that the Idaho Courts will adopt the difficult to apply "breach" accrual rule. If 
insureds can now make a UIM claim immediately following an accident, there is no reason to delay 
the accrual of the statute of limitations on pursuing that right. 
RESPONSE TO SUPPLEMENTAL DEMAND 
Based on the foregoing, I believe Farmers has acted at all times in good faith. The fact that 
Farmers has permitted you and Ms. Klein to submit a supplemental demand under the UIM provision 
ofher policy is a testament to the fairness with which Ms. Klein is being treated. We agree that Idaho 
does not have a clear and definitive decision determining when the statute of limitations for a UIM 
claim accrues, so the claim is and remains fairly debatable. We hope that this is not the case which 
will resolve the "accrual" issue, but if it is we believe we have a strong basis to defeat Ms. Klein's 
supplemental claim. 
However, to avoid the uncertainties of litigation and to further show good faith Farmers has 
authorized me to advise that it will participate in mediation to try to resolve Ms. Klein's supplemental 
claim. By doing so Farmers does not waive any defenses it has to Ms. Klein's supplemental claim, 
including but not limited to its statute of limitations defense. In that regard please be advised that 
Farmers considers causation for the additional medical treatment beyond that which was documented 
in the original proof ofloss dated November 7, 2012, a significant issue which causes us to conclude 
that the $100,000 in combh1ed proceeds from the settlement of the underlying case plus payment of 
the amount not in dispute amounts to full satisfaction of the damages suffered by Ms. Klein in this 
accident which occurred over seven (7) years ago. 
Please advise if you and your client ar · ling to participate in mediation. 
GLC: 
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This letter follows our prior discussions in reference to the above matter and attempts to 
resolve Ms. Klein's UIM claim through mediation. Given Farmers' reliance on a statute of 
limitations defense which is not supported by the policy of insurance or Idaho law, as well as its 
unwillingness to participate in meaning settlement negotiations, it appears Ms. Klein is now 
compelled to reach a resolution of her claim through arbitration per the terms of her policy. Please 
be advised that should arbitration become necessary Ms. Klein intends to pursue the amounts justly 
due her under the terms of her policy, as well as pre-judgment/pre-arbitration interest and attorneys 
fees as provided under I.C. §41-1839. Certainly if Farmers believes there are other alternatives to 
reach a resolution of this claim I am happy to discuss them with you. 
Please let me know if you have any further questions. 
KELI 
















Gary Cooper <gary@cooper-larsen.com> 
Tuesday, November 21, 2017 2:07 PM 
Ken Lyon 
Barbie Snell 
Klein - Farmers arbitration 
This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated October 26, 2017 to Dan Surmelis demanding 
arbitration. Although you did not strictly comply with the policy provisions for demanding arbitration I have 
recommended that Farmers accept your letter as an effective demand for arbitration. Farmers proposes that we 
use Marv Smith to arbitrate the issues which are subject to arbitration under the provisions of the policy. I 
talked to Marv. He believes he can be neutral even though he mediated the case. As a retired judge and very 
experienced neutral I accept him at his word. He is one of the better arbitrators in Idaho and is used quite often 
in that capacity. I do not recall ever using him as an arbitrator, but have used him many times as a mediator. I 
have also tried cases in front of him as a judge and find him to be fair and impartial. 
I have requeted authority to file a Declaratory Judgment Action to resolve the statute of limitations issue. I 
hope to have that authority in the next several days and will let you know when I file it here in Bannock 
County. 
Have a good Thanksgiving. 
Gary 
Gary L. Cooper 
COOPER & LARSEN 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: 
DO NOT read, copy, save, or disseminate this communication unless you are the intended recipient. This E-Mail communication contains confidential and/or 
privileged information intended only for the named recipients. If you have received this communication in error, please call us (collect) immediately at (208) ~35-
1145 and ask to speak to the sender of the communication; or please send a reply e-mail to the sender and notify the sender immediately that you have received 
this communication in error. 
This communication was not written and cannot be used for the purposes of avoiding federal tax penalties that may be imposed on you, unless specifically stated. 
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Ken Lyon 
From: Ken Lyon 
Sent: 
To: 
Tuesday, November 21, 2017 2:39 PM 
'Gary Cooper' 
Subject: RE: Klein - Farmers arbitration 
Gary-
Thank you for the acknowledgement. However, my letter to Mr. Surmelis was not meant as a formal demand for 
arbitration. Rather, my intent is to file a complaint demanding arbitration pursuant to the terms of the policy. I have it 
drafted and should have it filed by the first of next week. This should alleviate any need for you to file for declaratory 
relief as I anticipate we can address the statute of limitations issue on a motion to dismiss. 
As far as the appointment of an arbitrator, unfortunately we cannot agree to Marv Smith. If you have any other 
suggestions please let me know. I will also work on getting some choices for you to consider. 
I hope you also have a good Thanksgiving. Let me know if you have any further questions. 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Ill 
Law Offices of Kenneth E. Lyon, Ill 
10389 Double R Blvd. 
Reno, NV 89521 
Phone(775)398-5800 
Fax (775) 398-5801 
This email transmission is intended for the exclusive use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed, and may 
contain privileged and confidential information that is protected by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC 
Section 2701 ET.SEQ., and NRS Sections 179.425-179.450 and 205.320, and may also be protected under the attorney 
client, work product or other privilege. If you are not the intended recipient of this communication, you are hereby 
notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strickly prohibited. If you have 
received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately by telephone (775-398-5800) or fax (775-398-5801), or 
email, and delete the original message. 
From: Gary Cooper [mailto:gary@cooper-larsen.com] 
Sent: Tuesday, November 21, 2017 2:07 PM 
To: Ken Lyon <ken@LYONLAW.NET> 
Cc: Barbie Snell <barbie@cooper-larsen.com> 
Subject: Klein - Farmers arbitration 
Ken: 
This will acknowledge receipt of your letter dated October 26, 2017 to Dan Surmelis demanding 
arbitration. Although you did not strictly comply with the policy provisions for demanding arbitration I have 
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recommended that Farmers accept your letter as an effective demand for arbitration. Farmers proposes that we 
use Marv Smith to arbitrate the issues which are subject to arbitration under the provisions of the policy. I 
talked to Marv. He believes he can be neutral even though he mediated the case. As a retired judge and very 
experienced neutral I accept him at his word. He is one of the better arbitrators in Idaho and is used quite often 
in that capacity. I do not recall ever using him as an arbitrator, but have used him many times as a mediator. I 
have also tried cases in front of him as a judge and find him to be fair and impartial. 
I have requeted authority to file a Declaratory Judgment Action to resolve the statute of limitations issue. I 
hope to have that authority in the next several days and will let you know when I file it here in Bannock 
County. 
Have a good Thanksgiving. 
Gary 
Gary L. Cooper 
COOPER & LARSEN 
CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE: 
DO NOT read, copy, save, or disseminate this communication unless you are the intended recipient. This E-Mail communication contains confidential and/or 
privileged information intended only for the named recipients. If you have received this communication in error, please call us (collect) immediately at (208) 235-
1145 and ask to speak to the sender of the communication; or please send a reply e-mail to the sender and notify the sender immediately that you have received 
this communication in error. 
This communication was not written and cannot be used for the purposes of avoiding federal tax penalties that may be imposed on you, unless specifically stated. 
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Tuesday, November 28, 2017 10:58 AM 
'Gary Cooper' 
Klein v. Farmers 
Complaint.11.22.17.pdf; Summons.11.22.17 .pdf 
Attached is a courtesy copy of the Summons and Complaint filed on November 22, 2017 in the above matter. Let me 
know if you are authorized to accept service on behalf of Farmers or whether I need to send this out to a process 
server. As far as potential arbitrators, we would propose Anthony Park or Judge McKee. 
Let me know if you have any further questions. 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Ill 
Law Offices of Kenneth E. Lyon, Ill 
10389 Double R Blvd. 
Reno, NV 89521 
Phone(775)398-5800 
Fax (775) 398-5801 
This email transmission is intended for the exclusive use of the individual or entity to whom it is addressed, and may 
contain privileged and confidential information that is protected by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC 
Section 2701 ET.SEQ., and NRS Sections 179.425-179.450 and 205.320, and may also be protected under the attorney 
client, work product or other privilege. If you are not the intended recipient of this communication, you are hereby 
notified that any dissemination, distribution, or copying of this communication is strickly prohibited. If you have 
received this transmission in error, please notify us immediately by telephone (775-398-5800) or fax (775-398-5801), or 




AMENDING CUSTOMIZING EQUIPMENT EXCLUSION 
YOUR E-Z READER CAR POLICY 
It Is agreed that your policy Is amended as follows: 
Under PART IV - DAMAGE TO YOUR CAR, Exclusion number 10 Is deleted and replaced with: 
e1248 
1st Edition 
To a van, plck--up or panel truck due to Increased cost of repair or replacement of the following furnishings or 
equipment: 
a. Special carpeting, Insulation, wan covelfng, fumiture or bars. 
b. Dining, kitchen and sleeplng facllltles Including enclosures or bathroom facllllies. 
c. Height-extending roofs. 
d. Murals, speclals paint and/or methods of painting, decals or graphics. 
This endorsement Is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contmry. It Is othelWise 
subject to all other tenns of the polfcy. 




ENDORSEMENT ADDING REGULAR AND FREQUENT 
USE EXCLUSION TO PART II 
It Is agieed that the following excluslon Is added to the Exclusions under Patt II of your policy. 
e1210 
1st Edition 
Uninsured Motorist Coverage (and Underfnsured Motorist Covemge If applicable) does not apply to 
damages arising out of lhe ownelShlp, maintenance, or use of any vehicle other than your Insured car 
(or your Insured motorcycle If this ls a motorcycle pollcy), which Is owned by or furnished or available 
for the mgular use by you or a famlly member. 
This endorsement Is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anylhlng to the conbary. It Is othelwlse 
subject to all other tenns of the pollcy. 
91-1210 1ST EDITION 1-94 E1210101 
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V 
AMENDED BUSINESS USE EXCLUSION 
(Your E - Z Reader Car Polley) 
e1200 
1st Edition 
It Is agreed that Excluslon 6. Under PART 1- LIABILITY Is deleted and replaced wilh the followlng: 
Bodily Injury or property damage artslng out of the ownelShlp, maintenance or use of any vehlcle by any 
peison employed or otherwise engaged In a business other than the business descrtbed In Excluslon 5. 
This exclusion does not apply to the maintenance or use of a: 
a. Private passenger car. 
b. Utlllty car that you own, If rated as a private passenger car, or 
c. Utllity traller used with a vehicle described In a. orb. above. 
However, this exclusion does apply to any vehlcle: 
1. While used In el11)loyment by any peison whose primary duties am the delivery of products or services; 
or, 
2. While used In any employment In an emergency occupation on a full-time, part-dme, or wlunteer basis. 
SUch occupations Include. but are not Bmlled to, Fire Fighting, .Ani>ulance, or Pollce activities. However, 
this exclusion does not apply to the vehicle descdbed In the Declaradons or any private passenger car 
or utlllty car with which you mplace It 
3. Which Is one of a fleet or pool of vehlcles which are provided for the use of an Insured person In the 
COUJSe of his or her employment, unless such vehicle Is speclflcally Isled In the Declarations. 
This endorsement Is part of your pollcy. It supeisedes and controls anything to the contrary. It Is otherwise 
subject to all other tenns of the pollcy. 
81-1200 1ST EDITION 4-92 D-96 
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SCHEDULE FOR HIGHER 




For an additional premium, It Is agreed that the folowlng optional limits are added to UNDERlnsured 












Coverage C - 1 UNDERlnsured Motorist Coverage e1179i 1st Edition 
For an addltlonal premium It Is agmed that UNDER Insured Molmtst Coverage C-1 Is added to Part II of your 
policy. 
We wlll pay all Sll11S which an Insured person Is legally entitled to nroover as damages from the owner or 
opera10r of an UNDERlnsured motor vehicle because of bodlly Injury SUSlalned by the Insured person. 
Limits of Llablllty 
a. Our llabllily under the UNDERlnsured Motorist Coverage cannot exceed the limlls of the UNDERlnsured 
Motorist Coverage sta1e<I In this policy, and our maximum llabDily under the UNDERlnsured Motorist 
Coverage Is the lesser of: 
1. The d"lffesence between the amount paid In damages to the Insured person by and for any person or 
oiganlzation who may be legally Hable for the bodily Injury, and the limit of UNDERlnsured Motorist 
Coverage; or 
2. The amount of damages established but not 19COVered by any agteement, settlement, or Judgment 
with or for the peJSOn or organization legally liable for the bodily Injury. 
b. We wDI pay up to the Omits of llablllly shown In the schedule below as shown In the Declarations. (Note: 





















c. The llmlt for '"8ch pets0n" Is the maximum for bodlly Injury suslalned by any peJSOn In any one 
occunence. Any dalm for loss of consortium or Injury to the selationshlp arising from this lnJury shall be 
Included In this llnll 
If the financial JeSfJOnslbllty law of the place of the accident beats the loss of consortium as a separate 
claim, financial aesponslblllly lmlls wlD be fumlshed. · 
d. Subject to the Bmlt for '"8ch pe1SOn," Ille lmlt for '"8ch occurrence" Is the maxlnun cormlned amount 
for bodily lnJury SUSlalned by two or moae pemons In any one occurrence. 
Addltlonal Definitions Used In This Part Only 
a. Insured person means: 
1. Youorafamlly member. 
2. Any Olher pemon whlle occupying your Insured car or your Insured motorcycle. 
3. Any peJSOn for damages that pelSOll ls entflled to recover because of bodily Injury to you, a famlly 
member, or ofler occupant of your Insured car or your Insured motorcycle. 
But, no peJSOn shaU be consldel8d an Insured person If the person uses a vehlcle without having sufficient 
reason to beleve that the use Is wllh pelmlsslon of the owner. 
b. Motor vehlcle means a land motorvehlcle ora 111ller but does not mean a vehicle: 
91-1184 1STEOITION 1-80 {Canllnued Next Page) E-96 E1184101 
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1. Operated on ralls or cmwler-beads. 
2. Which Is a fann type bactor or any equipment designed or modffled for use prlnclpalfy off public roads 
whlle not on publfc roads. 
3. Located for use as a iesldence or paemlses. 
c. Underlnsured Motor Vehicle .:. means a land motor vehlcle when: 
1. lhe owne.lShlp, maintenance or use Is insured or bonded for bodily Injury llablllty at lhe time of the 
accident; and 
2. lls IJmft for bodily Injury llabllly Is less than the amount of the Insured person's damages. 
An underlnsured motor vehlcle does not Include a land motor vehlcle: 
(a) Insured under the llabllity coverage of this pollcy; 
(b) fumlshed or available for the regular use of you or any famlly member; 
(c) owned by any govemmenlal unit or agency; 
(d) which are fann bactots and other off road designed vehlcles and equipment; 
(e) defined as an '\mlnsured motor vehlcle" In your pollcy; 
(f) which Is self Insured within the meaning of any flnanclal responslblllly law which applies. 
Other Insurance 
1. We will pay under this coverage only after the limlls of llablllly under any appJlcable bodlly Injury llablllly 
bonds or policles have been exhaUSled by payment of judgments or settlements. 
2. The amount of UNDERlnsumd Motoltst Coverage we wlll pay shall be reduced by the amount of any 
other bodily Injury coverage available to any party held to be liable for the accident. 
3. If any other colleellble Insurance applies to a loss coveaed by this part, we will pay only our share. Our 
share Is the propoltlon that our Umlts of llablllty bear to the total of all appRcable limits. 
4. We wlD not provide l11SU18nce for a vehicle other than your Insured car or your Insured motorcycle, 
unless the owner of that vehicle has no other Insurance applicable to this part 
5. If any appllcable lnsuraooe other than this policy Is Issued to you by us or any other mermer CXJ111J8"Y of 
the Fannem Insurance Group of Coq,anles, the total amount payable among an such polcles shaU not 
exceed the Umils provided for the single vehicle with the highest limits of llabllly. 
Under Part II of the pollcy the provisions that apply to Exclusions and AlblbatJon remain the same and apply 
to this endoisement. 
This endorsement Is part of your pollcy. It supensedes and controls anything lo the conllary. It Is otherwise 
subject lo all other leffllS of the policy. 
91-1194 1SfEDfTION 1-90 E1194102 
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ENDORSEMENT AMENDING DEFINITION 
OF INSURED PERSON UNDER PART I• LIABILITY 
e1154 
2nd Edition 
It Is agreed that under Part I " UabDlly, Items 2 and 3 lDlder 'Insured Person does not mean:" are amended 
to read as foRows: 
2. Any pelSOll, Including but not llmlled to a famlly member, for bodfly lnJury or property damage arising 
from the operation of a vehlcle by that petSOn as an eJq,loyee of the United States Govemment when lhe 
provisions of the Federal Tort Clalm Act. apply. 
3. Any pe1SOn, lncludlng but not llmlted to a family member, who uses a vehicle without having sufficient 
reason to believe lhat the use Is with the pennlsslon of the owner. 
This endorsement Is palt of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It Is otherwise 
sub)ect to all other tenns of the policy. 
91-1174 2ND EDITION 9-93 E1174201 
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ENDORSEMENT AMENDING DEFINITION 
OF UNINSURED MOTOR VEHICLE 
It Is agreed that under Part II - Uninsured Motorist, the following changes apply: 
E1105G 
1st Edition 
1. The words "(Including Underinsured Motorist Coverage)," If shown fn the title "Coverage C, • are deleted 
from the title "Coverage C.11 (Does not apply to E-Z Reader Motorcycle Policy.) 
2. Item 3b of "Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only" is deleted. 
3. Paragraph 2 (paragraph 1-Your E-Z Reader Motorcycle Policy) under •Other Insurance" Is deleted. 
4. The words "Except as provided In paragraph 2 above11 (paragraph 1-Your E-2 Reader Motorcycle Polley) 
are deleted from paragraph 3 (paragraph 2-Your E-2 Reader Motoroycle Poffcy) under "Other Insurance." 
This endorsement Is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It Is otherwise 
subject to all other terms of the policy. 







ENDORSEMENT AMENDING PART I • UABILITY 
(Your E·Z Reader Car Policy) 
It is agreed that Your E-Z Reader Car Policy is amended as follows: 




If there is other applicable Auto Liability Insurance on any other policy that applies to a loss covered by this 
part. we will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that 9ur limits of liabllity bear to the total of all 
applicable limits. . 
Any insurance we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insurance. 
If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you by us or any other member company of the 
Farmers Insurance Gt'Oup of C.Ompanies, the total amount payable among all such policies shall not exceed 
the limits provided by the single policy with the highest limits of liability. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls :tnything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all other teims of the policy. 




It is agreed that your policy is amended as follows: 
Under Part W - Damage to Your On; limits of Uability, item 1. {Item 2. in AZ, ID, IA, MI, MO, Ml', OH, 
OK and WI) is deleted and replaced by the following: 
1. The amount necessary to repair or replace the property or pal'fs with other of like kind and quali1T, or 
with new property less an ai(jmCment forph)sical deterioration and/ or depi~on. Property of like kind 
and quality includes, but is not limited to, parts made for or by the vehicle manufacturer. It also includes 
parts from other sourees such as rebuilt palfs, quality recycled (med) parts and parts supplied by 
non-o.rlgioal equipment manufacturem. 
This endo1Sement is part of yow.· policy. It supe1Sedes and controls anything to the contrmy. It is othemise 
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It is agreed that your policy is amended as desclibed below: 
Part m - MEDICAL is deleted and replaced with the following: 
PARrlll • MUOI. 




We will pay reasonable expenses for necessaiy medical services incumd within thtee )learS from the 
date of the accident because of bodily injury sustained by an insured pemon which was discovered and 
treated within one year of the accident. 
Jd:ltia1:11 llifritlcm Ue:lln 'Dis Pat Qty 
As used in this part, insured pemon means: 
1. You or any family member while occupying, or through being struck by, a motor vehicle or tmilei; 
designed for use on public roads. 
2. Any other pe1SOn while occupying your insured car while the car is being used by you, a family 
member 01· anothei· pemon if that pemon has .sufficient reason to believe that the use is wifh pennission 
of the owner. 
Necessary Medical Services means medical services which are usual and custommy for treatment of the 
iajmy, including the number or duration of treafments, in the county in which those services are provided. 
Necessary Medical Services are limi1ed to necessary medical, swgicaJ, dental, x-my, ambulance, hospital, 
profesmonal DlllSing and funeml services, and include the cost of phaonaceuticals, orthopedic and piosthetic· 
devices, eyeglasses, and headng aid& We will l1!imbmse you for any necessary medical services already 
paid by you. 
Necessary Medical Services do not include: 
1. Treahnent, services, pmducts 01•procedum that are: 
a. Experlmental in na1me, forreseareb, 01· not prlmmily designed to serve a medical pmpose; or 
b. Not commonly and customarily recognized throughout Che medical p»fession and within Che Unired 
S1ates as appropriate for the treatment of bodily injw.y; or 
2. 'The use of: 
a. Thennogmphy orotherreJated procedures of a similar nann:e; or 
b. Acupuncture or other related procedllft!S of a similar nature. 
3. Pmd&e, mual cost, or use of: 
a. Hot tum, spas, waterheds, 
b. Exercise equipment, 
c. Heating or vibrating devices, 
d. Furniture or e<JUiC:1 not prlmarily designed to se1ve a medical pmpose, 
e. Membelsbips m clubs, 
t Medical repods unless requested by us. 
Reasonable Expenses means expemes which are usual and custooa.y fornecessary medical services in 
the county in which those services are provided. We will :reimbume )'OU for any reasonable expenses 
already paid by you. 
Bc:duiaB 
This covemge does not apply for bodily injury to any pemon: 
1. Sustained while occupying your insured car when used to can.y pemons for a charge. 'Ilm exclusion 
does not apply to shared-expense carpools. 
2. Sustained while eccupying any vehicle while looded for use as a RSideuce orpmnises. 





4. Susmined while occupying or when sfruck by any vehicle (other Chan your insured car) which is owned 
by or fmnished or avaiJable for the regular use of you or any family member. 
5. Sustained while occupying a vehicle o1her 1han the car described in 1he Dedamtions while 1he vehicle is 
being used Jn the business or occupation of an insured person. 
6. Due to heait attacks, ·strokes, and other medical conditions orWnesses not camally related to an accident. 
7. Occuning during the cowse of employment if wolkers' compemafion benefifs me required. 
8. Caused by war (declmM or undeclared), dvil war, insmrection, rebellion, 1evolution, nuclear maction, 
mdiafion, or mdioactive confmnioation, or any consequence of any of these. 
9. Dming active participation in any organized or agn!ed-upon lacing or speed contest or demonstmtion, or 
in pmctice or prepamtion for any such contest. · 
10. Where medical expemes are paid or payable by any govemmental entity. 
D!tanfretimd ~ 
DetemJinafion of what are 1-easonable expenses and/ or necessary medical sel'Yices may be submitted to 
an independent medical consultant. Detenninafion as to whe1her an insured person is legally entitled to 
1ecover, and in what amount shall be made by agreement between 1he insured person and. us. If no 
agreement is reached, the decision will be made by mbitration. 
Atitraim 
If an insured person and we do not agree, (1) fftat the peison is entitled to m:over for medical seIVices, (2) 
1hat the medical services are a .result of a covered accident, or (3) as to 1he nature, t'n!quency, or cost of the 
medical services, either1hat person orwe may demand that 1he issue be detennined by mbifmtion. 
In that event, an addtmtor will be selected by the insured penon and us. If Bgl\lement on an mbitmtor 
cannot be reached within 30 da)1s, the judge of a court having jurisdiction will appoint the mbitrator. The 
expense of 1he mbitmtor and all other expenses of the mbitration will be shared equally. Attorney fees and 
fees paid for the witnesses are not expenses of mt>ittation and will be paid by the party incuning fftem. 
The mbittator shall detennine (1) if the medical seivices are as a molt of a covered accident, (2) if 1he 
medical services incumd are iemonable and necessm.y, and (3) the amount of any payment under this part as 
detennined by this policy. 
Arl>itration will take place in the county where 1he insured person lives. Local comt rules governing 
pmcedures and evidence will apply. 'The decision in writing of the mbmator will be subject to the tenm of 
this insumnce. 
Unit d llablity 
Reganlless of 1he number of vehicles insured, insuml persons, clahm or policies, or vehicles involved in the 
accident, we will l»\l' no more for medical expenses including funeml expemes, fftan the limit of liability 
shown for this coverage in the Dedamfions for each person btjured in any one accident. In no event sball 
ffte limit of liabllity for funeral expemes exceed $2,000 each person. 
Qtalremm 
If there is other applicable automobile medical insumnce on any other policy 1hat applies to a loss covend by 
Om part, we will pay only our share. Our share is ft1e propomon 1hat our limit of liability bears to the total of 
all applicable limits. 
Any insurance we provide to any insured peuon for a substitute or non-owned motor vehicle or hailer, 
shall be excess over any offter collectible insurance. 
If any applicable inmrance other Oum this policy Js issued to you by m or any offter member company of ffte 
Fannem Jnsunmce G1oup of Companies, the total amount payable among all such pollcles shall not exceed 
the limits provided by the single policy with the highest limits of liability • 
. Qr Rgt toRIDB" Payrrat 
When a person m been paid damages by us under this policy and also m:oveis from another, the amount 
m:ovmd from the other will be held by that person in tmst for us and reimbwsed to us to the extent of our 
p,vment. 
'l1u condidon does not apply if prohibited by state law. 
'l1u endomement is part of your policy. It supemedes and controls anything to die contmty. It is otherwise 
subject to allothertenm of the policy. 





For an additional premium, it is agiffll that the deductible applying to C.Ovaage F - C.Omprehensive is 
ieplaced by a $100 deductible fora covered loss to safety glass. 
Our limit of liability for loss is the amount necessm.y to replace safety glass. 
This endomement Is pmt of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to Che contmty. It is othenvise 














Law Off.lees of 
LOWELLN. IIAWKBS, CHARTBRBD 
1322 East Center 
Pocatello, Idaho 8320 I 
Licensed in Idaho and Utah (208) 235-1600 Fax (208) 235-4200 
VIA FAX 800-788-4997 
Jonathan Wing 
Allstate Indemnity Company 
POBox3036 
Bothwell, WA 98041 
Re: Erica Klein 
Claim Number: 
Date of Crash: 
Your Insured;· 
Dear Mr. Wing: 
July 16, 2010 
OJ 596313230WJ 
February 1, 2010 
SethHale 
We represent Erica Klein relative to the car crash with your insured Seth 
Hale, identified by your letters as Claim Number 0159631323OWJ. 
By this letter Ms. Klein revokes any priot Releases or Authorizations or 
other al;lthority to obtain any information. Additionally, we request that all information 
and documents obtained by the prior use of any authorization be sent to our office along 
with the letters sent by Allstate requesting information. Also, ifyou have taken any 
statement of the Ms. Klein please furnish a copy of the tape, transcript and any memo 
referencing any unrecorded portion. 
In an effort to resolve these claims pl~ase also provide us the cover~ge 
limits of your insureds. 
Any further correspondence with Ms. Klein should be through our office. 
Many thanks. 
RSL/kj 







Jan. 6. 201110:22AM V 
,-, -J '\ ) 
~II tat Idaho-B. Waah1ngton S e ,.. o s~ ,eaq •BOIS:S ID 83701 
\'bu'hl In good hands. 
1,1111,1 •1rlr 1JII In Ii (ld(hfill1l1(llnlll 1lrfl lal mlh 111, ,n 
LOWELL N. HAWKES '!,AW OFrXCSS 
1322 E CENTER ST 
POCATELLO ID 83201-4702 
January 06, 2011 
lNSUlWD; S2THHALE 
DATE OF LOSS: February 01, 2010 
CLAIM NUMlJBR: 01S9631323 SKS 





PHONB NOMBBR.: 800-3.S9-.S.S6S 
FAXNUMBBR: 866-514-2967 
P. 1 
OP.F!CE HOURS: Mon - Prl 8:00 am - 5:30 pm. 
Sat 8:00 am- 2:00 pm 
Enclosed is a copy of my insured's dee. sheet to verify the policy limil$ of$25,000. Thi$ jg in regards to the Brica Klein case. 
I have offered you the policy limits to settle this case. 
S~ncerely, 
.KENNETH SAVILLE 
800-359-5565 Bxt. 3822 
Alls111te Indemnity Company 









January 4, 2011 
014832 
1111•1111•h11111•ll1l·1•1111•1111111•1111·•111111l1ll1•••11•11•1 
Law Offices Of Lowell Hawkes 
1322 B Center St 
Pocatell?, ID 83201-4702 
RE: Insured: 










V ,. . 
Senl , corcespoodence to: 
Fal:lllers National Document Center 
P.O. Box268994 




JAN l_fJ 2011 
I appreciate your call informing me that Allstate, the th4"d party carrier has offered their liability 
limits. You have our permission to resolve the third party claim. We will not however be waiving the 
med pay subrogation. 
I am looking forward to receivfog your proof of loss submission to us for UIM coverage with Ms. 
Klein's medical support. We will need all medical specials and corresponding records as a result of the 
above accident. In addition will need to review records from all her providers she has see five year prior 
to this accident to complete an accurate evaluation. 
If you have any questions or concerns, please feel free to contact me at (208) 589-6895. 
Sincerely, 
Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
~tJ~m~ 
Mike Morrissey, GCA 
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3. Plaintiffs file included the following documents, a true and correct copy of which are 
attached hereto and designated as: 
Exhibit 1 -A true and correct copy of Plaintiffs insurance policy with Defendant. 
Exhibit 2 - A true and correct copy of the Pocatello Police Department Accident 
Report Insurance Information Sheet. 
Exhibit 3 - A true and correct copy of correspondence from Ryan Lewis to Allstate 
Insurance Company, dated July 16, 2010. 
Exhibit 4 - A true and correct copy of correspondence from Allstate Insurance 
Company to Ryan Lewis, dated January 6, 2011. 
Exhibit 5 - A true and correct copy of correspondence from Farmers Insurance to 
Ryan Lewis, dated January 4, 2011. 
Exhibit 6 - A true and correct copy of a Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement 
signed by Plaintiff Erica Klein effective April 25, 2011. 
4. Other documentation generated during Affiant's representation of Plaintiff include the 
following documents, a true and correct copy of which are attached hereto and 
designated as: 
Exhibit 7 -A true and correct copy of email correspondence from Affiant to Farmers 
Insurance, dated April 4, 2017. 
Exhibit 8 -A true and correct copy of email correspondence from Affiant to Farmers 
Insurance, dated May 1 7, 201 7. 
Exhibit 9 -A true and correct copy of correspondence from Affiant to Gary Cooper, 



































Exhibit 10 -A true and correct copy of correspondence from Gary Cooper to Affiant, 
dated July 11, 2017. 
Exhibit 11 - A true and correct copy of correspondence from Affiant to Farmers, dated 
October 26, 2017. 
Exhibit 12 - A true and correct copy of email correspondence from Gary Cooper to 
Affiant, dated November 21, 2017. 
Exhibit 13 - A true and correct copy of email correspondence from Affiant to Gary 
Cooper, dated November 21, 2017. 
Exhibit 14 - A true and correct copy of email correspondence from Affiant to Gary 
Cooper, dated November 28, 2017. 
5. Affiant further states that in discussions with Dan Surmelis, following notice of 
Affiant's representation of Klein, Mr. Sumelis confirmed that Klein's UIM claim was 
still open and that Farmers was still agreeable to resolving her claim by way of 
mediation. 
6. Affiant further states that in discussions with Mr. Surmelis following the submission 
of Klein's supplemental UIM demand, Mr. Surmelis confirmed receipt of Klein's 
demand package and advised Affiant that he had completed his evaluation of the claim 
and that he had sent his evaluation to his supervisors and was awaiting their response. 

































7. Affiant further states that on or about May 19, 2017, Affiant received a telephone call 
from attorney Gary Cooper advising Affiant of his representation of Farmers Insurance 
in reference to Plaintiffs UIM claim. At that time, Mr. Cooper advised Affiant that 
Farmers believed Plaintiffs UIM claim could be barred by the statute of limitations. 
Affiant expressed his disagreement with Farmers position. Both Affiant and Mr. 
Cooper agreed to research the issue further and exchange their findings. 
8. Affiant further states that on September 22, 2017, the parties participated in mediation 
in an attempt to resolve Plaintiffs UIM claim. However, the mediation was 
unsuccessful in reaching a final settlement of Klein's UIM claim. 
FURTHER AF~ SA YETH NOT. 













CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this date, I served the foregoing Affidavit of Kenneth E. Lyon, 
III in Support of Plaintifrs Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment on the 
party(ies) set forth below by: 
Placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope placed for 
collecting and mailing in the United States mail, at Reno, Nevada, postage 
prepaid, following ordinary business practices. 























Gary L. Cooper - Attorney at Law 
J.D. Oborn -Attorney at Law 
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered 
151 North Third A venue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Electronic: gary@cooper-larsen.com 
jd@cooper-larsen.com 
DATED this " )IL_day of March, 2018. 
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1 LIST OF EXHIBITS 
2 
Exhibit No.: No. of Pages 
3 
1. Copy of Plaintiffs insurance policy with Defendant. 38 
4 
5 
2. Copy of the Pocatello Police Department Accident Report 1 
Insurance Information Sheet. 
6 
3. Copy of correspondence from Ryan Lewis, Esq., to Allstate 1 
7 Insurance Company, dated July 16, 2010. 
8 
4. Copy of correspondence from Allstate Insurance Company to 1 
9 Ryan Lewis, Esq., dated January 6, 2011. 
10 5. Copy of correspondence from Farmers Insurance to Ryan Lewis, Esq., 1 
11 dated January 4, 2011. 
12 6. Copy of a Mutual Release and Settlement Agreement signed by 2 
13 
Plaintiff Erica Klein effective April 25, 2011. 
14 7. Copy of email correspondence from Affiant to Farmers Insurance, 1 
dated April 4, 2017. 
15 
8. Copy of email correspondence from Affiant to Farmers Insurance, 1 
16 
dated May 17, 2017. 
17 
9. Copy of correspondence from Affiant to Gary Cooper, Esq., dated 6 
18 June 26, 2017. 
19 
10. Copy of correspondence from Gary Cooper, Esq., to Affiant, 4 
20 dated July 11, 2017. 
21 11. Copy of correspondence from Affiant to Farmers Insurance, 1 
22 
dated October 26, 2017. 
23 12. Copy of email correspondence from Gary Cooper, Esq., to 1 
Affiant, dated November 21, 2017. 
24 
25 13. Copy of email correspondence from Affiant to Gary Cooper, Esq., 
1 
dated November 21, 2017. 
26 
14. Copy of email correspondence from Affiant to Gary Cooper, Esq. 1 











December 26, 2012 
Law Offices of Lowell N. H!i.wkes 
1322 E CENTER ST 
POCATELLO ID 83201 











I have attached Ms. Klein's Farmers Ins. car policy and dee sheet. 
Send all comspoodence to: 
Brnail: claimsdocuments@hpcs.com 
National Document Center 
P.Q Bax 268994 
Oklahoma Cit); OK 73126-8994 
Fax: (877) 217-1389 
If you have any questions or concerns, I can be reached at 208-589-6895. My scheduled office hours are 
Monday through Friday from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. Mountain Time. 
Sincerely, 
Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
.· . ·: , ,, 
~J:, ., :l' ~---~. ; : , '~A.l"' .. ,,, ,~ .. : . . ~~~~~~ 
y ,. • ......... : • • 
Mike Morrissey 














ERICA M KLEIN 
75 176080197 
1015457772-1-5 
FEBRUARY 01, 2010 
6 MONTHS 
V 
□=-Attached ia a true copy of the information sent to the insured. 
□ Attached is a true oopy of the declaration page, policyback and 
endorsements.# 
~ Attached is a true copy of the dec1aration page. 
~ polloybaak and endorsements did not mail with 
:but are inaluded as requested. 
The attached 
the declaration 
□ ,Attached is a true copy of the declaration page only. .. 
□Attached.is a :reconstructed copy of the. declaration only. 
□ A.ttaahed is a :t·econstrncted copy of the declaration page, pol.icybaclc 
.and endorsements. 
□ AttaC!hed is a reconst::ruoted copy of the cancellation. 
□ At.taahed is a true copy of the cancellation. 
Any additional Declaration Sheet(s) included with these documents labeled as 
uchange or change- misc.n may reflect a mid-term change in the policy and 
therefore a time period less than the original policy term, however the dates 
reflect the most current policy information on file, up to and including the 
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FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF IDAHO, POCATELLO, IDAHO 
.A STOCK INSURANCE COMPANY, HEREIN CALLED THE COMPANY 
DECLARATIONS 
Transadloa type: OFFER OF RENEWAL 
The Effective date is from TIME APPLIED FOR. * * * * The policy may be renewed for an additional policy tenn, as specified 
in the renewal offer, each time the Company offem to renew by sending a bill for the required renewal premium, 811d the insured pays said 
premium in advance of the :i:espective :renewal date. The Policy is usued in i:elia:nce upon the statements in the Declarations. 
lnsured's name and address: 
ERICA M KLEIN 
516 S 8TH AVE 
POCATELLO ID 83201-5305 
Issuing office: 
23175 NW Bennett St. 
Hillsboro, OR 97124 













12:00 NOON Standard Time 
PREMATIC NO LY46194 
Agent Gina L Wixom Ins Ag Inc 
Agentm: 75 47 330 Aaentphone: (208) •785-7377 
XXX 10,000 500 500 
XXX 








J6499A J6547A 87540 







Uenlaoldu or other Interest: 
BANK OF AMERICA 
PO BOX 2759 
uACKSONVL FL 32203-2759 
56-SOII! ml EDHIOI l-07 75 17608-01-97 
Messages / rating Information 
DED. REDUCED TO $100 FOR GLASS LOSS. 
Car Symbols: BI/PD(16) MED/PIP(29) Phys.Damage( 2) 
Household Composition Code (AllOl) 
COMMUTER, LESS 'PHAN 10 MI, ONE WAY, UNDER AGE 50. 
PLEASE CONTACT YOUR FARMERS AGENT FOR A FREE 
FARMERS FRIENDLY REVIEW TO ENSURE THAT YOUR 
FAMILY IS PROPERLY PROTECTED AND THAT YOU ARE 
RECEIVING ALL OF 'l'HE DISCOUN'l'S/CREDITS, COVERAGES 
AND PACKAGE POLICIES AVAILABLE. 
Polley activity (Submit amount dve with endosed Invoice) 
$ Pievious :Balance 
532. 60 P:i:emium. 
Pees 
Payments or Cxedits 
PR.EMA.TIC Total 
08-27-2009 
ANY iOTAL" IIAlAlKE OR CREDIT 
Of $ 0. 00 OR LESS Will 
BE APPIID TO TOUR. NEXT IIWHG. 
IIAIANCB 1MR $0 • 00 





COVERAGES - Indicated by "COV11 or the limit of Company's liability against each coverage. "NC" or 11NOT 
COV'' means "NOT COVERED" "MAX" means "Maximum Deduct1ble. 11 
BODILY INJURY Bodily Injuty Liability 
P.O. P10perty Damage liability 
U.M. Benefits for Bodily Injw:y caused by 
Uninsured Motorists 
MEDICAL Medical Expeose Insurana; Family 
Medical Expense, and Guest Medical 
Expense - See Policy Provision. 
If policy contains the E-550 No-Fault 
Endorsement or No-Fault Coverage D. 
Auto Medical Expense Coverage does 
not apply. 
NO-FAULT - SeeEn.dorsementE-550 (Illinois 
E-2250) or Coverage D if 
applicable. 
COMPREHENSIVE - Comprehensive Car Damage 
COLLISION Collision - Upset 
NON-AUI'O Comprehensive Personal Liabilily-
Each occurrence. Medical Payments to 
Others - Each Person. Damage to 
Property of Others - See Policy for 
Limits per OCCUireDce. 
Coverage Shown By Premlm 
TOwiNG 
01HER. 
A ptt:mium. amount shown :reflects the 
chuge for Towing & Road Service 
Coverage. 
A pxemimn amount shown reflects the 
charge for one or more miscellaneous 
coverages added by endorsement to the 
policy. 
If a refund is due under this policy and the insured cannot be located, we may deduct a handling charge. (Not 
applicable in Kansas) 
Subject to the Loss Payable Provisions or any other loss payable endorsement attached to the policy, payment for loss 
thereunder is payable as interest may appear to the named insured and the Lienholder or Other Interest on the reverse 
side. 
LOSS PAYABLE PROVISIONS 
(AppRcable only If henholder Is named, and no other AutomobOe loss payable endorsement Is attached to the poUcy) 
It is agreed that any payment for loss or damage to the vehicle desetibed in this policy shall be made on the following 
basis: 
(1) At our option, loss or damage shall be paid as interest may appear to the policyholder and the lienholder shown 
in the Declarations, or by repair of the damaged vehicle. 
(2) .Any act or neglect of the policyholder or a person acting on his behalf shall not void the coverage afforded to the 
lienholder. 
(3) Clwlge in title or ownership of the vehicle, or error in its description shall not void coverage afforded to the 
lienholder. 
The policy does not cover conversion, ~ement or secretion of the vehicle by the policyholder or anyone acting 
in his behalf while in possession under a contract with the lienholder. 
A payment may be made to the lienholder which we would not have been obligated to make except for these terms. 
In such event, we are entitled to all the rights of the lienholder to the extent of such payment. The lienholder shall do 
whatever is necessary to secure such rights. No subrogation shall impair the right of the lienholder to recover the full 
amount of its claim. 
We reserve the right to cancel this policy at any time as provided by its terms. In case of cancellation or lapse we will 
notify the lieoholder at the address shown in the Declarations. We will give the lienholder advance notice of not less 
than 10 days from the effective date of such cancellation or lapse as respects his interest. Mailing notice to the loss 
payee is sufftcient to effect cancellation. 
The following applies as respects any loss adjusted with the mortgagee interest only: 
(1) .Any deductible applicable to Comprehensive Coveiage shall not exceed $250. 
(2) .Any deductible applicable to Collision Coverage shall not exceed $250. 
This Declarations page when signed by us, becomes part of the policy numbered on the reverse side. It 
supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is subject to all the other terms of the policy. 
56-5002 6111 EDfilOH 8-07 C5002612 
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Declarations . 
Your Pemonal Coverage Page i& attached. 
Agreement 
Definitions 
What To Do In Case of Accident -----




Covei:ageA-Bodily Injui:y ···----··-• .. - ···-··-· .. -· -· 4 
Coverage B - Property Damage __ ...... ____ ·······-· ___ 4 
Additional Definitions _____ ....... - .. _ . 4 
Supplementru:y Payments ··-· •...... . . . 4 
Exclusions - What we do not Cover _____ 5 
Limits of Liability, .. _. . .. .. .. _ ........ __ . . . . 6 
Out of State Coverage ............... ., _____ ..... . 6 
Financial ResponS1'bility Law ___ ___ 6 
Other Insurance ------,----- 6 
PART n .. ONINSURm MOTORIST 
Covetage C - Uninsured Motorist Cov~ 
(Including UNDBRinsuted_ Motorist Coverage) __ .. 6 
AdditionalDefinltlons .. ·········---····· ...... 7 
Bxcluslons - What we do not Cover ---·--·-·. 
Limits of Liability . . .. --··---- _ -·. ···-··· . 
Other Insurance .. .... . . ...... _____ ,,, .... 
Atbitration . . .. .,,_,. ______ ........ .. 
PART 111 .. MEDICAL 
Covetage E - Medioo Expense Coverage 
Additional Definitions. _____ - __ _ 
Exclusions - What we do not Covet ___ _ 
Limit of Liability _________ _ 










PART IV - DAMAGE TO YOUR CAR 
Coverage F - Comprehensive . .... ..... . . . . 9 
Cove.rage G - Collision 10 
CoverageH-Towfag ________ 10 
Additional Definitions________ 10 
Supplementary Payments --~-~- 10 
Exclusions - What we do not Covet____ 10 
Limits of Liability ________ 11 
PaymentofLoss ________ 11 
Appmisal ____________ 11 
No Benefit to Bllilee ________ 11 
Othet Insurance ____ , _____ 11 
PART V .. CONDITIONS 




3. Legal Action Against Us ________ 12 
4. Ttansfei: of Yow: Intetest _________ 12 
5. Our Right to Recover Payment ~---~- ·12 
6. Two or More Cat8 Insw:ed 12 
7. Bankruptcy 12 
8. Termination or Reduction of Covemge 12 
9. No Duplica~onofBenefits 15 
SPECIAl PROVISIONS ------- 15 
ANY ADDITIONAL PROVISIONS .AFFECTING YOUR POLICY ARB A'ITACHED AS 11ENDORSEMEN'I'S." 
Thls policy is a legal conttact between you (the policyholder) and us (the Company). 
IT CONTAINS CERTAIN EXCLUSIONS. 
DAD YOUB.POUCY CABBPULLY. 




~ tsrEDIBOII (0) 9-88 








We agree with you, .in retum foi: yow: premium payment, to insw:e you subject to all the tenns of this policy. We will 
insure yQu for the coverages and the limits of liability shown in the Declarations of this policy. 
DEFINITIONS 
Tb.toughout this policy "you" and "your• mean the "named insured" shown in the Declarations and spouse if e. 
resldent of the same household. "We" 11us1' tnd 11our11 mean the Company named in the Declatatlons which provides 
this insu.t"ance. ln addi1ion, certain words appeat in bold type. They are defined as follows; 
Accident o.t occuuence means a sudden event; including continuous or .repeated exposure to the same conditions, 
resulting in bodily i.njotyor p:ropen, damage neither expected no.r .intended by the .insured person. 
Bodilf Injmy means bodily injuty to OJ: sickness, disease o.r death of any person. 
Damages a.re the cost of compensating those who suffct bodily injwy or ptop~ damage from an accideo.t. 
Family membermeans a petson related to you by blood, mur.iage ora.doptlon. who is a :resident of your household. 
Occupying means in, on, getting into or out 0£ 
Private Passengei Car means a fout wheel land motor vehicle of the private passenger or station wagon type 
actually licensed for use upon public highways. It io.cludes any motor home with no mote than six wheels and not 
used for business pw:poses. 
Pt0perty damage means physical inju.ty to o.t desti:uction of tangible p~petty, including loss of its use. 
State means the District of Columbia. and any st.at~ tetritoty ot posseasio.n of the Ullhed States, ot any ptOV'.ince of 
Canada. 
Utilitf ca1 means a fand motor vehicle hwing at least four wheels actually licensed for use upon public highways, 
with a rated load capad.!:y of not mote than 2,000 pounds, of the pickup, p11nel or van type. This doe11 not mean a 
vehicle used .in any business or occupation other than farming or .ranching. However, it does include a newly acquired 
or replacement vehicle of the wne type if its usage is the same as the utility car described in the Decluations. . . 
Utillff C:raflet means a. vehicle deslgned to be towed by a private p"'8enger cat 1U1d includes a farm wagon or fa.rm 
implement while tow-ed by a ptlvate passenger car or utility car. It does not include a ttailer used as an office. 
store, display or paasenger trailer. 
Youi insured cauneans: 
1. The vehicle described in the Declarations of this policy or any pdvatc passenger car or utility car with which 
you replace it. You must advise us within 30 d11ys of any change of pdvate passeuget cat ot udlity cat. If you.t 
policy twn ends more than 30 days after the change, you can advise us anytime before the end of that t.eon. 
2. Any illdditional private passenger car or utlHty car of which you acquite ownership during the policy period. 
Ptovided that: 
a. You notify us within 30 days of its acq,.usition> and 
b. As of the date of acquwtloo, all private passenger and utili1f cara you own are inauted with a member 
company of the Farmets Insurance Group of Companies. . 
Ownership shall include the written lea.sing of a private passeaget o,: utlHtf cat for a continuous period of at least 
shcmon~. 
3. Aiiyutili1J trailet:. 
a. That you own, ot 
b. While attached to yout laauied car. 
4. Any private passengei car, udlii, car or utility ualler not owned by you oi: a family- m.embet while being 
temporarily used as a sub8titute for aay other vehicle descti.bed .in thls definition because of its withckawal fro~ 
normal use due to breakdown, i;epait, semcing, loss o.r destruction. 
WHAT TO DO IN CASE Of ACCIDENT 
Nollet 
In the event of an accicleat; o.r loss, notice must be giveD. to us promptly. The notice must give the time, place '1nd 
cltcw:nstances of the accideat, ot loss, inclw:Uog the names and 1tddressea of injured petsons and witnesses. 







A petson claiming any coverage of this policy must also: 
1. Coope:tate with us and assist us in any matter concemlng a claim or suit 
2. Send us p.i:omptly any legal papers received i:elating to any clahn ot suit. 
3. Submit to physical examinations at ou: expense by docoo.rs we select as often as we may .reasoruably require. 
4, Authorize~ to obtain medical and othe.r tecotds. 
5, Provide any written ptoofs of loas we tequire. 
6. Notify police within 24 hours and us within 30 days if a hit-and-mn motorist is involved $.Dd e.n uninsured 
motorist claim is to be tiled. 
7. If claiming car damage coverage: 
a. 1'ake reasonable steps aftet loss to. protect the vehicle and its equipment frOJl'l further loss. We will pay 
.i:easonable expenses incurred in ptoviding that protection.' 
b. Promptly tepott the theft of the vehicle to the police. 
c. Allow us to inspect and applaise the dttnaged vehicle before its repau: o.r disposal. 
8, Submit to examination undet oath upon our request 
PART 1- UABllnY 
Coveraaa A - Boddy lnfurJ 
Cover• B - Property Damage 
We will pay damages for which any in.amed person is legally liable because of bodilf injury to any person and 
piopetty damage arising out of the ownetship, maitltenance o.r use of a pdwte passeager car> a. utility ~., o.r a 
utility ttailer. • 
We will defend ~y claim o.r suit asking fo.r these damages. We ma.y settle when we consider it appropriate. 
We will not defend any suit or make additiontl payments after we have paid the limit of liability for the coverage, 
Additional DefinHJans Used In Th1s Part Only 
Jnautecl person as used hi this pa.rt means: 
1. You or any family membet. 
2. Any pe.cson using your lnsuted cat~ 
3. A:Ay other person or oi:ga.nization wlth tespect only to legal liability fot acts or omissions of: 
a. Any petson coveted undet this part while usirtg your insured cat, 
b. You or any family membet covered under this part while using any private passenger car, utility car o.r 
udlity trailer other than your lasuted oat if not owned ot hired by that person OJ: otganh;ation. 
laemed person does not mean: 
1. 'fhe United States of America o.r any of its agencies. 
2. Any person for bodjq hljuty or ptope.rty damqe arising from the ope.ration of a vehicle by that puson as an 
employee of the United States Govemment when the provWo.ns of the Federal Tort Claims Act apply. 
3. · Any penon ,vho uses a vehicle without having 81.lfficlent reason to believe that the use is with the peunission of 
the owner. 
Yout insured car as used m this part shall also include any other pdvate passcageioar, udllty car or udltty ttallei 
not owned by or furnished o.t available fox the regular use of you or a fiunily mem~ But no vehlcle shall be 
consldeted as your Insured cat unle$$ there is sufficient .teason to believe that the use is 'With permission of the 
owner, lUld unless it is used by you or a family member. 
Svpplt1111nlary Pay11ents 
In addition to our limit of liability, we will pay these benefits as J:eSpects an huntted penoiu 
1. All costs we incur .in. the settlement of any claim ot defense of any suit 
2. Interest aftet entry of judgment on any amount that does not exceed ow: limit of liability. 
3. a. P.remiums on appeal bonds on any suit we defend. 




b. Pi:emiums on bonds to i:ele11Se attachments in any such suit for an amount not in excess of the applicable limit 
of liability of this policy. 
c. Up to $300 for the cost of bail bonds required becQuse of accident o.t traffic law violation arising out of use of 
yow insured car. . 
We are not obligated to apply fo.c o.t furnish any of the above bonds. 
4. Actual loss of wages or salary up to $50 a. day, but not other income, when we a.sk you to a.ttend a trial or hearing. 
5. Expenses you incur for immediate medical and surglcQI tteatment for othei:s necessary at the tlm.e of the accident 
resulting in boc'Wf hljurycovered by this pa:rt. 
6. Othet reasonable expenses incurred a.t our request. 
Ex<lusions 
This covei:a.ge does not 11:pply to: 
1. Bodily fnjuty or propetty damage a.rising out of tbe ownei:shlp, maintenance or use of a vehicle while used to 
carry persons or property for a charge. This exclusion does not apply to shared-expense car pools. 
2. Bodily injuqot property damage; 
a. Caused ii.1tentionally by or at the direction of an fnsuted peison, or 
b. Arising fi:om any ocClltrence caused by an intentional act of an insured pcrso.n whece the results are 
reasonably forescea.ble. 
3. Bodily lnjui:y or property damage with iespect to which any petson is an insw:ed under nuclear energy 
insutance. This excluslon applies evCJ'l il the limits of that insw:ance are exhausted. 
4. BodU, ittjuty to an employee of an hisuted pe.raon atising 1n the eo1ttse of employment. This exclusion does not 
apply to bodily injutyto a domestic employee unless workers1 or workmen's compensation benefits a.re required. 
5. Bodily injuiy o.t property damage fo.r any person while employed or othetwise engaged in the business o,: 
occupation of transporting, selling, :repairing, senicing, storing or pa.rking of vehicles designed for us.e mainly on 
public highways, including 1:oad testing or deliveq. 
This exclusion does not apply to the ownei:shlp, maintenance ot use of your insured c~ by you, any family 
member, or any partner, agent, or employee of you or any fi\mily mem.be.t This exclusion also does not apply to 
any other person who does not have other insurance available to him witli limits equal to at least those of the Idaho 
Financial Responsibility Law. In such event., the :insurance afforded that person will be limited to the requirements of 
the Idaho F'ma.ncial Responsibility Ltw. 
6. Bodily injuty or ptopctty daanage tu:ising out of the owne.tship, maintenance or use of any vehicle by any petson 
em.ployed or otherwise engaged in a. business othet than the busmess described in Exclusion 5. This exclusion does 
not apply to the mainteflMce ot use of a: 
a. Private passenger car. 
b. Utility car that you own, if tated as a private passenger cai; or 
c. Utiliif traitei used with a vehicle described in a. or b. above. 
7. Damage to p.topetty owned or being tmnsported by 2n insuted peison. 
8. Damage to property tented to, or in the chatge of> an lo.au.red penoa except a teside.nee ot private garage not 
owned by that petson. 
9. Bodily fnjuty or property damage uising out of the ownetship> maintenance or use of any motoriied vehicle 
with less than four wheels. 
10. Bodily iajuty ot property damage arising out of the ownership, .maintenance ot use_ of any vehicle other than 
your muted cat; which is owned by or furnished or availa.ble for :regular use by you or a. family member. 
11. a. Lfa.bility fot bodily injutyto an lnnued petso:n othlll: than you or a family niesnbet. 
b. Li1i.bility to any person ot organization because of bodily in.juty to you. 
12. Liability assumed under any 0011tta.ct or agreement except liability of othets you asswne 1n a w.tltten contract 
telating to the use of an auto you do not own. 
13. Ll.a.bllity lU'lsing from the sponsoring or taking part in any organized or agteed.-upon racing or speed contest or 
demonsttation in which yout insuted car bas active pa.ttlcipation, or in p.tactlce or ptepamtion for any such 
c-ontest. 
5'-51166 lSFEDIII llll 9-88 5 (5960105 
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14. Bodily mfusy or p.topetty damage arising out of the ownenhip, maintenanc~ or U$e by any petson of a vehicle 
in which you have transferred full ownetship interest but the transfer does not comply with the transfct of 
ownership ptovisions of the state motor vehicle law. 
15. Punitlve or exemplary damages or the cost of defense telated to such damages. 
limits of UaLflity 
The limits of liability shown in the Declarations apply subject to the following: 
1. The bodily Jnjuty liability limit for "each petson11 is the maximum for bodily fajuiy sustained by one penon in 
any occ,m.tence. Any clthn for loss of consortium ot injury to the .t:el1itionshlp arising from this iojuty shall be 
included in this limit, 
If the financial respons1hility law of the place of the accideat tteats the loss of consortium as a separate claim, 
financial responsibility limits will be fumished. 
2. Subject to the bo<lily injuty liability limit for "each person11 the bodily hijuty liability limit for 11each occuuence" 
ls the maxim.um combined amount forbodUy iajuty sustattied by two Ol' more persons in any occurrence. 
3. The ptoperf¥ damage liability limit fot 11each occuttence" is the maximum fot all damages to all property in 
any one occutteace. 
4, We will pay no more than the maximum limits provided by this policy regamless of the numbe.t of vehicles 
insw:ed. insured person., claims, claimants, policies, or vehicles involved jn the occurrence. 
5. Any amount payable by us to 8¼1 insmed person shall be reduced by any amount payable wder any woike.cs' or 
wo1ianen's compensation or arr.y similar medical or disability law. 
Out ef State Coverage 
An insmed peoon may become subject to the financial .responsibility law, compulsory insurance law ot simila.t law 
of another state or in Canada. This can happen because of the ownership, .maintenance or uac of your insured ca,: 
wht!n you travel outside of Idaho. We will interp.tet this policy to ptovide any bmadet coverage required by those 
laws, CJteept to the ~t that other Jiabili.W insurance applies. No peuon may collec::t mo.te than once for the same 
elements of loss. 
ConformltJ with R11ancial Rtspanslhility Laws 
When we certify this policy as ptoof under any financial responsibility law, it will comply with the law to the extent of 
the coverage tequlred by the la.w. 
0th• Insurance 
If there is othet applicable Auto Liability InsUllUlCe on any 0th.et policy that applies' to a loss covered by this pa!ti we 
will pay only our share. Our share is the proportion that our limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable Jimits. 
We will provide insumnce for an insured penoo, othet than you ot a family member, up to the limits of the Idaho 
Financial Respontibility Law only. 
Any .insu1l0Ce we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible insw:ance. 
If any applicable insutaoce otbet than this policy is isSlled to you by us ot any other member company of the Fann.eta 
Insw:ance Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such policies shall not exceed the limits provided 
by the s.ingle policy with the highest limits of liability. 
PART II• UNINSURED MOTORIST 
Cevaraga C • Unlnlr•• M,tarlst Coverage 
Oadudlng Underlnsurad Metorlst C1Y1ra91) 
We will pay all sums which an inuted penon is legally entitled to tecOV'et as damages from the ownet or ope.mtor 
of an umnauredmotor vehicle because of bodflf m)w:y sustained by the iosw:ed peiaon. The bodily injury must 
be caused by acclcleat and ru:ise out of the ownenhip, maintenance or use of the uaiaamed motor vehicle. 
Determination as to whether 84 :ha,.c:4 peaon is legally entitled to w:over clamagee or the amount of damages 
shall be made by agreement between the iaamed person and us. If no agreement is teached, the decision will be 




Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only 
As used in this part: 
1. lnsuted personmeans: 
a. You or a la:.mfff member. 
b. Any othet person while occupyhlg yout insured cat. 
V 
c. Any person. fot daaiages that pexson is entitled to tecover because of bodily inJuty to you, a family member, 
or another occupant of your insuted car. 
But, no person shall be considered an insured petaon if the pexson uses a vehicle without having sufficient reason to 
believe that the use is with permission of the owner. 
2. Motot vehicle means a land motor vehicle ot a miler but does not metn a. vehicle: 
a. Ope:rated on mils or crawler-treads. 
b. Which 18 a farm type tta.ctot, or any equipment designed or modified for use principally off public roads while 
not on pqblic roads. 
c. Located tor use as a. residence or premises . 
.3, U1W1Sured :motor vehicle means a motor vehicle which is: 
a. Not insttted by a. bodily Jn.jwy liability bond ot policy at the time of the aecideat. 
b, · Insured by a bodily injmy liability bond ot policy at the time of the accidettt which provides coverage in 
amounts less than the limits of Uninsured Motorist Coverage shown in the Occlara.tlons. 
c. A hlt-llll.d~ruo vehicle whose operator or owner has not been identified and which strikes: 
(1) You ot any family member. 
(2) A vehicle which you or a family meml,etue occupying. 
(3) Yourin.sutcd cat. 
d. Insured by a bodfl;y Jnjuty .liability bond or policy a.t the time of the accident but the Company denies 
cow.rage or is or becomes insolvent. 
4. Umnsmed motor vehicle,however, does not mean a vehicle: 
a. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you o.t any family member. 
b. Owned or operated by a. self-insured as conten,.plated by any financial .responslb.ility law, motor cauier law, or 
similar law. 
c. Owned by a go"Vemm.ental unit or agency. 
Exclusions 
'Ibis coverage shall not apply to the benefit of any insuter or self-insUter ut1der any worken' or wo:tkmen1s 
compensation law, or directly to the benefit of the United States, or any state or any political subdivision. 
This coverage shall not apply to punitive or exemplru:y dmnage, 01 the cost of defense related to such damages. 
This ,covenge does not apply to bodify- ittjuiy sustained by a. peison: 
1. While oc:cupyin.g any vehicle owned by you or a family member for which instmlnce is not afforded under this 
policy or through bemg sttuck by that vehicle. 
2. If that penon or the legal representative of that person makes a settlement without our written consent, 
3. While occupyln3 your insuted cat when used to catty petsons o.t p.ropetty for a charge. This exclusion does not 
apply to &hated-expense car pools. · 
4. If the injured petson was occupying a vehicle you do not own which is .insured for this cbvetage under another 
policy. · 
Limits of Lfabibl)' 
The limits of liability shown in the Declarations apply subject to the following: 
t. The limit for 11each person" is the mwmum for bodily injuiy sustained by any person in any one occuttence. 
Any claim for loss of consortium or inJuty to. the telationship arising from this injury shall be included in this .limit. 
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If the financial responsibility Jaw of the place of the accident treats the loss of consoi:tium as a separate claim, 
finQllcial responsibility limits will be fumish.ed. 
2. Subject to the limit for "each person", the limit fot "each occuueace11 is the maximum combined amount for 
bodily inJui:ysusmined by two or mo.re persons in any one occuttcnce. 
3. Subject to the law of the state of the occut.tence, we will pay no mo.re than these maximums .regardless of the 
number of vehldes insui:ed1 lnsuted peieons, claims, claimants, policies, ot vehicles involved in the occurrence. 
Other Insurance 
1. We will pay undei: this coverage only after the limits of liability under any applicable bodily :b1juty liability bonds 
o.t policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments o.r settlements. 
2. 'rhe amount of Uninsured Motorist Coverage we will pay under Additional Definitions 3b shall be reduced by the 
amount of any other bodily injui:ycove.mge available to any party held t<> be liable for the accide:n.t. 
3. Except as provided in pai:agn.ph 2 above, if any othet collectible insurance applies to a loss coveted by this part, 
we will pay o.nly ow: shue. Our share is the proportion that our limits of liability bear to the total of all applicable 
limits. 
4. We will not provide .insurance fut a vehicle othei: than youi: insured cat. unless the owner of thit vehicle ha$ no 
othei: insurance applic~le to this part, 
5. If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you. by us ot any othet me;l.l).ber com~y of the 
Fa.rmets Insurance Group of ~ompaa!e~ the total amount payable among all such policies shall not e:s:ceed the 
limits provided by the single policy with the highest limits of liability. 
Arhltra1ion 
If a.n insured petaott and we do not agree (1) that the pe:rson is legally entitled to tecove.r datnages from the own.et 
o.t operator of an uoittsured momr vehicle, o.t (2) as to the amount 0£ payment under this part. either that person or 
we may demand that the issue be detennlned by e.tbltta.tlon. 
In that event. an a.rbittator will be sele~d by the insured person and us. If agi:eement on an a.tbittator caooot be 
reached wltbin (30) days, the judge of a court having jurisdiction will appoint the arbitrator. The expense of the 
arbitxator and all other expenses of su:bittation will be shared equally. Attomey's fees and fees paid for the witnesses 
are 11.ot expenses of atbitration and will be paid by the party ineuttiog them. 
The ubitratot shall determine (1) the existence of the operator of an IUlinsured motor vehicle, (2) that the iosui:ed 
person is legally entitled to recover damages from the owner or open.tor of an uttinsuted motot vehicle, and (3) 
tlle ffll.ount of payment undet this part as detwn.ined by this policy or any other applicable policy. 
Arbitmtion will take place in the county where the insuted pe.rsoa lives. Local court roles governing procedru::es and 
evide.nce will apply. The decision in writing of the a.tbitrato.r will be binding subject to the terms of this insurance. 
Formal demand for su:bitrati.on shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. The court shall be located in the 
county and state of .residence of the party making the demand. DtllllUld mt.y also be made by sending a certified 
lettet to the patty against whom atbltration is sought, with a return receipt as evidence. 
PART UI .. JEDICAL 
Coverage E N Madkal Expense Coverage 
We will pay reasonable expenses incun:ed within three years from the date of awdent for necessary medical 
setrices and funet$l expenses because of bodily hljur:ysustained by an iaamed person. 
Addltlanal Definitions Used In This Part Only 
As used in this part, iftsuted petson or In~ peoona ~eans: 
1. You or any family mem.be:r while occupymg. o.t through being sttuck by, a motor vehicle or trailer, designed fo.r 
use on public .toads. 
2 . .filly other petson while occui,yhlg your insured cat while the car is being used by you, A family m.em.bet ot 
anothet pei:so.n if that petson has sufficient tea.son to believe that the use is with pennission of the owner. 
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Medical setrices m~s necessary medical, surgical. dental. x~:tay, ru:nbula:nc<; hospltal. p.rofessions.l musing and 
~etal semces, and mcludes the cost of pharmaceuticals, orthopedic and prosthetic devices, eyeglasses and hearing 
a1ds. 
Medical se:rrices does not .include the cost of any of the follow.ing: 
1, Hot tubs. spas. water beds. 
2. Exercise equlpment, heating or vibrating devices, 
3. Membership in health clubs, 
4. Medical :reports unless requested by us. 
Exclusions 
This covetage does not apply for bodily bljmyto any person~ 
1, Sustained while occupying yom: msured cat when used to cimy persons fot a charge. This exclusion does not 
apply to sbated-expense car pools. 
2. Sustained while occupying any.vehicle while located for use as a residence or premises. 
3. Sustained while occupying a motorized vehicle with less than fow: wheels. 
4. Sustained while occupying or, when sttuck. by, a.ny vehicle (otheJ: than yout insured cat) which is owned by or 
furnished ot available for the regular use of you ot any family inenibet. 
5. Sustained while occupying a. vehicle othet than the eat described in the Declarations while the vehicle is being 
used in the business or occupation of an !asuted peteon.. 
6. Occu.tting during the course of employment if wotkets1 ot workmen's compensation benefits ate required, 
7, CaU$ed by war (declared or undeclared), civil Wat, insurrection, rebellion. revolution, nuclear reaction, radiation or 
mdioactive conwninatlon, or any consequence of any of these, 
8. During active participation in any otganfaed or agreed~upon racing or speed contest or demonstration, or .in 
p.ractice or preparation for any such contest. 
ltmif of Uahilhy 
Regardless of the number of vehicles insuted, insured petso:ns, claims or policies, or vehicles involved in the 
accident. we will pay no more for medical expenses, including funeral expenses, than the limit of liability shown for 
this covemge in the Declarations for each pe.tson injured in any one accident. In no eve11t shall the limit of liability 
for funeral expenses aceed $2,000 each person. 
Other Insurance 
If there is othet appliable automobile medics.l insw:ance on any other policy that applies to a loss covered by this 
part, we will pay only our shate. Our share is the proportion that our limit of liability bears to the to~l of all 
applicable limits. · 
Any insw:ance we provide to any !asuted person for a. substitute o.t: non--owned motor ,vehicle o.t trailer shall be 
excess ovet any other collectible insurance. · 
If any applicable insurance othet than this policy is issued to you by us or any other membet company of the Fat.mets 
Insurance Group of Companies, the total amount payable among all such polic,ies shall not exceed the limits provided 
by the single policy with the highest limits of liability. 
PART IV • DAMAGE TO YOUR CAR 
Coverage F • Comprehenslva 
We will pay for loas to yom fnam:ed car caused by any accidental means except cofflslon, less any applicable 
deductibles. Any deductlble amount will apply separately to each lou, 
Loss caused by missiles, falling object$, fire, theft or la.rceny, explosion, Utthquake, windstorm, hail, water, flood, 
malicious mischief or vandalism, riot or civil commotio~ colliding with a bird or animal, o.s: b.teakage of glass is not 
deemed loss caused by collision. If bteakage of glass results from a colliaion, you may elect to have it ~ted as loss 
caused by eoJUsion, 
9 G-82 
Page 179
Coverage 8 .. CeUlslon 
We will pay for loss to you, huured cu caused by collision less any applicable deductibles. 
Any deductible shall apply sepw.tely to each Joss. 
Coverage H .. Towing and Read Servtco 
We will pay for r:easonable and necessazy towing and labor costs faeuued because of disablement of yout ittsmed 
car. The labor must be performed at the place of disablement 
Additlanal Definitions Used In This Part Only 
As used in this part: 
1. CoUlslon means collision of yout iasuted car with another object ot upset of yom insured cat. 
2. Loss means ditect and accidental loss of or danlage to your :fnamed cai; including its equipment 
3. Yout fAsuted car shall also include any othe.t private passe.oger car, utili1J Ollrt or utility trailer not owned by 
or fumished ot available for the t:egulat use of yon or a. family mem.bet. But no vehicle shall be consideted as 
yout wanted car ucl.ess there is sufficient reason to believe that the use is with permission of the owner. a.nd 
unless it is used by you or a family member. 
Supplementary Payments 
1. If you have comprehensive coverage, we will pay for tmnsportation expenses inC'IW'Cd by you because of the totru 
theft of your insured cat. We will pay up to $15 per day, but no more than $450. Tb.is covemge beg.Ins 48 hours 
after the theft has been reported to us and to the police and ends when the cat is returned to use or when we offet 
settlement fo.t the Ion. 
2. We will pay up to, but not more thal¼ 1200 for loss of clothing or luggage in your insured cat Qlld belonging to 
you or a f:amiJJ member if the loaa is caused by: 
a. CoJUsioa of your in.sured earwhile co"Veted by this policy. 
b, Fite, light:oiog, flood, eatth~ke, explosion, fulling air:aaft, o.r theft of the entire insured cat; and loss occws to 
yo11:r Insured car&om the same cause wbile covered for comprehensive by this policy. 
Exduslons 
This covemge does not apply to Joss: 
1, To yout Insured cat while used to catty persons or ptope.rty for a clw:ge. This exclusion does not Apply to 
shared-expense car pools. 
2. Caused by war (declared or undeclared), civil war, msuuectio~ rebellion. revolution, nu~ xeactio~ xadation or 
radioactive contamination, or any consequence of any of these. 
3. Caused by theft to equipment designed for the reproduction of sound, or any radio receiving ot t:adio receiv.ing and 
transmitting equipment. This applies to such equipment as a. tape player, tape xecorder, citizens band radio and 
two-way mobile ttdio, telephone, .radar detector, television or scanning monitot .i:ecelvet, It also applies to any 
electronic device .incotpott~ any of this eqwpm.ent, as well as accessories and antennas. 
This exclusion does not apply to that equipment which is permanently inscillled in the opening of the dash or 
console of yom lo.auted car normally used by the motor vehicle maiiufacturer fo:r the installation of a radio or 
sound reproducing device. 
4. Caused by theft to tapes, records, :reels, cassettes, cattddges., can,ing cases ot other devic:es fot use with equipment 
designed for the reproduction of sound. 
5. To a cam.pet body, Cf.nopy o.r udlif¥ trailer owned by you or a &lorll1 member and not described .in the 
Declamtio.ns. But, coverage does apply to a camper body, C1lnopy or utility tNftet ownetship of which you acquire 
during the policy period if you ask us to insure it within 30 days after you acquire it. 
6. To awnings, cabana$ or equipment designed to provide additional living facilities. 




7.1?ue and confined to weu and tear, freezing, mechanical or electdcm breakdown or failure, or road damage to 
tires. But coverage docs 11.pply if the loss results from burning of wiring. Also coverage does apply if the toes 
.results from the total theft of your muted cat. 
8. To a vehicle not owned by you when used in auto business operations. 
9. During any organized o.t agreed-upon racing o.r speed contest o.t demonstcatlon in which your msured oat has 
active participation, OE in ptactice o.c ptepantion fo.t any such contest 
10. To a van, p.ickup, or panel ttuck due to incteased cost of .repair or .replacement of the following furnishings or 
equipment: . 
a. specW carpeting, insulation, wall paneling. fui:niture Ol' bus. 
b. facilities fo.i: cooking and sleeping including enclosu.res or bathroom facilities. 
c. height-extending roofs. 
d. mutals, paintings ot other decals ot graphics. 
Limits of Liability 
Ow: limits of liabiliq, for loss shall not exceed the lowest of. 
1. The actual cash value of the stolen or damaged propetcy", 
2, The amount necessaey to repair or replace the prop~ty or parts with other of like kind and qualiq,, less 
deptecia.tlon. . 
3 .. $500 for a utility trailer not owned by you ot a family member. 
Payment of loss 
We may pay the loss in money or repair or replace damaged or stolen property. We nia.y, at any time before the Joss 
is paid or the ptopetty is replaced, return, at ow: expense, any stolen property either to you or to the address shown in 
the Declantions, with payment for the resulting damage. We may keep all or put of the ptoperty at the agreed or 
appraised ~alue. 
Appraisal 
You or we may demand appraisal of the loss. Each will appoint and pay a compet.ent and dis.interested appraiser and 
will equally share other app.raiHI expenses. The appraisers, or a judge of a court hav.iog jurisdiction, will select an 
umpire to decide any differences. Each appmiser will state sepatately the actual cash value and the amount of Jon. 
AJJ. award in writing by any two appraisers will detennine the amount payable, which shall be binding subject to the 
teml$ 0£ this insumnce, 
No Benefit to Batie• 
Thls coveca.ge shall not directly or Indirectly benefit any c11rrier or other bailee for hire liable for loss to yout insuted 
oat. 
Oth•lnsurace 
If the!e is otheJ: applicable similar insumm:e on any other policy that applies to a lo88 covered by this part, we will pay 
only our shfite. Ow: shate is the propottion that ow: limit of liability beara to the total of all applicable limits. This 
coverage does not apply to any substltute or non-owned ca,: if thete is similar coverage on it, 
Any insuunce we provide for a vehicle you do not own shall be excess over any other collectible huutance. 
If any applicable insurance other than this policy is issued to you by us or any other member comp911y of the Faimen 
Insw:ance Gtoup of Companies, the total anlOunt payable among all &Uch policies shall not exceed the limits provided 
by the smgle policy with the highest limit8 of liability. 
PART V- CONDITION$ 
I, Polley Period nd Territory 
This policy applies only to accideam, oecuuences, and losses during the policy period shown in the Declarations 
which occur within the United States, its terrltorlea or posseasions, or Canada, o.r while the CU' is being shipped 






This policy with the Decluatio.ns includes all agreements between you and us relating to this insurance. No other 
change or waive,: may be made in this policy except by endol'Sement ot new decla.tations o.r new policy issued by us. 
The premium for each term of this policy ks determined by information in our possession at the inception of that 
term. Any changes in this .information which would affect the mting of your policy will allow us to make an 
additional chatge or .cefund on a pti:> .rata basis. If a premium. adjustment ls necessary we will make the adjustment as 
of the effective date of the change. 
When we broaden coverage do.ting the policy pe,:iod without clw:ge, the policy will automatically provide the 
broadened covetage when effective in your state. We may make other changes or .replace this policy, to confoim to 
covemge cuuently in use at the next policy period. The ch$nge or new policy will be delivered to you, or mailed to 
you at your mililiog address shown in the Declarations at least 30 days before the effective date of the new policy 
petlod. 
J>olicy terms which conflict wlth laws of Idaho are hereby amended to confoun to such laws. 
3. Legal Aclion Against Us 
We may not be soed unless there is full CQmpllance with all the tenns of this policy. We ma.y not be sued unde.r the 
Liability Coverage until the obligation of a pei:son we fosw-e to pay .is .finally determined either by judgment against 
that pe.cson at the actual trial or by written agreement of that person, the claimant and us. No one shall have any right 
to make us a party to a suit to deteunine the liability of a person we insure, 
4. Transfer Of Yeur Interest 
Interest in this policy, may not be assigned without ow: wdtten consent, But, if the insuted named hi the Declatations, 
or the spouse of the insw:ed resident in the same household di.es, the policy will cover. 
a. The sw:vivor. 
b. The legal representative of the deceased pe.t:so.n while acting wlthin the scope of duties of a legal repi;esentative. 
c, Any petsoll having proper custody of your insured cat until It legal representative is appointed. 
5. Our Right to Recover Payment 
In the event of any payment undet this policy, we a.re entitled to all the rights of recovery of the person to whom 
payment was made apinst another. That person must sign and delivet to us any legal papm relating to that recovety, 
do whatever else is necessaxy to help us ~etcise th0$e right$ and do nothing After loss to prejudice om rights, 
When a pmon has been paid damages by us undet this policy and also teeoven from. anotb~ the amount 
.recovered from the other sbaJl be held by that person in trust for us and reimbw:sed to us to the extent of our 
payxnent. 
This condition does not apply if prohibited by state law. 
li: ma.y be necessary for us to make payment undet the Uninsw:ed Motorist Coverage due to the insolvency of anoth.et 
insurance carrlet. In S\lch a case, our right to recovet payme.nt is limited to proceedings directly against the insolvent 
insure,: or receiver. We will exetclse those rights which the person insured by the insolvent insurer might othetwise 
have had, if he ot she bad petSOnally made the payment. 
6. Two ar Iara Cars lnsund 
With respect to any accident 01: occuuence to which this and any other auto policy issued to you by any member 
company of the Fann.ea Insurance Group of Companies applies, the total limit of liability under all the policies shall 
not exceed the hlghest applicable limit of liability 1.Uldet tny one policy. 
7. Bankruptcy 
We are not relieved of any obligation under this policy because of the bankruptcy or insolvency of any .iosuted 
pemon. 
8. Ttrmlnratlon er Reduction of Coverqe 
a. Cancellation, noorenewal ot tcductlon of covemge: 
(1) You may cancel this policy by advising us in writing when at a. futu.te date the cancellation is to be effective. 
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(2) We may cance~ change the tenewal date, or cancel or reduce allot any p0.ttion of any covemge by m~ 
notice to you, your .tep.resentative, or any lienholder shown in the policy at the addJ:ess shown m the 
Declarations or by delivering the notice: 
(a) Not less than 10 days prior to the effective date of such cancella.tion, .teduction, or change of tenewal 
date: 
Q) For nonpayment of premium, or 
(ii) If the policy ruts been in force less than 60 da.ys. 
(b) Not less than 20 days prior to the effective date of cancellation for all other cases. 
If we C1U1Cel or reduce all or any pottion of any covemge, the notice we send you will describe that portion 
we are cancelling or reducing. 
(3) Out right to cancel is lli:oited only if this policy has been .in focce fot 60 days, or is a renew$!. We can cancel 
or nonrenew this policy if it has been in effect more than 60 da.}18 only if •ny of the following apply: 
(a) You fail to pay the premium when due. • 
(b) The insurance was obtained through materlal mim:p.resentatlon. 
(c) A:o.y insured pe.tson ma.de a. false or fraudulent claim or knowingly aided another person in making such 
a claim. · 
(4) You fail to disclose fully your motor '\tehicle accidents and movillg violations, ot losses covered under 
any automobile physictl damage or comp.rehensive coverage for the preceding 36 month& if called fo.t in 
the application. 
(e) You mil to disclose in the application any infotmation necessaty fo.r acceptance or p.roper .rating. 
(f) You violate any terms and conditl<>n$ of this policy. 
(g) You, any resident of yow: household, or any petson who regularly and frequently opetates YOU! :insured 
car: 
Q) has had bis or her driver's license suspended or revoked within the 36 months prior to the notice of 
cancellation or nonrenewal of coverage. 
(ii) is ot becomes mbject to epilepsy ot heart attacks, and does not ptoduce a physician's certificate 
stating that he or she ca-n operate a motor vehicle safely. 
Qi,.) has an accident or convicdon record, physical or mental condition which are such that his o.r her 
operation of an automobile might endanget the public safety. 
Qv) has been convicted, ot forfeited b~ during the 36 months .immediately preceding the notice of 
cancellation or nonrenewal of coverage for. 
(aa) Criminal negligence reauliing in death or homicide ad.sing out of the operation of a motor 
vehicle. 
(ab) assault arising out of the opetation of a. motor vehicle. 
(a.c) operating a motot vehicle while futoxicated or under the influence of drugs. 
(ad) leaving the scene of an accldeat without stopp.ing to report it. 
(ae) making false statements .in an application for a driver's license. 
(af) theft OJ: unlawful taking of a motot vehicle. 
(ag) any felony. 
(v) has been convicted ot: or forfeited bail for, three or mote violations within the 36 months 
.imm.e&tely pteeeding the notice of cancelhlti.on or nomenewal, of any Jaw. ordinance or regulation 
limiting the speed of motor vehicles. or any of the provisions of the motor vehicle laws of any s1a1e. 
Violati~na ~y be ;rep~ons of the same ?ffemes ot diffetent offenses. . . . . . 
(vi) ha5> while this policy JS 1n force, engaged in a prearranged speed contest while opetatuig ot riding Jn 
your inamed car. 
(vii) has, within 36 months prior to the notice of ca.ncellatlon or nonrenewal been addicted to the use of 
.oarcotlcs or other dmgs. 





{h) Your insmed earls: 
(i) so mechanically defective that its operation might endanger public safety. 
(ii) used in cattylng passengers for hire or compensation. This does not include car pools. 
(ill) used in the business of ttansportation of flammables or explosives. 
(iv) an. authorized emergency vehicle. 
{v) subject to an fuspectlon law and has not been inapect.ed or, if inspected, has failed to qualify within 
the period specified under such inspection law. 
(vi) substantially changed in type or condition during the policy petlod1 increasing the risk substantially, 
ot so as to give clear evidence of a use other than the original use~ 
(4) Pa.rt 3 above does not limit our right to add a deducuble not exceediiJg $100 under Covetage F of this policy 
as a condition to :renewal. · 
(5) We :will not cancel or nonrenew if: 
{a) You agree in writing to exclude a. person other than you by name from opera.tion of yom insured cat. 
(b) You also agtee to exclude coverage to youtself fot any negligence wblch may be imputed by law to you, 
\Vhich may arise out of the maintenance, ope.ration o.i: _use of a motor vehicle by such excluded person, 
Notice of cancellation ot nontenewal for nonpayment of premium must be mailed ot delivered to you with the teason 
for cancellation or nonrenewal. If cancellation. or nonroo.ewal is for au1y othet dtcwns~ we will send you the 
.reason fen: such cancellation or nonteaewal with the notice or we will send you a statement of your right to .request 
theteason. 
A wtltten request must be malled ot delivered tQ us not less than 10 days prior to the effective date of cancella.tlon. 
We will fumish you with a statement giving the reason or grounds for the notice of cancellation. 
Nonrenewal 
If we mall o.t delivei: a notice of nomenewal to you. we will senc1 you either the .i:eason for tt0nrenewal or a statement 
of yout right to .request the reason for such nontenewal. A written request must be made not less than 15 days prlor 
to the effective date of nonrenewal. 
We w.ill mail to you at the address shown .in the Declaxatiom, or delivef to you, notice of nonrenewal not less than 30 
days befote the end of the policy period, if we decide not to renew or continue this policy. 
This provision shall not apply in any of the following cases: 
1. You fail tQ pay the premium when due. 
2, We show a willingness to .renew. 
I£ your policy is renewed, we still may cancel it at our option. if grounds fot cancellation existed before the effective 
date of the renewal 
b. Automatic Tei:mination 
This policy will automatically tetminate at the end of the policy period if you or yout teptcsentatlve do not .accept our 
offer to renew it Your failure to pay the requited J:enewal premium as we ttquire means that you have declined our 
offer. 
· If other .insurance is obtained on your lasuted car, any sim.Uat insumnce afforded unclu thl$ policy fo.r that car will 
cease on the effective date of the other .imutance. 
c. Other Provisions 
(1) If different J:Cquirements fot cancellation and nontenewal oc termination of policies become applic1-ble 
becauge of the laws of Idaho, we wm comply with those requkemen.ts, 
(2) Ptoof of mAiling shall be sufficient pJ:oof of notice. We may deliver a notice instead of mailing it. 
(3) The effective date and hour stated on the notice for cancellation of the entire policy shall become the end of 
the policy period. 




(4) The effective date and time stated on the notice for teductiom of coverage o.r cancellation of a po.ttlon of the 
coverage, shall be the effective date of the change. The notice shall be part of the policy. It is an endorsemen.t. 
(5) Tei:m.ination o.r change may .result in a premlum refund. If so, we will send it to you. Our making or offering 
of a refund is not a condition of cancellation. 
If you cancel, the .tefund will be computed in accotdance with the customaxy short tare table and procedw:e. 
If we cancel or reduce coverage, the .refund will be cOJllputed on (L pro nta basis. 
9. No Duplication of Baneflts 
An.y amount paid under Covetage E will be tpplied agajnst any othet covetage of this policy applicable to the loss so 
that there is no duplication of Coverage E benefits. In no event shall a coverage limit be reduced below any amount 
J."equired by law. 
Optional Payment Plan on Renewal of Polity 
If we send you an offe.i: to renew any or all of the coverages in your policy, we will send you a Renewal Premium 
Notice. You may pay the premium either in full or in two equal installments. · 
If paid in mstalbnents, we will add a service charge ,vhett the policy is renewed. 
The fitst premium installment, including the setrice chatge, shall.be payable on ot befote the policy tenewal date. The 
second installment shall be payable not later than 60 days after the renewal date. 
SPECIAL PROVISIONS 
Policy fees which you pay ate not part (ff the premium, but are fully eamed when cove.rage is effective. They a.re not 
:refundable (acept u noted In a. and b. below), but may be applied a$ a credit to policy fees tequited fo.r other 
.insu.mnce accepted by us. 
a. If we c111cel this policy durlng ot at the end of lhe fitst policy period, we shall refund all policy fees. 
b, If you cancel this policy during or at the end of the fitat policy period because it does not agree with the 
application fUld is not as represented by the agent, we shall .refund all policy fees. 
This policy shall not be effective unless countetsigned on the Declarations Page by e duly authorized representative 
of the Company named on the Decimations Page. ' 
The Company named on the Declarations ba.s caused this policy to be signed by the offioets shown below. 
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HOUSEHOID PET OOVERAGE 
This endomement provides new additional cove1age for which :you do not PV' any additional 
premium. 
If :you have a cove1ed loss under :your CompJ:ehensive or Collision covemge, and your household 
pet is iqjured while inside yom iIJ.9Ured car durlng the loss, or is inside your .insuffl1 car when it is 
stolen we will pay up fD $600 for veterlnmy care or pet intennent expenses. 
Pleffle review your policy and the Household Pet Covemge endomement for details. &'ince the 
policy including endomemenCs is our confract with you, if there's any difference between the 
policy and this summmy, die policy language will fake piecedence. If :you have any questions 
reganling your policy or would like infonnation about Homehold Pet Covemge or about other 
coverages, please contact your Fanne~ agent, who wDl be happy to assist you. 
J!J547A 
1d:Hftkll 
Yourpollcyis amended as follows: 
Under Part IV Damage To Your Car, the following is added fD Additional Definitions Used Jn ThJs Part 
Only: 
4. 'Household pet" means a fully domesticated animal owned by you forpeisonal companiomhip, such as 
a dog, a cat, a ~e, a binl or a rodent. Household Pet does not include any type of home, cow, pig, 
sheep, goat, chicken, tmtey, or captive fuN>eadng animal, or any animal commonly kept for food or 
pmrit. 
Under Part IV Damage To Your Car, the following is added to Supplementaiy Payments: 
3. If you have Coverage F - Compmiemive coverage for your Insured car and your Household Pets are 
inside fhat insunld car dudog Us coveied total theft, we wDl pay m110nable amounts up to $600 for the 
loss, vete:rinaly care, burlal, or disposal of any and all such Household Pees because of that covered total 
theft loss. 'lheft of Household Pees wiD be paid based upon flleir ac1ual cash value to a maximum of 
$600 per covered total theft loss for any and all Household Pets. 
4. If you have Covemge G - Collision a:ul your Household Pets are inside that imured car at the time of a 
covered loss under Coverage G - Collision, we wUl P\l' i.ea90nable mmmds up fD a tofal of $600 for die 
loss, veterlnaiy care, bmial, and/ or di.9posal of all such Household Pets adsiog out of their theft, iDjmy 
or deaftl dming a coveted loss. Loss of Household Pets will be paid bmed upon ifs their actual cam 
value to a maximum of $600 percov~ loss for any and all Household Pets. 
Under Part IV Damage To Your On; the following is added to Exdmiom: 
12. To Household Pets fflat are il\ilm or die from beat, debydndion, or exposure t.o weather or fD other 
animals from any covered loss under Coverage For Coverage G. 
Under Part IV Damage To Your Ou; Che following is added to limits of I.Jability: 
3. Under Coverage F and Coverage G, $600 for any one covered loss, for any and all Household Pets 
stolen, il\iuffll or .killed as a mmlt of that coveffll loss. 
This endoisement is part of your pollcy. It supemedes and controls anything t.o Che contrm.y. It is othel'Wise 







IMPORTANT NOTICE OF REDUCTION OFCOVERAGE 
Dear Customer, 
We are writing to inform you of a coverage reduction in your auto policy. 
In response to the growing trend of cus~ed vehicle enhancements, the J6499A 
Customized Equipment Endorsement has been created. This endorsement defines the term 
"customized equipment" to provide you with a better understanding of your policy coverage. 
It also sets a limit of$1,000 as the most paid for a covered loss to that equipment. 
For a more detailed description of your coverage, please refer to your underlying policy and 
to its endorsements. Since the policy .including all of its endorsements is your contract with 
us, if there's any difference between the policy and this message, the policy language will take 
precedence. 
The J 6499A Customized Equipment Endorsement provides limited coverage for those who 
have customiz.ed equipment o.n their vehicle, and helps control the cost of auto insU1-ance for 
everyone. If you need additional coverage for "customized equipment'' for a covered vehicle, 
or have any other questions, please con~t your F~ agent. 
CUSTOMIZED EQUIPMENT ENDORSEMENT J6499A 
1st Edition 
Under PART IV - DAMAGE TO YOUR CAR, Coverage F - Comprehensive, and Coverage G -
Collision, the following is added: 
We will also pay for repair or replacement of customized equipment up to a total of $1,000 for any 
one loss event Multiple items of customized equipment lost or damaged in the same event are 
considered to be one loss. 
The following definition is added to PART IV - DAMA.GE TO YOUR CAR, Additional Def"mitions 
Used In '!'his Part Only: 
Customized equipment means any furnishings or equipment, which is pennanently attached to your 
insured car and common to its use, which is not the vehicle's factory available fumishings or equipment 
This includes, but is not limited to: 
a. any video, electronic sound reproducing or transmitting equipment, and its component parts, media and 
data, including but not limited to DVD, Grune System or MP3 player; 
b. any painted, chrome or finished surfac~ whether .refinished in whole or in part, of any automobile 
insured under this Part where the claim exceeds the cost of duplicating the vehicle's factory applied 
surface finish; 
c. tires, wheels, rims, spinners, grilles. louvers, side pipes, hood scoops or spoilers or any exterior surface, 
body or exhaust equipment. or modification thereto, which exceeds the cost of repairing or replacing 
the vehicle's factoty available equipment 
d. any engine, transmission or suspension parts, or modification thereto, which exceeds the cost of 
repairing or replacing the vehicle's factoty available equipment; 
93-6503 mmmoa 1-0& {COtltit11141i N&Xt Page) )6503101 
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e. GPS navig-ational systems; 
f. special carpeting, insulation, wall paneling, furniture or bars; 
g. facilities for cooking or sleeping includingenclosutes or bathroom facilities; 
h. height-extending .roofs; or 
i. custom murals. paintings o.r othe.r decals o.r graphics. 
Unde.r Additional Definitions Used In This Part Only, 2., loss.is deleted and replaced with: 
2. Loss means direct and accidental loss of or damage to your insured car, including its customized 
equipment. 
This endorsement is part of your policy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It is otherwise 
subject to all othe.r terms of the policy. 
93-65113 ISTEDlllON I-OB J65113102 
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PARl"IV- DIIVIAfl:lO'«lR.OtR- <DJEFWEF 
E1417 
1s li:ltkn 
It is agreed that if a loss to auto safety glass is repaired 1ather than replaood, the deductible applJing to 
Coverage F - Onnprehemive under Patt IV - Damage to Your OU' is waived. If the auto safeey glass is 
i:eplaced, the deductible applying to Comprehemive will mnain in foiu. 
1bis endoisement Js part of your policy. It supemedes and controls anything t.o the contraty. It is othemise 
subject to all ofher tenm of the policy. 




DEDUCTIBLE PROVISIONS UNDER PART V 
(E -z READER CAR POLICY) 
e1301 
1st Edition 
It is agn,ed that provisions contained In Part V - Condlllons. Secllon 8. - Tennlnatlon or Reduction of 
Coverage, which pertain to our right to add a $100 deductible under Coverage F or G are deleted and 
replaced with the following: 
'SUbject to any appllcable Sla1e law, Section 8. does not limit our light to add or lnaease a deductible 
under Coverage F and/or G of this policy as a condition to renewal.11 
This endotsement Is pad of your pollcy. It supersedes and controls anything to the contrary. It Is otherwise 
subject to all other tenns of the pollcy. 

































KENNETH E. LYON, III 
ISB # 4431 
10389 Double R Blvd 
Reno, Nevada 89521 
Phone: (775) 398-5800 
Fax: (775) 398-5801 ·- ~ ,.,,__.,._--
Email: ken@lyonlaw.net 
KENNETH E. LYON, JR. 
ISB # 1117 
5785 Rio Vista Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 
Phone: (208) 251-2124 
Email: ken.lyon21@gmail.com 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Erica Klein 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 








Case No: CV-2017-~-OC 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Erica Klein, by and through her undersigned counsel of record, 
and hereby files her opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. Said opposition 
is made and based upon the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities, the Affidavit o 
Kenneth E. Lyon, III and all attached exhibits filed herein, the Affidavit of Ryan Lewis and all 
attached exhibits filed herein, all pleadings and papers filed herein, and such oral argument as 
may be presented for t~~ourt's consideration. 
































MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTORITIES 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Erica Klein ("Klein") filed the instant matter seeking this Court's order 
compelling Defendant Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farmers") to mandatory 
arbitration to resolve her underinsured motorist ("UIM") claim pursuant to the terms of her 
insurance policy. Farmers seeks summary judgment on the argument that Klein's action 
accrued at the time of the underlying accident with the tortfeasor, or at the time she resolved her 
claim with the tortfeasor, and is therefore barred by the five year statute oflimitations set forth 
in LC. 5-216. As more fully addressed below, summary judgment should be denied because an 
issue of fact exists concerning whether Klein's demand for arbitration was made within a 
reasonable time as determined by the subject matter of the contract of insurance, the situation of 
the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance of the contract. Additionally, 
summary judgment should be denied because Klein's UIM claim has not accrued as a matter of 
law as there has been no breach of the insurance contract necessary to trigger the application of 
LC. 5-216. 
II. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about October 10, 2009, Farmers issued a policy of automobile insurance to Klein, 
identified as Policy Number 75-17608-01-97 ("the Policy"). (Lyon Aff., Exhibit 1.) 
Relevant to these proceedings, the Policy was effective October 10, 2009 through April 
10, 2010, provided coverage for Klein's 2008 Chevrolet Malibu, and provided $500,000 in UIM 
































Pursuant to the terms of the Policy, Coverage C for UIM coverage states: 
We will pay all sums which an insured person is legally entitled to recover as 
damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle because of 
bodily injury sustained by the insured person. The bodily injury must be caused 
by accident and arise out of the ownership, maintenance or use of the uninsured 
motor vehicle. Determination as to whether an insured person is legally entitled 
to recover damages or the amount of damages shall be made by agreement 
between the insured person and us. If no agreement is reached, the decision will 
be made by arbitration. 
(Lyon Aff., Exhibit 1, p. 6.) 
states: 
Pursuant to the terms of the Policy, there is a mandatory arbitration provision which 
If an insured person and we do not agree (1) that the person is legally entitled to 
recover damages from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, or 
(2) as to the amount of payment under this part, either that person or we may 
demand that the issue be determined by arbitration. 
In that event, an arbitrator will be selected by the insured person and us. If 
agreement on an arbitrator cannot be reached within (30) days, the judge of a court 
having jurisdiction will appoint the arbitrator. The expense of the arbitrator and all 
other expenses of arbitration will be shared equally. Attorney's fees and fees paid 
for the witnesses are not expenses of arbitration and will be paid by the party 
incurring them. 
The arbitrator shall determine (1) the existence of the operator of an uninsured 
motor vehicle, (2) that the insured person is legally entitled to recover damages 
from the owner or operator of an uninsured motor vehicle, and (3) the amount of 
payment under this part as determined by this policy or any other applicable policy. 
Arbitration will take place in the county where the insured person lives. Local 
court rules governing procedures and evidence will apply. The decision in writing 
of the arbitrator will be binding subject to the terms of this insurance. 
Formal demand for arbitration shall be filed in a court of competent jurisdiction. 
The court shall be located in the county and state of residence of the party making 
the demand. Demand may also be blade by sending a certified letter to the party 
against whom arbitration is sought, with a return receipt as evidence. 
































The Policy also included two endorsements regarding UIM coverage. The first 
endorsement, endorsement 1180A, involved higher UIM limits of $500,000. (Lyon Aff., 
Exhibit 1.) The second endorsement, endorsement Ell 79i, provided additional language 
concerning UIM coverage. (Lyon Aff., Exhibit 1.) Such additional language included: "We 
will pay under this coverage only after the limits of liability under any applicable bodily injury 
liability bonds or policies have been exhausted by payment of judgments or settlements." (Lyon 
Aff., Exhibit 1.) 
On February 1, 2010, Klein was driving her 2008 Chevrolet Malibu when her vehicle 
wast-boned by a vehicle driven by a third party tortfeasor insured by Allstate Insurance. (Lyon 
Aff., Exhibit 2.) 
Klein was injured in the accident and retained Ryan Lewis ("Lewis") to represent her. 
(Lyon Aff., Exhibit 3.) 
On December 14, 2010, Lewis provided Mike Morrissey ("Morrissey"), the Farmers' 
adjuster assigned to Klein's UIM claim, a copy of Klein's demand package sent to Allstate 
requesting settlement for the Allstate policy limits of $25,000. (Cooper Dec., Exhibit 1.) 
Allstate subsequently offered to resolve Klein's liability claim against the tortfeasor for 
his full policy limit in the amount of $25,000. Lewis notified Morrissey of Allstate's offer. On 
January 4, 2011, Lewis received confirmation from Morrissey that it had been advised of the 
Allstate offer and received Farmers' permission to resolve the third party claim. (Lyon Aff., 
Exhibits 4 and 5.) 
On April 25, 2011, Klein resolved her injury claim with Allstate Insurance for the full 
































On November 7, 2012, Lewis submitted Klein's UIM demand package to Morrissey with 
a proof of loss demand pursuant to I.C. 41-1839 in the sum $250,000.00. (Cooper Dec., Exhibit 
2.) 
On December 12, 2012, Morrissey extended an offer to resolve Klein's UIM claim for 
the sum of $75,000. (Cooper Dec., Exhibit 3.) 
On December 13, 2012, Farmers issued a check to Klein in the amount of $75,000 for the 
undisputed portion of the UIM benefits owed to her pursuant to I.C. 41-1839. (Cooper Dec., 
Exhibit 4.) 
On December 13, 2012, Lewis clarified and Morrissey acknowledged that the $75,000 
payment was for the undisputed portion of Klein's UIM benefits and did not resolve or 
otherwise constitute a final settlement and that Klein's UIM claim would be kept open, subject 
to her future medical needs. (Lewis Aff., Exhibit 1.) 
On January 30, 2013, Lewis acknowledged the assignment of Dan Emerson ("Emerson") 
as the new adjuster for Farmers and provided him with a status of Klein's ongoing medical 
treatment. (Cooper Dec., Exhibit 5.) 
On July 7, 2013, Emerson confirmed discussions with Mr. Lewis and requested updated 
medical information. (Cooper Dec., Exhibit 6.) 
On November 5, 2013, Dan Surmelis ("Surmelis") advised Lewis that Klein's UIM 
claim had been assigned to him and suggested mediation as an option to try to resolve the claim. 
(Cooper Dec., Exhibit 7.) 
On December 1, 2013, Surmelis again advised Lewis of his assignment as the new 
adjuster for Klein's UIM claim and requested information concerning the medical treatment 
































On January 22, 2014, Surmelis confirmed discussions with Lewis concerning the status 
of Klein's UIM claim which included possible mediation following review of Klein's updated 
medical information. (Cooper Dec., Exhibit 9.) 
On July 7, 2016, the undersigned ("Lyon") advised Surmelis that Klein had changed 
counsel and of Klein's intent to submit a supplemental demand package with updated medical 
information in an effort to reach a final resolution of her UIM claim. Lyon also asked if 
Farmers' preference was still to try to resolve the matter by way of mediation. (Cooper Dec., 
Exhibit 10.) 
On August 12, 2016, Surmelis acknowledged Lyon's representation of Klein. Surmelis 
also advised Lyon of Klein's obligations under the Policy, of the $75,000 payment previously 
tendered, and of the arbitration provision of the Policy. Surmelis also indicated that Farmers 
was prepared to respond to any demand for payment under the terms of Klein's policy within 
sixty (60) days ofreceipt of the proof ofloss. (Cooper Dec., Exhibit 11.) 
In subsequent discussions with Lyon, Surmelis confirmed that Klein's UIM claim was 
still open and that Farmers was still agreeable to resolving her claim by way of mediation. 
(Lyon Aff.,, 5.) 
On February 17, 2017, Lyon provided Surmelis with Klein's supplemental demand 
package requesting the balance of her UIM benefits. (Cooper Dec., Exhibit 12.) 
On or about April 4, 2017, in discussions with Lyon, Surmelis confirmed receipt of 
Klein's demand package and advised that he had completed his evaluation of the claim, that his 
evaluation had been sent his supervisors, that he was awaiting their response, and was therefore 
































On April 4, 2017, Lyon granted Surmelis a two week extension to respond to Klein's 
supplemental UIM demand. (Lyon Aff., Exhibit 7.) 
On May 17, 2017, Lyon requested an update from Surmelis concerning the status of 
Klein's UIM claim. (Lyon Aff., Exhibit 8.) 
On or about May 19, 2017, the undersigned received a call from attorney Gary Cooper 
("Cooper") indicating he was representing Farmers. Cooper advised Lyon that Farmers 
believed Klein's claim was barred by the statute oflimitations. After briefly discussing the 
issue, both Lyon and Cooper agreed to research the issue further and exchange their findings. 
(Lyon Aff., ,r 7.) 
On June 26, 2017, Lyon forwarded a letter to Cooper concerning Lyon's research on the 
issue of the application of the statute oflimitations on Klein's UIM claim. (Lyon Aff., Exhibit 
9.) 
On July 11, 2017, Cooper provided Lyon with Cooper's research concerning the 
application of the statute of limitations on Klein's UIM Claim. At that time, Cooper, on behalf 
of Farmers, also inquired as to whether Klein wished to participate in mediation in an effort to 
resolve her UIM claim. (Lyon Aff., Exhibit 10.) 
Klein agreed, and on September 22, 2017, the parties participated in mediation in an 
attempt to resolve Klein's UIM claim. The mediation was unsuccessful. (Lyon Aff., ,r 8.) 
On October 26, 2017, due to the inability of the parties to agree on a value of her UIM 
claim, Lyon advised Farmers that it appeared the issue would need to be resolved through 
arbitration pursuant to the terms of her policy and put Farmers on notice that Klein intended to 
seek pre-judgment/pre-arbitration interest and attorneys fees as provided under LC. 41-1839 






On November 21, 2017, Cooper, acknowledged receipt of Lyon's October 26, 2017 letter 
and interpreted it as a demand for arbitration. At that time, Farmers proposed an arbitrator. As 
well, Cooper advised that he was seeking authority from Farmers to file a Declaratory Relief 
4 
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On November 21, 2017, Lyon responded to Cooper's email clarifying that the October 
26, 2017 was not intended as a formal demand for arbitration. Rather, Lyon advised that a 
formal demand would be filed with the court pursuant to the terms of the Policy. (Lyon Aff., 
Exhibit 13.) 
On November 22, 2017, Klein filed the instant matter seeking this Court's order 
compelling arbitration as provided under her policy of insurance. (Complaint.) 
On November 28, 2017, Lyon provided Cooper with a courtesy copy of the Summons 
and Complaint, together with the names of potential arbitrators Klein was willing to agree to. 




Standard of Review 
Summary judgment shall be granted if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 





Goss, 144 Idaho 225, 159 P.3d 862 (2007); City of Kellogg v. Mission Mountain Interests Ltd., 
Co., 135 Idaho 239, 16 P.3d 915 (2000). The moving party has the burden of proving the 































denials from the pleadings, but must set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. 
Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 166, 16 P.3d 263 (2000). In making this determination, all 
allegations of fact in the record and all reasonable inferences from the record are construed in the 
light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. City of Kellogg, supra; Friel v. Boise City 
Housing Authority, 126 Idaho 484, 887 P.2d 29 (1994). 
B. 
Summary Judgment Should Be Denied as an Issue of Fact Exists 
Concerning Whether Klein's Demand for Arbitration Was Made 
Within a Reasonable Time 
It is a well-recognized legal principle that in reviewing an insurance policy, where the 
policy language is clear and unambiguous, the rights and obligations of the parties are 
determined as a matter oflaw according to the plain meaning of the words used. See Farm 
Bureau Mutual Insurance Co. of Idaho v. Eisenman, 153 Idaho 549,286 P.3d 185 (2012); 
Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,233 P.3d 1221 (2010). 
Unless contrary intent is shown, common non-technical words are given the meaning applied by 
laymen in daily usage as opposed to the meaning derived from legal usage. Armstrong v. 
Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 147 Idaho 678,205 P.3d 1203 (2009). A provision in an insurance 
policy is ambiguous only if it is reasonably subject to conflicting interpretation. Mutual of 
Enumclaw v. Box, 127 Idaho 851, 908 P.2d 153 (1995). "Because insurance contracts are 
adhesion contract, typically not subject to negotiation between the parties, any ambiguity that 
exists in the contract must be construed most strongly against the insurer." Weinstein v. 
Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,321,233 P.3d 1221, 1243 (2010), citing 
































As set forth above, Klein's insurance policy unambiguously mandates arbitration when 
an agreement as to the value of her UIM claim cannot otherwise be reached with Farmers. 
Specifically, the Policy states: "Determination as to whether an insured person is legally entitled 
to recover damages or the amount of damages shall be made by agreement between the insured 
person and us. If no agreement is reached, the decision will be made by arbitration." The Idaho 
Supreme Court has specifically upheld these types of arbitration provisions in insurance policies. 
See Mason v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 Idaho 197, 177 P.3d 944 (2007); Hansen v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 735 P.2d 974 (1987). Nevertheless, Farmers 
now seeks to avoid the mandatory arbitration provision it agreed to when it issued the Policy on 
the argument that the time period by which to bring arbitration has expired. This is despite the 
fact, as detailed above, Farmers and Klein have been attempting to come to an agreement 
concerning the value of her UIM claim, and despite the fact the Policy is silent as to when 
arbitration must be demanded. 
"The well-established law in Idaho is, 'Where no time is expressed in a contract for its 
performance, the law implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable time as determined 
by the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending 
the performance.'" Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,318,233 
P.3d 1221, 1240 (2010), quoting Curzon v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 86 Idaho 38, 43,382 P.2d 906,908 
(1963). What constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact. See, Spear v. California State 
Auto Assn., 831 P.2d 821 (Cal. 1992). 
In this case, the Policy clearly provides that arbitration only occurs once it has been 
determined that the parties cannot reach an agreement concerning the value of the UIM Claim. 































As detailed above, Farmers acknowledged that the payment of the $75,000 did not 
represent full and final payment to Klein and that her UIM claim would be kept open subject to 
her ongoing medical needs. At no time did Farmers indicate that Klein's claim would be denied 
' 
closed, or that it would no longer negotiate with her in an attempt to reach a final resolution of 
her claim. Indeed, once the undersigned became involved, Farmers confirmed that Klein's claim 
was still open and confirmed it was still willing to participate in mediation as necessary to 
resolve her claim. As well, following the submission of the supplemental demand package, 
Surmelis acknowledged that he had evaluated the claim and submitted his evaluation to his 
supervisors and needed a two week extension to reply to the demand. It was only after 
subsequent attempts to follow up with the status of Farmers' response that Farmers, through 
Cooper, first raised the issue of the statute of limitations. 
More importantly, even in light of this legal issue, negotiations continued. Specifically, 
both parties agreed to exchange their findings concerning their respective research on the statute 
of limitations. After this occurred, both parties agreed to participate in mediation in an effort to 
reach a final resolution of the claim. Once the mediation proved unsuccessful, Klein promptly 
notified Farmers of her belief that arbitration would be necessary to resolve her claim and then 
timely filed her demand for arbitration as provided for under the terms of the Policy. 
Based on the foregoing, and the documents and affidavits filed in support thereof, a 
genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Klein's demand for arbitration was reasonable 
in light of the considerations delineated in Weinstein, supra. At the very least, Klein should be 
allowed to pursue discovery pursuant to I.R.C.P. 56(d) to obtain her claims file with Farmers and 
other information to establish that her demand for arbitration was made within a reasonable time 
































Summary Judgment Should Be Denied as Klein's UIM Claim 
Could Not Accrue as a Matter of Law Until the Parties Were Unable to 
Reach an Agreement on the Value of Her UIM claim and Farmers Refused Arbitration 
Summary judgment should be also denied on the grounds that Klein's UIM could not 
have accrued as a matter of law until the parties were unable to reach an agreement as to the 
value of her UIM claim and Farmers refused arbitration. 
On this issue, Farmers maintains Klein's demand for arbitration, filed with the court as 
mandated by the Policy, is untimely because her UIM claim "accrued" either at the time of the 
underlying accident, or at the time she settled with the third party tortfeasor, and is therefore 
beyond the five year statute of limitations contained in LC.§ 5-216. However, Farmers 
argument is not supported by the language of the Policy or by Idaho law and therefore should be 
rejected. 
Since an action for UIM benefits sounds in contract, a majority of jurisdictions have held 
that the statute of limitations commences to run only on the earliest date the contract is breached. 
See, 2 Auto. Liability Ins. 4th § 32: 11.1 
1 Jurisdictions which have adopted the majority view include: Blutreich v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 
170 Ariz. 541,826 P.2d 1167, 1171 (Ariz.Ct.App. 1991) (limitations period for an action to 
recover benefits under UIM motorist provision begins to run only upon insurer's breach of 
contract); Spear v. California State Auto. Ass 'n, 2 Cal.4th 1035, 9 Cal.Rptr.2d 381, 831 P.2d 821, 
825 (1992) ("an insured' s cause of action against insurer to compel arbitration of [UM] benefits 
does not accrue, and statute of limitations does not begin to run, unless the insurance company 
refused to arbitrate"); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Spinelli, 443 A.2d 1286, 1287 (Del.1982) (action by 
insured for UM benefits sounds in contract rather than tort and cause of action does not accrue 
until insurer denies coverage); Norfleet v. Safeway Ins. Co., 144 Ill.App.3d 838, 98 Ill.Dec. 598, 
494 N.E.2d 720, 723 (1986) (time period for filing demand for arbitration of UM claim began to 
run on date that insurer refused to comply with arbitration demand); Whitten v. Concord Gen. 
Mut. Ins. Co., 647 A.2d 808,811 (Me. 1994) (limitations period for filing UM claim against 
insurer began to run when insurer rejected insureds' demand for payment of medical bills); 







The underlying consensus of these decisions is that the statute of limitations should not 
begin to run until a justiciable claim for breach of contract exists. Id Indeed, even Oanes v. 
Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401 (Minn. 2000), relied upon by Farmers, acknowledges that the· 
5 breach of contract analysis is the majority view, stating: "The issue before us is whether we 
6 should ... adopt the position taken by a majority of jurisdictions that a cause of action for the 






















breached." 617 N.W.2d at 404. 
Although Idaho has not specifically addressed the issue, established Idaho case law 
concerning contracts and the contractual relationship which exists between an insurance 
company and an insured individual suggests it would follow the majority rule. 
For example, Idaho recognizes that the statute of limitations on a contract claim does 
not begin to run until the claim accrues upon a breach of the contract. See Spence v. HowellL 
126 Idaho 763, 890 P.2d 714 (1995)(statute of limitations on contract claim does not begin to 
run until claim accrues upon breach of contract). Idaho also recognizes that that an action on 
UM benefits accrued when insurer denied insured's request for benefits); Lane v. Nationwide 
Mut. Ins. Co., 321 Md. 165, 582 A.2d 501-07 (1990) (same); Berkshire Mut. Ins. Co. v. Burbank, 
422 Mass. 659,664 N.E.2d 1188, 1190 (1996) (same); Jacobs v. Detroit Automobile Inter-
Insurance Exch., 107 Mich.App. 424,309 N.W.2d 627,630 (1981) (same); Grayson v. State 
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins., 114 Nev. 1379, 971 P.2d 798, 800 (1998) (limitations period runs from 
date insurer denies payment of insured's UIM claim); Metropolitan Property & Liab. Ins. Co. v. 
Walker, 136 N.H. 594,620 A.2d 1020, 1022 (1993) (same); Wille v. Geico Cas. Co., 2 P.3d 888, 
890 (Okla. 2000); Vega v. Farmers Ins. Co., 323 Or. 291, 918 P.2d 95, 98 (1996) (same), 
superseded by statute in Or.Rev.Stat. §§ 742.504(4)(A), 742.504(12) (1999); Webster v. Allstate 
Ins. Co., 833 S.W.2d 747, 750 (Tex.Ct.App. 1992) (same); Alvarez v. American Gen. Fire & 
Cas. Co., 757 S.W.2d 156, 158 (Tex.Ct.App. 1988) (same); Schwindt v. Commonwealth Ins. Co., 
140 Wash.2d 348,997 P.2d 353,360 (2000) (same); Safeco Ins. Co. v. Barcom, 112 Wash.2d 
































an insurance policy is in contract and has therefore found any policy provisions which seek to 
limit the five year statute of limitations set forth in LC. § 5-216 to be unconstitutional. See 
Sunshine Min. Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co.,. 107 Idaho 25,684 P.2d 1002 (1984). Finally, in 
Greenough v. Farm Bureau Mutual Ins. Co,., 142 Idaho 589, 130 P.3d 1127 (2006), the Idaho 
Supreme Court overruled prior case law which allowed prejudgment interest for UM/UIM 
claims to accrue from the date of the accident. In doing so, the Court found that the money 
comes due as provided under the express terms of the insurance contract. Therefore an insured 
is not entitled to prejudgment interest until there is compliance with the applicable contract 
prov1s1ons. 
Idaho's focus on the contractual relationship that arises from a policy of insurance is 
also evidenced in Sullivan v. Allstate Ins. Co., 111 Idaho 304, 723 P.2d 848 (1986), wherein the 
Idaho Supreme Court specifically stated that it does not agree with those jurisdictions which 
find that the insurance carrier steps into the shoes of the uninsured motorist and becomes an 
adversary of its own insured notwithstanding the premiums that have been paid for coverage. 
The Court strengthened this position in Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co,., 149 
Idaho 299, 233 P.3d 1221 (2010), specifically finding that an insurance company's obligation 
to pay uninsured motorist benefits is based on terms of the contract of insurance. 149 Idaho 
318. It is this contractual obligation which establishes a duty on the part of the insurance 
company to act in good faith even when its insured makes a claim under the UM coverage of 
the policy because "[t]he covenant requires the parties to perform, in good faith, the obligations 
contained in their agreement." 149 Idaho at 317, citing Van v. Portneuf Med Ctr., 14 7 Idaho 
































This authority clearly shows that Idaho views an insurance policy as a contractual 
relationship and that the rights and obligations of the parties are governed by the terms of the 
contract. Only upon a breach of the terms of the agreement does a cause of action accrue. This 
is particularly true when, as in this case, the insurance policy requires arbitration if the parties 
are unable to reach an agreement concerning the value of the claim. When the policy imposes 
such a condition, the cause of action cannot accrue until this condition come to pass and there 
has been a breach of the contract, i.e., the parties are unable to reach an agreement and one 
party refuses to arbitrate the controversy. 
Although the Idaho Supreme Court has not directly decided this issue, two decisions are 
instructive as to the analysis which should be considered by this court in determining whether 
Klein's UIM claim has accrued. 
The first decision which is instructive is the California Supreme Court's decision in 
Spear v. California State Auto. Assn., 831 P.2d 821 (Cal. 1992). This case involved a petition to 
compel arbitration filed by Spear against CSAA for UM benefits which was opposed by CSAA 
on the ground that the action was barred by the statute of limitations. 831 P .2d at 822. Although 
Spear had timely filed a lawsuit against the uninsured driver and had timely notified CSAA of 
his intent to purse a UM claim, the claim was delayed pending the completion of Spear's 
associated worker' compensation action. Id. When the worker's comp action was resolved 
almost five years later, Spear notified CSAA of the settlement and his intent to negotiate his UM 
claim. Id CSAA responded that it would not settle the claim, and if arbitration was filed, it 
would attempt to dismiss the claim based on a statute of limitations defense. Id. 
The lower courts denied the petition for arbitration finding, in relevant part, that the 































However, in reversing, the California Supreme Court held that Spear's claim did not accrue until 
CSAA refused to arbitrate the controversy. Importantly, the holding was based on the insurance 
contract which required arbitration if the parties could not reach an agreement concerning the 
UM benefits. This provision stated: 
"If an insured person making claim under this Part and we do not agree that such 
person is legally entitled to recover damages .... , or if so entitled, do not agree as 
to the amount, then either party, on written demand of the other ... shall institute 
arbitration proceedings .... " 
831 P.2d at 823. 
Applying this language, the Spear Court reasoned that the action to compel arbitration 
was a suit in equity to compel specific performance of a contract. 831 P .2d at 824. As such, 
the statute of limitations governing a written contract applied. Id. As well, given the condition 
that arbitration was not required until an agreement could not be reached between the parties, 
the Court also determined that there could be no breach of the contract while the parties were 
negotiating in good faith before submitting to arbitration. 831 P.2d 825. Rather, the contract is 
breached only when one party has refused to arbitrate the controversy. Id. It is at that time that 
the cause of action to compel arbitration accrues. Id. 
The second case which is instructive is the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Walden 
v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 131 Idaho 18, 951 P .2d 949 ( 1998), which also considered 
the import of an arbitration provision when determining whether a contract of insurance had 
been breached. 
Walden involved claims for breach of contract and bad faith brought by the Walden 
against Nationwide based on Nationwide's failure to pay UM benefits. 131 Idaho at 19. 































policy. Id Nationwide advised Walden that it did not believe her claim was a limits case and 
demanded arbitration. Id Walden's policy had an arbitration clause requiring arbitration if the 
insured and the insurer could not agree on either the insured's right to recover damages from an 
uninsured motorist, or the amount of the damages the insured was entitled to. Id 
Nationwide subsequently advised Walden of the name of the arbitrator it was 
designating pursuant to the arbitration provision. Id Walden did not designate an arbitrator, 
but instead filed suit alleging breach of contract and bad faith based on Nationwide's failure to 
pay the policy limits. Id. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Nationwide, 
in relevant part, on a finding that Walden had "not shown a breach of contract or any other 
grounds for supporting a suit against the defendant." 131 Idaho at 20. 
On appeal, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. The Court 
found that Nationwide was not in breach of the contract, finding: 
A term of the policy is that the parties will submit to binding arbitration to 
determine the amount of damages, if that amount is in dispute. In this case the 
amount of damages was in dispute. By refusing to designate an arbitrator, Walden 
was the party who failed to comply with the terms of the policy, not Nationwide. 
Nationwide was entitled to have the amount of damages determined in arbitration. 
Nationwide was not in breach of contract and did not act in bad faith in relying on 
the provisions of the arbitration agreement. 
131 Idaho at 20. 
Applying the analysis set forth in Spear and Walden to the facts presented in this case, 
Klein's action to compel arbitration should be considered as a suit in equity to compel specific 
performance of a contact. See also, Fazzio v. Mason, 150 Idaho 591,597,249 P.3d 390 
(201 l)(the object of specific performance is to best effectuate the purpose for which the 
contract is made). As such, the proper statute of limitations for Klein's demand for arbitration 































founded upon an instrument in writing." See Peterson v. Gentillon, 154 Idaho 184,296 P.3d 
390 (2013)(1.C. 5-216 does not bar claim for specific performance for claimant in possession of 
property despite fact that a claim for breach of contract would be beyond the five year statute of 
limitations); Simons v. Simons, 134 Idaho 824, 11 P.3d 20 (2000)(1.C. 5-216 applicable to 
action for specific performance). However, there could be no breach of contract and accrual of 
Klein's UIM claim until the Klein and Farmers were unable to reach an agreement concerning 
the value of the claim and until there was a refusal to arbitrate. See also, Swafford v. Huntsman 
Springs, Inc., (Supreme Court ofldaho, 2017 Opinion No. 125), quoting Lido Van and Storage, 
Inc. v. Kuck, 110 Idaho 939,942, 719 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1986)("A cause of action accrues and 
the statute of limitation begins to run when a cause of action exists."). 
In this case, as shown by the documents and affidavits submitted herein, Klein's UIM 
claim has not accrued as there has been no breach of the insurance contract. Rather, the parties 
continued to negotiate in good faith culminating in the recent exchange of their respective legal 
arguments concerning the statute of limitations and their participation in mediation. It was only 
after the mediation it became apparent that an agreement could not be reached. Even then there 
was no specific refusal by Farmers to participate in arbitration ~til the filing of its motioJ?.}QL ------------------ ..... __________ .. _ 
summary judgment challenging Klein's demand ~or arbitration. At best, there has only been an 
-~- -·---~~- - -- w -~-----.,- ~ .. -~--~ ,-----.. ----------~. 
anticipatory breach based on Farmers email correspondence on November 21, 2017 wherein 
.. ~ -·------~.,,., ........ ~ --~·- -----
Cooper indicated he was requesting authority to file a declaratory relief action...9n the mistaken 
belief that Klein had demanded arbitration. However, even if Cooper's correspondence could 
be construed as an anticipatory breach on the part of Farmers to participate in arbitration, 
Klein's claim is well within the five year period prescribed by LC. 5-216 and her action 







Despite the above authority, Farmers argues that Idaho should follow a minority 
viewpoint held by some jurisdictions that a UIM claim accrues either at the time of the 
underlying accident with the underinsured motorist, or at the time a settlement is reached or 
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In support of its argument that Klein's UIM claim should be deemed to have accrued at 
the time of her underlying accident with the underinsured motorist, Farmers cites to Hill v. Am. 
Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619,249 P.3d 812 (2011), which invalidated an "exhaustion 
clause" requiring an insured to exhaust the full limits of the tortfeasor's insurance policy before 
being eligible for UIM benefits. Importantly, this decision did involve or address the application 
of an arbitration provision. Furthermore, the Court's analysis was based on the interpretation of 
the terms of the insurance contract and the public policy considerations impacted by the contract 
requirements. Thus, on this point, the Hill decision serves to re-affirm the Idaho Supreme 
Court's contractual viewpoint when addressing issues involving UIM coverage. Finally, 
although Hill invalidated an exhaustion claim allowing an insured to proceed with a UIM claim 
prior to full settlement with the tortfeasor, Hill does not stand for the proposition that an insured 
has an immediate cause of action against an insurance company at the time of underlying 
accident. 
Indeed, such a finding would be illogical as was the conclusion reached by the Nevada 
Supreme Court in Grayson v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. 114 Nev. 1379, 971 P.2d 798 (1998), 
when determining when the statute of limitations begins to run for UIM benefits under Nevada 
law which also allows a UIM claim prior to obtaining a full settlement against the tortfeasor. As 































This case presents an issue of first impression in Nevada: When does the statute of 
limitations begin to run on a cause of action for benefits under an UIM provision 
of an automobile policy? Courts in other jurisdictions have addressed this issue 
and the overwhelming majority of these jurisdictions have concluded that the 
limitations period begins to run on a UIM claim upon the insurer's breach of the 
insurance contract. 
These cases are based on the rationale that it would be illogical to begin the statute 
of limitations before the insured even has a justiciable claim for breach of contract. 
Although our UIM statutory scheme provides the insured with the option to file a 
suit against her UIM carrier prior to obtaining a judgment against the tortfeasor, if 
the insured chooses not to do so, an action for breach of contract will not lie at the 
time of the accident because the UIM carrier has not yet been called upon to fulfill 
a promise under the contract. 
Moreover, practically speaking, it would be fundamentally unfair to time-bar an 
insured from compensation she bargained for because an insured may not be aware 
until long after the accident that she will need to pursue a claim against her UIM 
insurer. Specifically, at the time of the accident or even several years thereafter, 
the insured may not know the extent of her injuries, the amount of the tortfeasor' s 
available coverage, or whether the cost of her medical treatment will exceed the 
value of the tortfeasor's insurance policy and available assets. 
114 Nev. at 1381-82 (citations omitted.) 
For similar reasons, the minority view that a UIM claim begins to accrue at the time of 
the underlying accident with the third party tortfeasors should be rejected under Idaho law. 
Idaho law is also inconsistent with the other minority view that a UIM claim begins to 
accrue at the time the insured obtains a settlement with, or judgment against, the underinsured 
motorist. Nevertheless, Farmers advocates the settlement/judgment rule on the grounds it is the 
only way to prevent an insured from being able to indefinitely forestall the commencement of 
the limitations period by failing to assert the UIM claim. 
In support of its position, Farmers relies on Danes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401 
(Minn. 2000). However, Danes is distinguishable in that it does not address the issue of specific 































prompted by prior Minnesota case law interpreting accrual of a claim for "implied-in-law" UIM 
coverage, as well as policy language which required exhaustion of the policy limits against the 
tortfeasor before the UIM benefits were recoverable. 617 N.W.2d at 402. This law is 
distinguishable from Idaho law in light of Hill, supra, and distinguishable from the express 
terms of the Policy which implies a reasonable time to submit a UIM claim and a reasonable 
time to request arbitration if an agreement cannot otherwise be reached. Weinstein, supra. 
These distinctions are critical because they alleviate the concern expressed by the Oanes Court 
that the settlement/judgment accrual date was necessary to ensure that injured insured cannot 
forestall the commencement of the limitations period indefinitely by failing to assert the UIM 
claim. 
Furthermore, the viewpoint expressed in Oanes has been criticized by several courts as 
being inconsistent with the general rule that a contract action accrues at the time the contract is 
breached. See Palmero v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 606 A.2d 797 (Me. 1992)(insured not 
injured by his UIM carrier and, therefore, has no right to seek judicial relief against the insurer 
unless and until the insurer breaches the insurance contract which occurs when insurer refuses 
payment or arbitration if applicable); McDonnell v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co., 299 P.3d 715 (Alaska 2013)(insurance company can require insured to make a claim or 
notice of potential claim within a certain period of time without requiring the insured to file 
suit); Am States Ins. Co. v. LaFlam, 69 A.3d 831 (R.I. 2013)(court hard-pressed to envision a 
scenario in which an insured who is in need of benefits and who has viable UIM claim would 
delay asserting the claim and remain less than fully compensated any longer than is necessary). 
The other cases relied upon by Farmers are either distinguishable for similar reasons, 































Transamerica Ins. Grp., 737 A.2d 969 (Conn.App. 1999), is actually consistent with Klein's 
position in that the court determined the plaintiffs had timely filed their application to compel 
arbitration in light of the insurance policy which required plaintiffs to exhaust all underlying 
insurance and which was silent as to the date by which plaintiffs had to make a demand for 
arbitration. As well, the Rosenthal, Brittain, Wheeler, and Boyle decisions cited by Farmers are 
no longer good law in light of Erie Ins. Exch. v. Bristol, 174 A.3d 578 (Pa. 2017), wherein the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court announced its adoption of the majority breach of contract rule, 
stating: "Absent a compelling public policy ground or legislative intent, we conclude there is no 
reason to create a special rule for determining when the statute of limitations starts to run in UM 
cases. We conclude the proper circumstance to start the running of the limitation period is an 
alleged breach of the insurance contract, which will be occasioned in this context by a denial of 
the claim or a refusal to arbitrate. This is the point when 'the cause of action accrued.'" 17 4 
A.3d at 589-90 (citation omitted). 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
In sum, Farmers has offered no compelling public policy considerations nor provided the 
court with established Idaho law which would suggest that Idaho should deviate from the rule 
followed by the majority of jurisdictions that a cause of action to obtain UIM benefits begins to 
accrue only after there has been a breach of the insurance contract. On the other hand, the 
authority cited herein clearly shows that the Policy at issue in this case should be interpreted like 
any other contract and the rights and obligations of the parties should be determined from the 
clear language of the Policy. Because the Policy requires arbitration only after the parties are 































have occurred pursuant to Idaho law until Farmers refused to participate in arbitration. 
Similarly, because the Policy is silent on when arbitration must be demanded after an agreement 
cannot be reached, Idaho law imposes a reasonable time standard. 
As demonstrated above, the parties continued to engage in negotiations in an attempt to 
reach a final valuation and settlement of Klein's UIM claim through September 22, 2017, the 
date both parties voluntarily participated in mediation. It was only after the mediation that it 
became evident that an agreement could not be reached and that the final value of Klein's UIM 
claim would have to be determined through arbitration. Klein filed her demand for arbitration 
on November 22, 2017. As such, summary judgment should be denied as a genuine issue of 
material facts exists as to whether this was within a reasonable time, taking into consideration 
the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending 
their performance. Summary judgment should also be denied as Klein's claim could not have 
accrued as a matter of law beyond the five year ~+itations period set forth in LC. 5-216. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this__![_ day of~arch, 2018. 
enneth E. on, 
Idaho Bar o. 7071 
Law Offices of Kenneth E. Lyon, III 
10389 Double R Blvd 
Reno, NV 89521 
Phone: (775) 398-5800 
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FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
CASE NO. CV-2017-4584-OC 
REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGEMENT 
COMES NOW the Defendant Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho ("Farmers"), by and 
through counsel, and does hereby file this Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated more fully below, Farmers requests that the Court 
dismiss the Complaint with prejudice as a matter oflaw. 
INTRODUCTION 
Farmers filed the motion for summary judgment to request that this case be dismissed in 
its entirety because the five-year statute oflimitations started to run on or before April 25, 2011, 
REPLY MEMO IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- PAGE 1 
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and Erica Klein did not submit an additional demand nor file the Complaint in this case until 
after April 25, 2016, more than five years after the statute oflimitations accrued. Thus, the 
Complaint filed by Klein is barred by the statute oflimitations and should be dismissed. Klein 
opposes the motion on two grounds. Klein argues that the statute oflimitations did not accrue 
until the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the value of the UIM claim and Farmers 
refused arbitration. Klein also argues that there is question of fact as to whether she demanded 
arbitration within a reasonable time. The purpose of these arguments is to shift the focus from 
when a UIM claim accrues and the statue oflimitations starts to run to when a breach of 
arbitration provision actually occurs. The summary judgment motion was brought to determine 
when a UIM claim accrues. There are no issues regarding breach of the arbitration provision. 
Thus, the arguments raise by Klein are inapplicable to the real issue to be decided by the Court. 
Nevertheless, Klein's arguments will be addressed. 
The first argument runs counter to the purpose of the statute of limitations that operates to 
extinguish remedies of"those who are unduly tardy in enforcing their known rights." Renner v. 
Edwards, 93 Idaho 836,838,475 P.2d 530, 532 (1969). Idaho case law is most consistent with 
the Date of the Accident Rule, that holds that the UIM claim accrues on the date of the accident, 
or the Settlement/Judgment Rule, that holds that the UIM claim accures on the date of settlement 
with the tortfeasor. Under either of these rules, Klein failed to pursue her claim until the five year 
statute oflimitation had expired. As such, the Complaint should be dismissed as a matter oflaw. 
The second argument is irrelevant to the statute of limitations issue. The arbitration 
provision does not allow the issue of the statute oflimitations to be decided in arbitration. 
Klein's claim is barred by the statute oflimitations and cannot be rescued by an arbitration 
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clause. The claim is time barred. However, even if this argument is considered, the Court can 
determine that the demand for arbitration was not made within a reasonable time as Klein waited 
nearly five years from the date when the amount of the claim was in dispute after Farmers offered 
$75,000 to fully and finally resolve the claim. The Idaho Supreme Court has held that waiting 11 
months to seek arbitration, as a matter oflaw, was a waiver of the right to enforce an arbitration 
provision in an insurance policy. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 
670-71, 735 P.2d 974, 981-82 (1987). 
STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Klein has not refuted any of the facts contained in the original supporting memorandum. 
Klein did include additional facts that support the grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Farmers. Those facts are included below. 
Klein was involved in a motor vehicle accident on February 1, 2010, that was caused by a 
driver insured by Allstate. Complaint, ,r,r 9-10. On December 14, 2010, attorney Ryan Lewis sent 
a detailed and extensively documented demand letter to Allstate demanding the $25,000 policy 
limits from its insured and a virtually identical letter to Farmers notifying Farmers that he 
believed there was a UIM claim under Ms. Klein's Farmers' policy (Policy Number 75 17608-
01-97). Cooper Declaration, Ex 1; Complaint, ,r 4. In December 2010, Michael Morrissey was 
the adjuster for Farmers that was assigned to handle Klein's claim. Klein subsequently settled 
with Allstate and its insured for the $25,000 liability limits under the Allstate policy on April 25, 
2011. Complaint, ,r 20. 
Thereafter, by letter dated November 7, 2012, Ryan Lewis submitted a Proof of Loss with 
some 432 pages of medical records to support the UIM claim and requested payment of 
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$250,000.00. Cooper Declaration, Ex 2. On December 12, 2012, after Farmers analyzed the 
medical records submitted on behalf of Klein, Morrissey notified Ryan Lewis that Farmers 
considered $75,000 as the "amount justly due" and advised that a check for $75,000 would be 
printed and delivered the next day. Cooper Declaration, Ex 3. The letter specifically stated: 
Based on the information in hand, I am in a position to offer $75,000 (Seventy Five 
Thousand Dollars) to resolve your client's uninsured motorist claim, inclusive of all 
subrogation and/or liens. Per our conversation I [ will] have the check cut for the 
$75,000 as the amount justly due as soon as our printer in the Pocatello office is 
repaired. 
Cooper Declaration, Ex 3. By letter dated December 13, 2012, the $75,000 check was forwarded 
to Ryan Lewis and it was cashed. Cooper Declaration, Ex 4; Complaint, ,r 16. 
In the opposition memorandum, Klein refers to an e-mail communication between Ryan 
Lewis and Morrissey. Lewis told Morrissey in a December 13, 2012 e-mail that he was concerted 
that Farmers intended to settle Klein's claim by paying the $75,000. Lewis Dec. Ex. 1. Morrissey 
responded the same day and stated that the $75,000 was paid as the amount justly due and was 
intended as an offer to resolve the claim. Lewis Dec. Ex 1. However, he had not received a 
release from Klein and would keep the claim open. Lewis Dec. Ex. 1. 
In January 2013, Dan Emerson assumed handling of the claim on behalf of Farmers and 
had some communications with Ryan Lewis. Cooper Declaration, Ex 5. On July 7, 2013 
Emerson wrote a letter to Ryan Lewis's law firm and asked if "you want us to keep her 
Underinsured Motorist claim open." Cooper Declaration, Ex 6. There was no response. Dan 
Surmelis took over the claim in November of2013 and sent Ryan Lewis a letter dated November 
5, 2013, asking him to call to discuss options to resolve the claim including mediation. Cooper 
Declaration, Ex 7. Follow up letters of December 1, 2013 and January 22, 2014 reflect that Dan 
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Surmelis talked to Ryan Lewis and asked that he contact him to discuss possibly moving the 
claim towards a final resolution. Cooper Declaration, Exs 8 and 9. These facts are not disputed 
by Klein. 
February 1, 2015, the five year anniversary of the accident came and went without a 
response from Lewis. April 25, 2016, the five year anniversary of the settlement with Allstate 
came and went without a response from Lewis. These facts are not in dispute. It was not until 
July 7, 2016, that Klein or anybody on her behalf did anything to further pursue Klein's UIM 
claim. By letter of that date Kenneth Lyon, III, Klein's new attorney, sent a letter to Dan 
Surmelis advising him that he was now representing Klein. Cooper Declaration, Ex. 10. Surmelis 
responded in a letter dated August 12, 2016, and informed Lyon that Farmers would respond to 
any additional demand within sixty days. Cooper Declaration, Ex. 11. It was not, however, until 
February 7, 2017, that Klein actually updated the medical history with a supplemental demand 
packet. Cooper Declaration, Ex. 12. In Lyon's February 7, 2017 letter he acknowledged that 
communications from Ryan Lewis in 2013 and 2014 were the last communications on behalf of 
Klein to Farmers about her UIM claim. Cooper Declaration, Ex 12. It is also acknowledged that 
"no further information was provided by Mr. Lewis"after his submission dated November 7, 
2012. Cooper Declaration, Ex 12. 
ANALYSIS AND ARGUMENT 
I. The Complaint should be dismissed because the applicable five-year statute of 
limitations bars any claim by Klein to further UIM benefits. 
The statute oflimitations on insurance contracts is the written contract five (5) year 
statute oflimitations contained in I. C. Section 5-216. Sunshine Min. Co. v. Allendale Mut. Ins. 
Co., 107 Idaho 25, 684 P .2d 1002 (1984). That is not disputed by the parties. The issue to be 
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decided is when did the statute oflimitations start to run. This issue has not been decided by any 
Idaho appellate court. Thus, this is an issue of first impression in Idaho. There are three different 
approaches to when a UIM claim accrues and the statute of limitations starts to run in other 
jurisdictions. The first is that the statute oflimitations starts to run on the date of the accident or 
' 
the "date of accident rule." The second is that the statute does not start to run until there has been 
a breach of the insurance contract. This is called the "breach of contract rule." Finally, other 
jurisdictions have held that the statute starts to run when the insured settles with, or obtains a 
judgment against, the third-party tortfeasor. This rule is referred to as the "settlement/judgment 
rule." Klein merely argues that the breach of contract rule should govern without seriously 
addressing the merits of the other two rules or the fact that they are more consistent with Idaho 
case law than the breach of contract rule. Each of these will be discussed below. 
A. Date of the Accident Rule - The claim accrues and the statute of limitations 
starts to run on the date of the accident. This rule is the most consistent with 
rulings by the Idaho Supreme Court. Based on this rule, the statute of 
limitations expired in February 2015, five years after the accident. 
Some courts have held that the statute of limitations on UIM claims accrues on the date of 
the accident. The advantage to this rule is that the accrual date is objectively certain. Woodall v. 
Travelers Indem. Co., 699 So. 2d 1361 (Fla. 1997) (Injured parties' cause of action against its 
underinsured motorist (UIM) carrier for UIM benefits accrues on date of accident, even if injured 
parties' policy contains provision that payment will be made only after limits of liability have 
been used up under all applicable bodily injury liability policies); Green v. Selective Ins. Co. of 
Am., 144 N.J. 344,676 A.2d 1074 (1996) (Statute oflimitations on claims for uninsured motorist 
and underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) benefits runs from date of accident, rather than breach of 
policy). The "date of accident" rule has admittedly not caught on with a majority of courts. 
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Klein rejects the date of the accident rule on the grounds that Idaho treats insurance 
policies as contracts and then cites to case law from other jurisdictions that rejected public policy 
arguments in favor of the breach of contract rule. This line of argument is at odds with the what 
the Idaho Supreme Court did in Hill v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619,249 P.3d 812 
(2011). In Hill, the Idaho Supreme Court determined that exhaustion clauses in UIM provisions 
are void because the violate public policy and that an insured has a UIM claim immediately 
following an injury accident without first exhausting the insured's right against the responsible 
parties. Id. In doing so the Court in Hill specifically stated that the "liberty of contract is not an 
absolute an unlimited right." Id. In light of this reasoning, Klein's arguments are unavailing that 
the Idaho Supreme Court would reject the date of the accident out of hand because insurance 
policies are considered contracts. 
Before Ryan Lewis, on behalf of Klein, settled with Allstate on April 25, 2011, the Idaho 
Supreme Court changed longstanding law in Idaho by holding that an exhaustion clause in an 
UIM automobile insurance policy, requiring the insured to recover by settlement or judgment all 
of the tortfeasor's bodily injury liability limits before collecting UIM benefits, is void, 
unenforceable, and severable. Hill, 150 Idaho 619,249 P.3d 812. Thus, an insured with a UIM 
motorist benefit claim was permitted to make a claim for and collect UIM benefits against his/her 
own insurer immediately following an accident. This change in the law also imposed a 
corresponding obligation on the insurer to investigate and attempt to resolve the claim in good 
faith regardless of whether, when or how much the UIM insured collected from the responsible 
party's liability insurance. Hill, 150 Idaho 619, 249 P.3d 812. The decision by the Idaho 
Supreme Court in Hill was made on public policy grounds and not on the basis of contract law. 
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The decision in Hill is most consistent with a rule that the statute of limitations for a UIM benefit 
claim accrues on the date of the accident, because that is when the insured is allowed to pursue 
the claim for UIM benefits. Thus, the rule most consistent with Idaho law and the rule that 
provides the most objectively certain date for the accrual of the statute oflimitations is the date 
of accident rule. 
It should be recalled that the purpose of the statute oflimitations in Idaho is to stimulate 
the "bringing of actions within the designated time limits when events and circumstances are 
fresh in the minds of the parties and witnesses." Renner v. Edwards, 93 Idaho 836,838,475 
P.2d 530, 532 (1969). As well, the Idaho Supreme Court has held: 
To those who are unduly tardy in enforcing their known rights, the statute of 
limitations operates to extinguish the remedies; in effect, their right ceases to create 
a legal obligation and in lieu thereof a moral obligation may arise in the aid of which 
courts will not lend their assistance. 
Id. The accident in this case occurred on February 1, 2010. The claim for additional UIM benefits 
was not made until July 7, 2016. Based on the "date of accident" rule, the statute oflimitations 
started to run on February 1, 2010 and expired on February 1, 2015, more than a year before Mr. 
Lyon became involved in the case and gave notice on July 7, 2016 that Klein intended to make 
an additional claim. 
B. Breach of Contract Rule - The claim does not accrue until the insurer 
breaches the insurance contract by denying payment or making only a 
partial payment. This rule allows an insured to indefinitely extend the statute 
of limitations by waiting to flle a UIM claim. This rule circumvents the intent 
and purpose for a statute of limitations. 
Some courts have held that the statute oflimitations for UIM claims does not start to run 
until the contract is breached, either by partial payment or denial of benefits. However, this is 
not the majority rule today, even if it was at one time. This rule is unworkable because it 
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indefinitely extends the time within which to make UIM claims. After years of hearing 
arguments about when the statute oflimitations accrued under this rule, Courts in numerous 
jurisdictions have sought a better reasoned and more objectively certain rule for determining the 
"accrual" date that marks the start of the running of the statute of limitations. The decision in 
Hill, as explained above, is inconsistent with the "breach of contract" rule that allows claims to 
remain in limbo indefinitely. If an insured can now make a UIM claim immediately following an 
accident, there is no reason to delay the accrual of the statute oflimitations on pursuing UIM 
claims. The case law cited to by Klein from California, Nevada, and Pennsylvania and other 
jurisdictions reject the type of reasoning that was used by the Idaho Supreme Court in Hill. The 
breach of contract rule and the jurisdictions that follow it would undermine the holding in Hill. 
Klein relies on the California case of Spear v. California State Auto. Assn., 831 P.2d 821 
(Cal. 1992). This case does not deal with the statute oflimitations for a UIM claim but focuses 
entirely on when cause of action to demand arbitration arises. The court in Spear held that cause 
of action to demand arbitration arises when an insurer refuses to arbitrate. However, that is not 
the issue in this case. The issue in this case is when did the cause of action for the UIM claim 
accrue. That is a different issue that is not addressed in Spear. Thus, Spear is not applicable when 
determining what accrual rule Idaho should adopt. 
Same applies to Klein's reliance on Walden v. Nationwide Insurance Company, 131 
Idaho 18, 951 P .2d 949 ( 1998). This case dealt with breach of a arbitration provision not when 
the UIM claim accrued. The facts of Walden are inapposite as that case involved a lawsuit filed 
by an insured that failed to name an arbitrator. That is not the issue raised in this motion for 
summary judgment and has no bearing on when a UIM claim accrues. 
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Klein then argues that Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 406-07 (Minn. 2000), 
quoted extensively below, is not applicable because it does not deal with specific performance of 
an arbitration provision. Danes is not cited to regarding arbitration. It is cited to in support of the 
reasoning behind the adoption of the settlement/judgment rule by Minnesota that holds that a 
UIM claim accrues and the statue of limitations starts to run when an insured settles with a third-
party tortfeasor. As such, it is applicable to the issues raised in the summary judgment motion. 
Klein claims that there was no breach of the insurance policy until at the earliest 
November 21, 2017, when counsel for Farmers indicated that Farmers would be pursuing a 
declaratory judgment action on the statute of limitations issue. Opposition Memo, p. 18. She 
admits that Farmers paid the amount justly due to which she was entitled under her UIM policy 
based on her November 7, 2012 demand, as it was required to do within "sixty (60) days if the 
proof of loss pertains to uninsured motorist or underinsured motorist coverage benefits" pursuant 
to Idaho Code§ 41-1839 and that this money was offered with the intent to fully settle the 
Klein's claim. Complaint, 1115 - 16; Lewis Dec. Ex. 1. Klein implies that the actual breach did 
not occur until she made a supplemental demand for UIM benefits on February 7, 2017 and 
Farmers failed to respond as required by I. C. 41-1839. 1 This supplemental demand came more 
than seven (7) years after her accident; more than five (5) years, nine (9) months after she settled 
with Allstate. If that is the case, the statute oflimitations on her claim for UIM benefits did not 
accrue until approximately April 2017 and will not expire until April 2022, more than twelve 
(12) years after her accident. It is this kind ofresult that has caused the breach of contract rule to 
1 Farmers appropriately responded to the initial demand in December 2012 as required by LC. 41-1839. 
However, LC. 41-1839 does not require Farmers to respond a second demand. Farmers responded timely and paid 
the undisputed amount. Farmers was under no obligation to respond a second time. 
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fall out of favor and why it should be rejected in this case. 
C. Settlement/Judgment Rule - The DIM claim accrues on the date of settlement 
with, or judgment against, the third-party tortfeasor. While not as certain as 
the date of accident rule, this rule provides more certainty than the breach of 
contract rule and is more consistent with the purpose behind the statute of 
limitations. Klein settled with the third-party tortfeasor on April 25, 2011. 
Under the Settlement/Judgment Rule the statute of limitations expired five 
years later on April 25, 2016, before Lyon become involved and sent the July 
7, 2016 letter. 
The settlement/judgment rule has been adopted by a considerable number of courts. This 
rule holds that the statute of limitations accrues on the date of settlement with, or judgment 
against, the third-party tortfeasor. See Danes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401,407 (Minn. 
2000) (Designating the date of settlement with or judgment against the tortfeasor as the accrual 
date for UIM claims protects both the insured's and the insurer's rights by insuring that the 
claimant will not be enabled to forestall the commencement of the limitations period indefinitely 
by failing to assert the UIM claim); Consiglio v. Transamerica Ins. Grp., 55 Conn. App. 134, 
737 A.2d 969 (1999) (six-year statute oflimitations for breach of contract began to run when the 
action against the tort-feasor was settled, not when the accident occurred); Prudential Prop. & 
Cas. Ins. Co. v. Perez-Henderson, 49 Conn. App. 653, 714 A.2d 1281 (1998) (Six-year statute of 
limitations applicable to contract claim for underinsured motorist (UIM) benefits began to run on 
the date of the insured's settlement with the tort-feasor); and North Carolina Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. 
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 115 N.C.App. 666,446 S.E.2d 364,369 (1994); Yocherer v. 
Farmers Insurance Exchange, 252 Wis.2d 114,643 N.W.2d 457, 463-64 (2002) ("or claims 
seeking underinsured motorist coverage, the date on which a presentable claim exists is the date 
on which the insured resolves his or her claims against the tortfeasors, whether it was by 
settlement or judgment...); Jackson v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 880 So.2d 
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336, 343 (Miss. 2004) ("[T]he Jacksons added State Farm to the suit more than three years after 
they knew the extent of Rebecca's injuries and knew the amount of [ the tortfeasor's] insurance 
coverage. Accordingly, their claims against State Farm are barred by the three-year statute of 
limitations."). 
The reasoning for adopting the settlement/judgment rule was explained by the Minnesota 
Supreme Court in Danes v. Allstate Ins. Co. held: 
... if the accrual date was the date of the breach of the insurance contract, that is, the 
date the claim was denied, the insured would be able to postpone the operation of the 
statute oflimitations indefinitely. Consistent with this concern, we again decline to 
adopt the rule that commences the statute of limitations when the contract is 
breached. 
We instead adopt a third option for the time a UIM claim accrues and the statute of 
limitations begins to run. This option is the date of settlement with or judgment 
againstthetortfeasor. See Wheelerv. NationwideMut. Ins. Co., 749 F.Supp. 660,662 
(E.D.Pa.1990) (holding that a UIM claim accrues when insured's rights have vested, 
which does not occur until the insured knows that the tortfeasor was an underinsured 
motorist; citing similar holding with regard to UM claim in Boyle v. State Farm Mut. 
Auto. Ins. Co., 310 Pa.Super. 10, 456A.2d 156, 162 (1983));seealsoNorth Carolina 
Ins. Guar. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 115 N.C.App. 666,446 S.E.2d 
364, 369 (1994) (holding that the statute of limitations did not commence on UM 
claim until the tortfeasor's insurance company was declared insolvent and the UM 
claimant was then "at liberty to sue"). 
Using the date of settlement with or judgment against the tortfeasor as the accrual 
date for UIM claims is consistent with our Nordstrom decision. The UIM claim will 
accrue when the condition precedent to raising the UIM claim that we identified in 
Nordstrom has been satisfied, not before. The statute of limitations will not be 
triggered until the UIM claim becomes ripe, eliminating the possibility that the 
limitations period will have run before the claim could be brought. 
Designating the date of settlement with or judgment against the tortfeasor as the 
accrual date for UIM claims is also consonant with our concern expressed in O'Neill 
and Weeks that the claimant not be enabled to forestall the commencement of the 
limitations period indefinitely by failing to assert the UIM claim. With the date of 
settlement or judgment as the accrual date, that cannot happen. 
Adopting the date of settlement or judgment as the accrual date protects the interests 
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of both the insured and the insurer. 
Oanes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401, 406-07 (Minn. 2000). As stated above, this case is 
directly on point. It address the central issue of when a UIM claim accrues for purposes of the 
running of the statute of limitations. 
In this case, Klein settled the third-party tortfeasor claim on April 25, 2011, more than 
five (5) years before the July 7, 2016 letter from Kenneth Lyon, III to Dan Surmelis which 
notified Farmers that Klein wished to submit a supplemental claim for the remaining limits of her 
UIM benefit. Based on the forgoing, Klein's UIM claim accrued on April 25, 2011, when her 
claim against the third-party tortfeasor was settled. Thus, the statute oflimitations started to run 
on April 25, 2011 and expired on April 25, 2016. Klein did not notify Farmers she intended to 
make a supplemental claim nor actually make a supplemental claim nor file this Complaint until 
November 22, 2017, more than five years after the UIM claim accrued. The statute oflimitations 
had clearly expired prior to the filing of the Complaint. As such, the Complaint should be 
dismissed in its entirety. 
II. Even if it is determined that the UIM claim is not barred by the statute of 
limitations, the Court can determine as a matter of law that Klein did not demand 
arbitration within a reasonable time. 
Klein argues that summary judgment should be denied because Klein demanded 
arbitration within a reasonable time. The arbitration provision does not allow the issue of the 
statute oflimitations to be decided in arbitration. Klein's claim is barred by the statute of 
limitations and cannot be rescued by an arbitration clause. However, even if this argument is 
considered, the Court can determine that the demand for arbitration was not made within a 
reasonable time. It is undisputed that in 2012, Ryan Lewis submitted a demand to Farmers under 
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the UIM policy for $250,000. Farmers responded with an offer to settle the entire claim for 
$75,000. That amount was accepted by Klein. The Farmers adjuster intended the payment to fully 
resolve the claim but agreed to keep the claim open. Lewis Dec. Ex. 1. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that a valid arbitration provisions are waived if a party 
is untimely in its pursuit of arbitration. Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 
670-71, 735 P.2d 974, 981-82 (1987). In Hansen, the insurer filed a motion to compel 
arbitration eleven months after the insured had filed a lawsuit against the insurer. The lawsuit 
was filed to pursue uninsured motorist benefits under an insurance policy. The Idaho Supreme 
Court determined that the arbitration provision was valid but that insurer's motion was untimely. 
However, "enforcement of arbitration agreements or provisions in a written contract is rendered 
meaningless when the parties to such agreements proceed with the litigation process." Id. The 
insurer in Hansen knew when the lawsuit was filed that there was a dispute regarding coverage 
under the uninsured motorist provision but waited eleven months to pursue arbitration after 
settlement negotiations broke off and it became apparent the case would not settle. Based on 
those facts, the Idaho Supreme Court held as a matter of law that the insurer "waived its right to 
enforce the arbitration provision of the uninsured motorist coverage in the insurance contact." Id. 
The denial of the motion to compel arbitration was upheld. 
In this case, Klein knew that the amount under the arbitration clause was in dispute on 
December 13, 2012, when Farmers offered to settle the entire claim for $75,000. Farmers 
rejected Klein's demand for $250,000. Klein then basically stopped communicating with Farmers 
until July 7, 2016. For thee and a half years Klein did nothing to pursue her claim with Farmers 
and failed to respond to communications from Farmers. Klein did not even submit a new demand 
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for payment until February 2017, more than four years after Farmers had rejected her initial 
demand and offered to settle the claim for $75,000. Even then, no demand for arbitration was 
ever made until the Complaint in this case was filed on November 22, 2017, nearly five years 
after Famers rejected her first demand and paid her $75,oqo with the intent to settle the cl.aim. 
Waiting that long is unreasonable and should be considered a waiver of the arbitration provision 
as a matter oflaw. Hansen, 112 Idaho at 670-71, 735 P.2d at 981-82. 
Klein has argued that Famers never stated that the claim would be denied, closed, or that 
it would no longer negotiate with her. Opposition Memo, p. 11. However, the arbitration 
provision does not require a denial, closure, or refusal to negotiate. Arbitration can be invoked if 
"an insured person and [Farmers] do not agree ... (2) as to the amount of payment" under the 
UIM provisions. Lyon Aff., Ex. 1, p. 8. There was obviously a disagreement as to the amount of 
payment when Farmers rejected the demand for $250,000 and offered to fully "resolve" Klein's 
claim for $75,000. Cooper Declaration, Ex 3. The Farmer's adjuster specifically told Klein's 
attorney that he intended the $75,000 offer to fully settle the claim. Lewis Dec., Ex. 1. Again, 
Klein delayed nearly five years to demand arbitration. Such a delay constitutes a waiver as a 
matter oflaw. Hansen, 112 Idaho at 670-71, 735 P.2d at 981-82. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the undisputed evidence in the record, the supplemental claim submitted by 
Klein on July 7, 2016 and the Complaint that was filed on November 22, 2017 were made more 
than five years after her UIM claim against Farmers accrued. Thus, the Complaint should be 
dismissed with prejudice. In the alternative, Klein's delay in demanding arbitration of nearly five 
years after Farmers rejected the demand for $250,000 and offered $75,000 to full resolve the 
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claim was unreasonable and constitutes, as a matter oflaw, the right to arbitration under the 
insurance policy. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 












MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This case comes before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment. 
A hearing was held March 26, 2018, where the Court heard oral argument from both 
parties through their respective counsel. The Court reserved ruling and took the 
Defendants motion under advisement and now issues this written decision. 
BACKGROUND1 
On February 1, 2010, Klein was injured in an automobile accident. The driver of 
the other automobile involved in the accident, Seth Hale ("Hale"), was insured by 
Allstate. On December 14, 20 I 0, Klein made demand for compensation to Allstate 
through her attorney Ryan Lewis ("Lewis") seeking Hale's policy limits. Lewis also 
provided Mike Morrissey ("Morrissey") a copy of the demand package sent to Allstate 
1 The background facts listed here are taken from the pleadings of the parties and the record in this case. 
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and notification to Farmers that she believed there was a UIM claim under her policy of 
automobile insurance. Morrissey was the first of the adjusters assigned to Klein's UIM 
claim by Famers Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farmers"). 
At the time of the accident, Hale had automobile liability insurance coverage in 
the amount of $25,000.00. Allstate offered a settlement to Klein to resolve the liability 
claim against Hale in the full amount of his policy limit. On January 4, 2011, Lewis 
notified Morrissey who confirmed that Farmers had been advised of the offer and advised 
to resolve the third party claim. On April 25, 2011, Allstate settled her claim against 
Hale. Allstate paid Klein a total of $25,000.00. 
On November 7, 2012, Klein sent Farmers a demand letter and accompanying 
UIM package with a proof of loss demanding in the sum of $250,000.00. On December 
13, 2012, after reviewing the submitted documentation, Farmers tendered $75,000.00 
check in response to Klein's demand. Farmer's payment was not refused and the 
settlement check was cashed. 
However, Farmers did not consider or treat the claim as a closed matter following 
the $75,000.00 payment. In fact, an email exchange between Lewis and Morrissey on the 
day the check was sent and cashed, ended in a response from Morrissey stating that he 
(Farmers) had not received a release from Klein and her UIM claim would be kept open, 
subject to future medical needs. 
Farmers sent letters to Lewis on January 2013 from Dan Emerson who was the 
second Farmer's adjuster assigned to handle Klein's claim, asking if "[Lewis] would like 
the claim to remain open?" No response was returned by Lewis. Again in November 
2013, another email was sent by Dan Surmelis ("Surmelis") who was the third Farmer's 
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adjusters assigned to handle Klein's claim, asking Lewis to call him to discuss options 
resolving the claim. Follow up letters were sent by Farmers on December 1, 2013, and 
January 22, 2013. The January 2013 letter reflected that Lewis and Surmelis had 
discussed the claim's status and the possibility of moving towards a resolution through 
mediation. 
It was not until July 7, 2016 that Klein made contact with Farmers through a new 
lawyer, Kenneth Lyon, III ("Lyon"). On July 7, 2016, Klein's new counsel sent a letter 
stating that he was now handling the claim on Klein's behalf and intended to submit a 
supplemental demand package with updated medical information in an effort to reach a 
final resolution of Klein's claim. On August 12, 2016, Farmers responded with a letter 
that informed Lyon that Farmers would respond to any additional demand within sixty 
days. 
On February 7, 2017, Lyon sent Farmer's a supplemental demand packet in which 
Lyon acknowledged that the last communications on Klein's behalf to Farmers occurred 
in 2013 and 2014 and that no further information was provided by Lewis to Farmers after 
his demand dated November 7, 2012. On or about April 4, 2017, Surmelis confirmed 
receipt of Klein's demand package and stated that he had completed his evaluation. 
Surmelis requested a two week extension to respond to Klein's supplemental demand, as 
his evaluation had been sent to his supervisors and he was awaiting a response. Lyon 
agreed to the request and on May 17, 2017, reached out to Surmelis for an update on the 
status of the claim. 
In response to this communication, Lyon received a call from Gary Cooper 
("Cooper"), counsel for Farmers, advising Lyon that Farmers believed Klein's claim was 
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barred by the statute of limitations. On June 26, 2016, Lyons sent a letter to Farmers 
concerning research on the issue of the application of the statute oflimitations to Klein's 
claim. In response, on July 11, 2017, Cooper provided Lyons with Farmer's research on 
the issue and on behalf of Farmers inquired as to whether Klein wished to participate in 
mediation in an effort to resolve her claim. On September 22, 2017, both parties 
participated in mediation, but mediation was unsuccessful. 
On October 26, 2017, Lyons informed Farmers that the issue would need to be 
resolved through arbitration pursuant to the terms of Klein's policy and put Farmers on 
notice that Klein intended to seek pre-judgment/pre-arbitration interest and attorney fees 
as provided by Idaho law unless other alternatives would be reached. Cooper advised that 
Farmers interpreted this letter as a demand for arbitration, proposed an arbitrator, and 
informed Lyon that he was seeking permission to file a Declaratory Relief Action to 
resolve the statute of limitations issue. On November 21, 2017, Lyon responded again by 
letter clarifying that his October 26, 2017, letter for arbitration. He advised that Klein 
would seek arbitration through an order of the Court pursuant to the terms of the policy. 
On November 22, 2017, Klein then filed her Complaint seeking an order from the 
Court to require Farmers to participate in arbitration regarding an under-insured motorist 
("UIM") claim submitted by Klein to Farmers. Farmers asserts that it is entitled to 
summary judgment and dismissal of Klein's Complaint asserting that it is barred by the 
expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to written contracts, LC.§ 5-216. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
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"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. "'2 When considering 
a motion for summary judgment, a court should liberally construe all facts and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.3 
The moving party has the burden of showing the lack of a genuine issue of material 
fact.
4 
To meet this burden, the moving party must challenge, in its motion, and establish 
through evidence that no issue of material facts exists on an element of the nonmoving 
party's case.5 Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when the 
nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case 
upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. 6 
To support or oppose a motion for summary judgment, a party must "set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."7 "A party defending a motion 
for summary judgment may not rest on its pleadings, but must offer affidavits or other 
evidentiary materials which demonstrate that an issue of fact remains."8 The Court must 
determine as a threshold question whether the evidence submitted by the parties is 
admissible.9 Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party fails to 
2 1.R.C.P. 56(c); Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459,460, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008); 
Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 267 (2002); see also Cox v. 
Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,494, 50 P.3d 987, 989 (2002). 
3 Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991). 
4 Northwest Bee-Corp, 136 Idaho at 838, 41 P.3d at 267. 
5 Id 
6 Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 583, 588 (1996). 
7 Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172, 175 (2007). 
8 Theriault v. A.H. Robins Co., 108 Idaho 303, 306, 698 P.2d 365,368 (1985) citing First Piedmont Bank 
and Trust Company v. Doyle, 97 Idaho 700,551 P.2d 1336 (1976). 
9 Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10 at 13, 175 P3.d 172 at 175. 
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establish, through admissible evidence, that there is a genuine dispute of material fact to 
the moving party's case. 10 
ANALYSIS 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requires a party, in response to a motion for 
summary judgment, to set forth specific facts by way of affidavit showing that there is a 
genuine issue for trial. In the present matter, Klein has asserted of the existence of a 
genuine issue of material fact as to whether Klein's demand for arbitration was 
reasonable in light of the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and 
the circumstances attending the performance, as described in Weinstein v. Prudential 
Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co .. 11 
Farmers responded to this argument in their reply memorandum, stating if the 
issue was to be considered by the Court, that it could determine [Klein's] demand for 
arbitration was not made within a reasonable time. 12 Farmers argued that the length of 
time between their offer to settle in December of 2012 and the time the demand for 
arbitration was filed in November 2017 was unreasonable and should be considered a 
waiver of the arbitration provision as a matter of law. 13 However, Farmers did not 
address whether a genuine issue of material fact existed in determining whether Klein's 
demand for arbitration was made within a reasonable time. 
The Supreme Court of Idaho has provided guidance to lower courts on this issue 
by stating, "[W]here no time is expressed in a contract for its performance, the law 
10 Id 
11 Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 11, March 12, 2018; see 
Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,318,233 P.3d 1221, 1240 (2010) citing 
Curzon v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 86 Idaho 38, 43,382 P.2d 906,908 (1963). 
12 Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Support of Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 13, 
March 19, 2018. 
13 Id. at 15. See Also Hansen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 112 Idaho 663, 670, 735 P.2d 974, 981 
(1987). 
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implies that it shall be performed within a reasonable time as determined by the subject 
matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the 
performance."14 In Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., the Supreme Court of 
Idaho did not speak directly to whether or not the issue of reasonableness is an issue of 
fact or law. However in Thiel v. Stradley, the Court was examining the question of 
reasonableness in the context of motion filings under the IRCP and stated, "[T]he 
question of reasonableness is ordinarily a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of 
fact after both parties have had an opportunity to try this issue."15 Although the issues are 
differing, the question of reasonableness is the same as applied to the issue in the present 
case. 
The treatment of reasonableness as a question of fact has also been upheld in 
other jurisdictions. The Supreme Court of California has implemented similar methods of 
ruling on issues where a contract does not express a time for performance. In a case 
before the Supreme Court in California dealing with a motion to compel arbitration of a 
UIM claim, the Court held, "[W]hat constitutes a reasonable time is a question of fact, 
depending on the situation of the parties, the nature of the transaction, and the facts of the 
particular case." 
A contract of adhesion is an agreement between two parties of unequal bargaining 
strength, expressed in the language of a standardized contract, written by the more 
powerful bargainer to meet its own needs and offered to the weaker party on a 'take it or 
leave it' basis. Insurance contracts are contracts of adhesion. "Ambiguities in a contract 
14 Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho at 318, 233 P.3d at 1240. 
15 Thiel v. Stradley, 118 Idaho 86, 88, 794 P.2d 1142, 1144 (1990). 
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of adhesion should be construed against the drafter." 16 As the drafter of the contract , 
Farmers could have contractually defined a time limit for the parties to demand 
arbitration. Having failed to do so, the analysis must then turn on the question of whether 
Klein failed to settle her UIM claim or demand arbitration within a reasonable time. The 
issue of whether Klein acted, or failed to act within a reasonable time is a question for the 
trier of fact. 
"[I]f the record contains any conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds 
might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied."17 The Court has 
many times upheld that "[T]he burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests at all 
times upon the moving party."18 In this present case, the moving party did not prove the 
absence of genuine issue of material fact on the issue of whether Klein failed to demand 
arbitration or finalize a settlement of her UIM claim within a reasonable time. 
CONCLUSION 
Thus, in liberally construing all facts and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor 
of the nonmoving party19, this Court has determined that the issue of whether Klein's 
demand for arbitration was made within a reasonable time is a genuine issue of material 
fact and as such should not be decided by the Court prior to trial. Therefore, the 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is DENIED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
16 Farm Bureau Ins. Co. of Idaho v. Kinsey, 149 Idaho 415, 419, 234 P. 3d 739, 743 (2010). 
17 Harris v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,298, 847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992). 
18 McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765,769,820 P.2d 360,364 (1991). 
19 See Id.; G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514,517,808 P.2d 851, 854 (1991); Kline v. 
Clinton, 103 Idaho 116, 120, 645 P.2d 350, 354 (1982); Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 
865,868,452 P.2d 362, 365 (1969). 
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FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No: CV-2017-4584-OC 
PLAINTIFF'S OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Erica Klein, by and through her undersigned counsel of record, 
and hereby files her oppositi.on to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider. Said opposition is made 
and based upon the foregoing Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Plaintiffs Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and the supporting affidavits and exhibits previously 
filed, all other pleadings and papers filed herein, and such oral argument as may be presented for 
the Court's consideration at the hearing scheduled for June 25, 2018. 
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MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTORITIES 
I. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff Erica Klein ("Klein") filed the instant matter seeking this Court's order 
compelling Defendant Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farmers") to mandatory 
arbitration to resolve her underinsured motorist ("UIM") claim pursuant to the terms of her 
insurance policy. Farmers moved for summary judgment, arguing Klein's UIM claim accrued at 
the time of the underlying accident, or at the time she resolved her claim with the third party 
tortfeasor, and is therefore barred by the five year statute of limitations set forth in LC. 5-216. 
Klein opposed summary judgment on the grounds the contract of insurance is silent as to 
when a demand for arbitration is required to be filed. As such, the law implies performance 
within a reasonable time as determined by the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the 
parties, and the circumstances attending the performance. Whether Klein's demand for 
arbitration was made within a reasonable time in light of these considerations is an issue of fact 
precluding summary judgment. 
Concerning Farmers' statute oflimitations defense, Klein argued that Idaho law is 
consistent with the majority rule that a claim for underinsured motorist benefits does not accrue 
until there has been a breach of the contract of insurance. As such, summary judgment based on 
the statute of limitations was inappropriate because her UIM claim could not have accrued as a 
matter oflaw until the parties were unable to reach an agreement on the value of her claim and 
Farmers refused arbitration. 
The Court denied Farmers' motion for summary judgment finding: "(a]s the drafter of 
































arbitration. Having failed to do so, the analysis must then turn on the question of whether Klein 
failed to settle her UIM claim or demand arbitration within a reasonable time. The issue of 
whether Klein acted, or failed to act within a reasonable time is a question for the trier of fact." 
(Memorandum Decision, p. 8.) 




Standard of Review 
The decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration is within this Court's sound 
discretion and is reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Merek v. Lawrence, 153 Idaho 
50,278 P.3d 920 (2012). 
The abuse of discretion determination is a three part test which asks whether the 
district court"( l) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within 
the outer boundaries of its discretion and consistently with the legal standards 
applicable to the specific choices available to it; and (3) reached its decision by an 
exercise of reason." 
153 Idaho at 53, citing Commercial Ventures, Inc. v. Rex M & Lynn Lea Family Trust, 145 Idaho 
208, 212, 177 P.3d 955, 959 (2008), quoting Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas Refinary 
Corp, 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475,479 (2004). 
B. 
Farmers' Statute of Limitations Defense Does Not Require Reconsideration 
In its Memorandum Decision, the Court correctly recognized Klein's action to compel 
arbitration is controlled by the terms and conditions of the contract of insurance which does not 
provide a time period by which the parties must demand arbitration. (Memorandum Decision, p. 































performance within a reasonable time as determined by the subject matter of the contract, the 
situation of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance. (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 7.) See Weinstein v. Prudential Property and Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,318, 
233 P.3d 1221, 1240 (2010). Finally, the Court correctly determined what constitutes a 
reasonable time under these circumstances is a question of fact. (Memorandum Decision, p. 8.) 
Nevertheless, Farmers claims the Court erred because the Memorandum Decision "does 
not address the statute of limitations, which is determinative on the issue of whether Klein can 
even bring the Complaint requesting arbitration. The issue was raised by Farmers but is not 
addressed in the Court's Decision." (Mtn, p. 5.) 
However, it was unnecessary for the Court to decide whether the statute of limitations 
begins to accrue upon a breach of the insurance contract, as adopted by a majority of the 
jurisdictions addressing the issue, because neither Klein nor Farmers alleged or presented facts 
in support of a breach of the insurance contract. Indeed, as the Court recognized, Farmers did 
not consider or treat Klein's UIM claim as being closed following the $75,000 payment, and in 
fact, confirmed her claim would be kept open, subject to future medical needs. (Memorandum 
Decision, p. 2.) Further, Klein's UIM claim has never been denied, and pursuant to the terms of 
the contract, the parties attempted to come to an agreement concerning the value of the claim, 
even participating in mediation, prior to the demand for arbitration. (Memorandum Decision, p. 
4.) Given the neither party alleged a breach of contract, and given the Court adopted findings of 
fact consistent with the terms of the insurance policy, whether the statute of limitations accrued 
upon an alleged breach was irrelevant to the Court's decision. 
Furthermore, consideration of the minority view advanced by Farmers was only 































ongoing negotiations between Klein and Farmers after the purported expiration of the claim, 
supports an implicit rejection of the minority view. Although the Court could have specifically 
stated it was rejecting Farmers' argument, the Court's decision not to do so does not warrant 
reconsideration of the denial of summary judgment. 
Rather, the Court correctly focused on the language of the insurance contract which 
provides that the "[ d]etermination as to whether an insured person is legally entitled to recover 
damages or the amount of damages shall be made by agreement between the insured person and 
us. If no agreement is reached, the decision will be made by arbitration."1 Importantly, pursuant 
to the express language of the policy, a demand for arbitration could have been made by either 
Farmers or Klein.2 Again, because the contract of insurance does not specify a time period for 
the parties to demand arbitration, a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Klein's 
demand for arbitration was reasonable in light of the subject matter of the contract, the situation 
of the parties, and the circumstances attending the performance. Weinstein, supra. See also, 
Johnswn v. Keefer, 48 Idaho 42, 48,280 P. 324 (1929)("What is a reasonable time for making 
demand must depend upon the facts of each case, some of the authorities stating it is a question 
of fact for the jury.") 
I I I 
II I 
I II 
1 See Lyon Aff., Exhibit 1, p. 6 in support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's 
Motion for Summary Judgment, filed March 12, 2018. 
2 See Lyon Aff., Exhibit 1, p. 8 in support of Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's 



































Based on the foregoing, Farmers has offered no compelling reason for this Court to 
reconsider its Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. As such, Farmers' Motion for Reconsideration should also be denied and this matter 
set for trial so the Court may determine whether Klein's demand for arbitration was reasonable 
in light of the subject matter of the insurance contract, the situation of the parties, and the 
circumstances attending the parties' performance. 
T" 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _fl_ day of June, 2018. 
Law Offices of Kenneth E. Eyon, III 
10389 Double R Blvd 
Reno, NV 89521 
Phone: (775) 398-5800 
































CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this date, I served the foregoing Plaintiffs Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion to Reconsider on the party(ies) set forth below by: 
addressed as follows: 
Placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope pl':1ced for 
collecting and mailing in the United States mail, at Reno, Nevada, postage 
prepaid, following ordinary business practices. 
Gary L. Cooper - Attorney at Law 
J.D. Oborn - Attorney at Law 
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered 
151 North Third A venue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Electronic: gary@cooper-larsen.com 
jd@cooper-larsen.com 
DATED this L~"/(_ day of June, 2018. 
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163 Idaho 209 
Supreme Court of Idaho, 
Boise, May 2017 Term. 
Ronald L. SWAFFORD and Margaret Swafford, 
husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, 
v. 
HUNTSMAN SPRINGS, INC., an Idaho 
corporation, Defendant-Respondent. 
Docket No. 44240 
I 
Filed: December 13, 2017 
I 
Rehearing Denied February 12, 2018 
Synopsis 
Background: Property owners brought action against 
developer, alleging that developer had failed to comply 
with development's master plan by essentially cutting 
off their property from the development. The District 
Court, Seventh Judicial District, Teton County, Gregory 
W. Moeller, J., granted summary judgment in favor of 
developer. Property owners appealed. 
Holdings: The Supreme Court, Jones, J., held that: 
[I] breach of contract claim accrued when improvements 
to development were completed; 
[2] Idaho Consumer Protection Act (ICPA) claim accrued 
when improvements to development were completed; 
[3] misrepresentation claim accrued when improvements 
to development were completed; and 
[4] developer was entitled to award of appellate 
attorney fees pursuant to statute providing such award 
to prevailing party in action concerning commercial 
transaction. 
Affirmed. 
*790 Appeal from the District Court of the Seventh 
Judicial District of the State of Idaho, Teton County. 
Hon. Gregory W. Moeller, District Judge. 
The district court's judgment in favor of Huntsman 
Springs is affirmed. Attorney fees and costs on appeal are 
awarded to Huntsman Springs. 
Attorneys and Law Firms 
Swafford Law, PLLC, Idaho Falls, attorneys for 
appellant. Larren K. Covert argued. 
Moulton Law Office, Driggs, attorneys for respondent. 
Sean R. Moulton argued. 
SUBSTITUTE OPINION, THE COURT'S 
PRIOR OPINION DATED JULY 6, 
2017 IS HEREBY WITHDRAWN. 
JONES, Justice. 
I. NATURE OF THE CASE 
In an appeal arising out of Teton County, Appellants, 
Ronald and Margaret Swafford (collectively, the 
"Swaffords"), challenge a district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Respondent, Huntsman 
Springs, Inc. ("Huntsman Springs"). The action stems 
from the Swaffords' claim that Huntsman Springs failed 
to comply with the Master Plan by essentially cutting off 
their property from the development. The district court 
granted summary judgment in favor of Huntsman Springs 
after concluding that all of the Swaffords' claims were 
barred by the applicable statutes of limitations. 
Il.FACTUALANDPROCEDURALBACKGROUND 
Huntsman Springs is a 1,350 acre development in Driggs, 
Idaho, that is planned to include 650 homes, a five-
star hotel, and a golf course. Between 2006 and 2007, 
Huntsman Springs promoted its priority reservation 
program, which allowed prospective buyers to reserve 
an opportunity to purchase certain property sites. On 
July 16, 2007, during the infancy of the development, 
the Swaffords entered into a contract (the "Contract") 
with Huntsman Springs to purchase an undeveloped 
commercial site at "Lot 4, Block 50, Huntsman Springs 
PUD, Phase 1, Addition to the City of Driggs, Teton 
WESTlAW © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 
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County, Idaho" (the "Property"). At the time of purchase, 
Huntsman Springs' promotional materials included *791 
a Master Plan, which indicated that the Property's east 
side would be bordered by a walk and bike path while its 
west side would be bordered by grass, trees, and a path or 
roadway. On September 21, 2007, the sale of the Property 
closed with the recording of a warranty deed. 
Between 2007 and 2008, Primrose Street, which bordered 
the west side of the Property, was paved, but the area 
between Primrose Street and the Property was improved 
by adding landscaping, a walking path, and trees. Thus, 
the Property did not have access to Primrose Street. 
On August 20, 2014, Mr. Swafford wrote a letter to 
Huntsman Springs demanding 
that the Master Plan be complied 
with, providing my lot with ingress 
and egress from Primrose as 
expected from the address. I also 
insist that the family walk and 
bike paths as well as trees be in 
place immediately. I hereby request 
immediate resolution of this issue. 
I request the area conform to 
the plans provided at the time of 
purchase. 
On July 17, 2015, the Swaffords filed a complaint 
wherein they claimed that Huntsman Springs "specifically 
intended for the [Swaffords] to rely on the Master 
Plan." The Swaffords alleged the following: (If Huntsman 
Springs breached the Contract by failing to comply with 
the Master Plan; (2) Huntsman Springs breached an 
express warranty that the Property would be developed 
and improved in accordance with the Master Plan; (3) 
Huntsman Springs breached its duty of good faith and fair 
dealing by failing to develop the Property in accordance 
with the Master Plan; (4) Huntsman Springs' unfair 
and deceptive marketing and sales conduct breached the 
Idaho Consumer Protection Act (the "ICPA"); and (5) 
Huntsman Springs' promotional materials included false 
representations. 
On September 28, 2015, Huntsman Springs filed an 
answer. On September 29, 2015, Huntsman Springs 
filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or in 
the alternative, a motion for summary judgment. In an 
accompanying memorandum, Huntsman Springs argued 
that each of the Swaffords' claims was barred by 
the applicable statutes of limitations. On November 3, 
2015, the Swaffords responded with a memorandum in 
opposition to Huntsman Springs' motion for judgment 
on the pleadings and/or motion for summary judgment. 
Therein, the Swaffords argued that their contractual 
claims were not barred by the five-year statute of 
limitations because they were not fully aware of the 
damage until September 2014, because until then, they 
"expected and anticipated that [Huntsman Springs] would 
eventually complete the project as specified on the Master 
Plan." 
On November 17, 2015, the district court held a 
hearing on Huntsman Springs' motion. The district court 
characterized Huntsman Springs' motion as a motion for 
summary judgment so that each party's affidavit could 
be considered. On February 19, 2016, the district court 
issued its memorandum decision. First, the district court 
found that the Swaffords' contractual causes of action 
were subject to a five-year statute of limitations under 
Idaho Code section 5-216. Further, the district court held 
that the statute of limitations in a contract case begins to 
run when the aggrieved party has constructive notice of 
the breach. The district court found that the Swaffords 
had constructive notice of Huntsman Springs' breach 
when a plat was recorded on July 20, 2007, showing that 
Huntsman Springs was not complying with the Master 
Plan, or, at the latest, when the improvements were 
made to the area between the Property and Primrose 
Street in August 2008. Accordingly, the district court held 
that the contractual causes of action were barred by the 
statute of limitations because the Swaffords did not file 
their complaint until July 2015-nearly seven years after 
the latest time the cause of action could have accrued. 
Second, the district court held that the ICPA claim was 
barred because it was subject to a two-year statute of 
limitations, which began running at the same time as the 
contractual claims. Third, the district court held that the 
misrepresentation claim was barred because it was subject 
to a three-year statute of limitations under Idaho Code 
section 5-218(4), which began running at the same time 
the other causes of action accrued. *792 A corresponding 
judgment was entered on April 11, 2016. 
On May 20, 2016, the Swaffords filed a timely notice of 
appeal. On July 6, 2017, this Court released its original 
decision in this appeal. On July 25, 2017, the Swaffords 
WESTLAW © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 2 
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filed a petition for rehearing, and on August 11, 2017, 
the Swaffords filed a brief in support of their petition 
for rehearing. In response to the Swaffords' petition for 
rehearing, we issue this substitute opinion. 
ID. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment 
in favor of Huntsman Springs? 
2. Is either party entitled to attorney fees on appeal? 
IV. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
[11 121 [31 
"When this Court reviews a district court's ruling 
on a motion for summary judgment, it employs the 
same standard properly employed by the district court 
when originally ruling on the motion." Chandler v. 
Hayden, 147 Idaho 765, 768, 215 P.3d 485, 488 
(2009). "Summary judgment is proper when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact and the only remaining 
questions are questions of law." Id. "This Court 
liberally construes all disputed facts in favor of the 
nonmoving party and draws all reasonable inferences 
and conclusions supported by the record in favor of the 
party opposing the motion." Id. 
Kugler v. Nelson, 160 Idaho 408, 412, 374 P.3d 571, 575 
(2016). • 
V.ANALYSIS 
A. The district court did not err in granting summary 
judgment in favor of Huntsman Springs because there 
are no genuine issues of fact as to the time at which the 
Swaffords' causes of action accrued. 
14) [5) As a preliminary matter, we may affirm a 
judgment on alternate grounds "[w)hen a judgment 
on appeal reaches the correct conclusion, but employs 
reasoning contrary to that of this Court." Kosmann v. 
Gilbride, 161 Idaho 363, 366, 386 P.3d 504, 507 (2016) 
(quoting Martel v. Bulotti, 138 Idaho 451, 454-55, 65 P.3d 
192, 195-96 (2003)). Here, the district court's holding that 
the statute of limitations began to run, at the latest, in 
2008 was based, in part, on the filing of a plat. We affirm 
the district court's judgment on alternate grounds and 
decline to address whether the filing of the plat amounted 
to notice of the breach. 
[6] "A cause of action accrues and the statute of 
limitations begins to run when a cause of action exists." 
Lido Van and Storage, Inc. v. Kuck, 110 Idaho 939, 942, 
719 P.2d 1199, 1202 (1986). Idaho Code section 5-216 
provides that an action upon a written contract must 
be brought within five years. J.C. § 5-216; Saddlehorn 
Ranch Landowner's, Inc. v. Dyer, 146 Jdaho 747, 750, 
203 P.3d 677, 680 (2009). In this case, the alleged breach 
of contract was the failure to provide the Property with 
access to Primrose Street. In their brief in support of 
the petition for rehearing, the Swaffords allege that there 
are other breaches of contract and misrepresentations 
that must be addressed. Specifically, the Swaffords claim 
that Huntsman Springs was obligated to construct certain 
"proposed recreational facilities," such as paths and 
equestrian trails, "within the project." The Swaffords 
argue that summary judgment was improper because a 
question of fact existed regarding what the "proposed 
recreational facilities actually were and how they were 
proposed." However, in their briefing on appeal, this issue 
was merely mentioned in passing and was not supported 
with cogent argument; therefore, this Court will not 
consider the issue. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 
P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010) (citing Inama v. Boise Cnty. Bd 
of Comm'rs, 138 Idaho 324, 330, 63 P.3d 450, 456 (2003)) 
("Regardless of whether an issue is explicitly set forth in 
the party's brief as one of the issues on appeal, if the issue 
is only mentioned in passing and not supported by any 
cogent argument or authority, it cannot be considered 
by this Court."). In sum, this Court's analysis of the 
Swaffords' claims will be limited to their allegation that 
Huntsman Springs failed to provide the Property with 
access to Primrose Street. 
(71 *793 '"'1rere no time is expressed in a contract for 
its performance, the law implies that it shall be performed 
within a reasonable time as determined by the subject 
matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and 
the circumstances attending the performance." CurzOll 
v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 86 Idaho 38, 43, 382 P.2d 906, 
908 (1963). There was no contractual agreement· as to 
when the access would be provided. Between 2007 and 
2008, Primrose Street was paved and the area between 
the street and the Property was improved by landscaping 
WESllAW © 2018 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 3 
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it, constructing a walking path, and planting trees. If a 
reasonable time to provide the claimed access had run 
before the construction of those improvements, then the 
Swaffords' cause of action had accrued and the statute of 
limitations had begun to run. If a reasonable time had 
not yet run, then the construction of those improvements 
constituted an anticipatory breach of contract and the 
statute of limitations had begun to run. "An anticipatory 
breach of contract has been defined as 'a repudiation [by 
the promisor] of his contractual duty before the time fixed 
in the contract for his performance has arrived.' " Foley 
v. Munio, 105 Idaho 309, 31 I, 669 P.2d 198, 200 (1983). 
The construction of those improvements in the area 
between the Property and Primrose Street was notice to 
the Swaffords that Huntsman Springs would not perform 
the alleged agreement to provide access to Primrose Street. 
Id. at 312, 669 P.2d at 201 (a present breach of contract 
is equivalent to notice to the promisee that the promisor 
would not perform). Thus, in either instance the statute 
of limitations began to run by the completion of the 
improvements in 2008. The Swaffords did not bring their 
breach of contract action until July 17, 2015, which was 
nearly three years after the deadline. Accordingly, we 
affirm the district court's judgment because the Swaffords' 
breach of contract action is barred by the statute of 
limitations. 
(8) Although the bulk of the Swaffords' briefing on 
appeal was dedicated to their contractual claims, they 
also appealed, and briefly discussed, the district court's 
dismissal of their ICPA claim and their misrepresentation 
claim. We affirm the district court's judgment on both 
of these claims because both claims are barred by the 
applicable statute of limitations. 
The statute of limitations for a private action under the 
ICPA is two years, and it begins to run after the cause of 
action accrues. LC.§ 48-619. The ICPA provides that: 
(1) Any person who purchases or 
leases goods ... and thereby suffers 
any ascertainable loss of money or 
property, real or personal, as a 
result of the use or employment by 
another person of a method, act or 
practice declared unlawful by this 
chapter, may treat any agreement 
incident thereto as voidable or, 
in the alternative, may bring an 
action to recover actual damages 
or one thousand dollars ($1,000), 
whichever is the greater. 
LC. § 48-608(1). The definition of "goods" includes real 
property. l.C. § 48-602(6). Acts or practices declared 
unlawful by the ICPA include "[a]dvertising goods or 
services with intent not to sell them as advertised ... 
[and] [e]ngaging in any act or practice which is otherwise 
misleading, false, or deceptive to the consumer." I.C. § 
48-603(9) and (17). 
Further, the ICPA requires that the offending party must 
be a person who "knows, or in the exercise of due care 
should know, that he has in the past, or is" committing an 
act or practice declared unlawful by Idaho Code section 
48-603. l.C. § 48-603. 
In their complaint, the Swaffords alleged that Huntsman 
Springs violated the ICPA by advertising the commercial 
lots with no intention of constructing the development in 
compliance with the advertisements. 
The district court held as follows: 
Nothing in the record would support 
a finding that a cause of action under 
[the ICPA] could have accrued any 
later than the date applicable to the 
breach of contract claims. Because 
the statute governing the [ICPA] 
bars any action after two years, [the 
ICPA claim] is even more untimely 
than those centered on a breach of 
written contract. 
It is uncontested that the improvements were completed 
in 2008. Without ruling upon whether Huntsman Springs 
violated the *794 ICPA, if Huntsman Springs violated 
the ICPA, that violation occurred when the improvements 
were completed in 2008. It was then that the Swaffords 
suffered an ascertainable loss and the ICPA cause of 
action accrued. The Swaffords did not bring their ICPA 
action until July 17, 2015, which was nearly five years after 
the deadline. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 
judgment because the Swaffords' ICPA claim is barred by 
the statute of limitations. 
(9) (10) (ll) The statute of limitations for a 
misrepresentation claim is three years, and it begins to run 
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after "the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts 
constituting the fraud or mistake." I.C. § 5-218(4). 
Where discovery of a cause of action 
for fraud commences the statute of 
limitations, the date of discovery is a 
fact question for the jury unless there 
is no evidence creating a question of 
fact. DBSIITRI v. Bender, 130 Idaho 
796, 807, 948 P.2d 151, 162 (1997). 
Actual knowledge of the fraud can 
be inferred if the aggrieved party 
could have discovered the fraud by 
reasonable diligence, although the 
Court will hesitate to infer such 
knowledge. Id. at 807, 948 P.2d at 
162. 
Nerco Minerals Co. v. Morrison Knudsen Corp., 140 Idaho 
144, 150, 90 P.3d 894, 900 (2004). 
In their complaint, the Swaffords alleged that Huntsman 
Springs misrepresented the development of the Property. 
The Swaffords did not specify whether the alleged 
misrepresentation was fraudulent or negligent, but for 
the purposes of this appeal, the distinction is immaterial 
because both causes of action have a three-year statute of 
limitations. 
The district court held that "the facts alleging [the 
misrepresentation] were discovered, or could have been 
discovered, ... at the very least, when the park separating 
the [Property] and Primrose Street was completed. 
Therefore, this action should have been brought by July 
20, 2010, or at least by August 2011." 
It is uncontested that the improvements were completed 
in 2008. Without ruling upon whether Huntsman Springs 
misrepresented the development of the Property, if 
Huntsman Springs misrepresented the development of 
the Property, the Swaffords could have discovered 
the misrepresentation when the improvements were 
completed in 2008. It was then that the Swaffords had 
actual knowledge of the alleged misrepresentation. The 
Swaffords did not bring their misrepresentation action 
until July 17, 2015, which was nearly four years after 
the deadline. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's 
judgment because the Swaffords' misrepresentation claim 
is barred by the statute of limitations. 
B. Huntsman Springs is entitled to costs and attorney fees 
on appeal. 
112) 
Idaho Code section 12-120(3) mandates that when "the 
gravamen of a lawsuit" is a commercial transaction, the 
prevailing party is entitled to attorney's fees. Kugler v. 
Nelson, 160 Idaho 408, 413, 374 P.3d 571, 579 (2016). 
Under the statute, a "commercial transaction" is any 
"transaction [ ] except transactions for personal or 
household purposes." I.C. § 12-120(3). 
Prehn v. Hodge, 161 Idaho 321, 331, 385 P.3d 876, 886 
(2016). 
Huntsman Springs is entitled to costs and attorney fees on 
appeal. The subject of this lawsuit is the contract for the 
sale of the Property, which is a commercial lot. Indeed, 
the Swaffords refer to the Property as a commercial Jot 
in their complaint. Moreover, no facts indicate that the 
Property is for the Swaffords' personal or household 
purposes. Therefore, because the subject of the lawsuit 
is a commercial transaction and Huntsman Springs has 
prevailed, Huntsman Springs is entitled to costs and 
attorney fees on appeal. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We affirm the district court's judgment m favor of 
Huntsman Springs and award costs and attorney fees on 
appeal to Huntsman Springs. 
Chief Justice BURDICK, Justices EISMANN, 
HOR TON and BRODY concur. 
All Citations 
163 Idaho 209,409 P.3d 789 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT I 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, COUNTY OF BANNOCK 
ERICA M KLEIN , 
Plaintiff, 
-. ~,i r ,-t...:-\ .. ' 
vs. 
Case No:CV-2017-0004584-OC 
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER 
FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
The above entitled matter came before the Court on the 25th day of June , 2018 for 
a hearing on Defendant's Motion for Reconsideration. Plaintiff Erica M. Klein appeared 
in person with counsel, Ken Lyon, Ill. Gary Cooper appeared in person on behalf of the 
Defendant Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho. Stephanie Morse was the Court 
Reporter. 
Counsel for the parties presented argument to the Court. The Court took the matter 
under advisement and will issue a written decision. 
DATED this may of June, 2018. 
Case No.: CV-2017-0004584-OC 
MINUTE ENTRY & ORDER 
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MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
RECONSIDER 
This case comes before the Court on Defendant's motion to reconsider the Court's 
previous decision denying its motion for summary judgment. A hearing was held June 
25, 2018, where the Court heard oral argument from both parties through their counsel. 
The Court reserved ruling and took the Defendant's motion under advisement and now 
issues this written decision. 
BACKGROUND1 
The Plaintiff (hereinafter "Klein) filed her Complaint seeking an order from the 
Court to require the Defendant (hereinafter "Farmers") to participate in arbitration 
1 The background facts listed here are taken from the pleadings of the parties and the record in this case. 
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regarding an under insured motorist ("UIM") claim submitted by Klein to Farmers. 
Klein's claim is a contract claim. Farmers asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment 
and dismissal of Klein's Complaint asserting that it is barred by the expiration of the 
statute of limitations applicable to written contracts, J.C. § 5-216. 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
On February 1, 2010, Klein was injured in an automobile accident. Seth Hale 
(hereinafter "Hale"), the driver of the other automobile involved in the accident was 
insured by Allstate. On April 25, 2011, Allstate settled her claim against Hale. Allstate 
paid Klein the sum $25,000.00 which was the total policy limits available to Klein under 
the Allstate policy insuring Hale's liability. 
On December 14, 2010, Klein also made a claim for injuries suffered in the 
accident seeking UIM benefits from Farmers under her policy of automobile insurance. A 
demand letter was sent to Farmers by her attorney Ryan Lewis on November 7, 2012, 
Klein made demand upon Farmers for $250,000.00. On December 13, 2012, Farmers 
tendered $75,000.00 in response to her demand. Farmer's payment was not refused and 
the settlement check was cashed. However, Klein and Farmers did not consider or treat 
the claim as a closed matter following the $75,000.00 payment. In fact, an email 
exchange between Lewis and Mike Morrissey of Farmers on the day the check was sent 
and cashed, ended in a response from Morrissey stating that Farmers had not received a 
release from Klein and her UIM claim would be kept open, subject to future medical 
needs. Thereafter, Farmers sent letters to Ryan Lewis on November 5, 2013, December 
1, 2013, and January 22, 2013, seeking to finalize the claim. 
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In July 2016, Klein made contact with Farmers through a new lawyer Kenneth 
Lyon III (Lyon), by letter dated July 7, 2016. Farmer's responded by letter dated August 
12, 2016, and informed Lyon that it would respond to any additional demand within sixty 
days. Lyon did not respond for six (6) months. On February 7, 2017, Lyon sent 
Farmer's a supplemental demand packet in which Lyon acknowledged that the last 
communications on Klein's behalf to Farmers occurred in 2013 and 2014 and that "no 
further information was provided by Mr. Lewis" to Farmers after his demand dated 
November 7, 2012. 
Farmers sent letters to Lewis in January 2013 from Dan Emerson who was the 
second Farmer's adjuster assigned to handle Klein's claim, asking if "[Lewis] would like 
the claim to remain open?" No response was returned by Lewis. Again in November 
2013, another email was sent by Dan Surmelis ("Surmelis") who was the third of 
Farmer's adjusters assigned to handle Klein's claim, asking Lewis to call him to discuss 
options to resolve the claim. Follow up letters were sent by Farmers on December 1, 
2013, and January 22, 2013. The January 2013 letter reflected that Lewis and Surmelis 
had discussed the claim's status and the possibility of moving towards a resolution 
through mediation. 
On or about April 4, 2017, Surmelis confirmed receipt of Klein's demand package 
and stated that he had completed his evaluation. Surmelis requested a two week extension 
to respond to Klein's supplemental demand, as his evaluation had been sent to his 
supervisors and he was awaiting a response. Lyon agreed to the request and on May 17, 
201 7, reached out to Surmelis for an update on the status of the claim. 
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In response to this communication, Lyon received a call from Gary Cooper 
("Cooper"), counsel for Farmers, advising Lyon that Farmers believed Klein's claim was 
barred by the statute of limitations. On June 26, 2016, Lyons sent a letter to Farmers 
concerning research on the issue of the application of the statute of limitations to Klein's 
claim. In response, on July 11, 2017, Cooper provided Lyons with Farmer's research on 
the issue and on behalf of Farmers inquired as to whether Klein wished to participate in 
mediation in an effort to resolve her claim. On September 22, 201 7, both parties 
participated in mediation, but mediation was unsuccessful. 
On October 26, 2017, Lyons informed Farmers that the issue would need to be 
resolved through arbitration pursuant to the terms of Klein's policy and put Farmers on 
notice that Klein intended to seek pre-judgment/pre-arbitration interest and attorney fees 
as provided by Idaho law unless other alternatives would be reached. Cooper advised that 
Farmers interpreted this letter as a demand for arbitration, proposed an arbitrator, and 
informed Lyon that he was seeking permission to file a Declaratory Relief Action to 
resolve the statute of limitations issue. On November 21, 2017, Lyon responded again by 
letter and advised that Klein would seek arbitration through an order of the Court 
pursuant to the terms of the policy. 
On November 22, 2017, Klein then filed her Complaint seeking an order from the 
Court to require Farmers to participate in arbitration regarding a UIM claim submitted by 
Klein to Farmers. Farmers answered and moved for summary judgment. Farmers asserts 
that it is entitled to summary judgment and dismissal of Klein's Complaint, asserting that 
it is barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to written contracts, 
LC. § 5-216. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under 1.R.C.P. 11.2, a motion to reconsider a court order "may be made at any 
time prior to, or within 14 days after the entry of a final judgment."2 No final judgment 
has been entered; therefore the Plaintiff's motion is timely. The standard of review 
applied by the Court is the same standard of review applied when initially deciding the 
order to be reconsidered.3 If the original order is within the Court's discretion, so is the 
decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration. 4 A motion for reconsideration 
asks for reexamination of the correctness of an order and no new or additional evidence is 
required to support the motion. 5 
"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. ,,,6 When considering 
a motion for summary judgment, a court should liberally construe all facts and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. 7 
The moving party has the burden of showing the lack of a genuine issue of material 
fact.8 To meet this burden, the moving party must challenge, in its motion, and establish 
through evidence that no issue of material facts exists on an element of the nonmoving 
party's case.9 Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when the 
2 1.R.C.P 1 l.2(b )(1 ). 
3 Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616, 621, 338 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Idaho 2014); Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 
Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (Idaho 2012). 
4 Id. 
5 Int'/ Real Estate Sols., Inc v. Arave,, 157 Idaho 816, 819, 340 P.3d 465,468 (2014). 
6 I.RC.P. 56(c); Alleguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Idaho, 145 Idaho 459,460, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008); 
Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 267 (2002); see also Cox v. 
Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,494, 50 P.3d 987, 989 (2002). 
7 Loomis v. City of Hailey, 119 Idaho 434,807 P.2d 1272 (1991). 
8 Northwest Bee-Corp, 136 Idaho at 838, 41 P.3dat267. 
9 Id 
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nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case 
upon which that party bears the burden of proof at trial. 10 
To support or oppose a motion for summary judgment, a party must "set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein."ll "A party defending a 
motion for summary judgment may not rest on its pleadings, but must offer affidavits or 
other evidentiary materials which demonstrate that an issue of fact remains."12 The 
Court must determine as a threshold question whether the evidence submitted by the 
parties is admissible. 13 Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party 
fails to establish, through admissible evidence, that there is a genuine dispute of material 
fact to the moving party's case. 14 
ANALYSIS 
After applying the standards applicable to summary judgment in favor of the 
non-moving party (Klein), the Court found that entry of summary judgment in favor of 
Farmers is not appropriate. Insurance contracts are written contracts to which a five (5) 
year statute of limitations applies. 15 The issue in this case involves determination of the 
date when the statute of limitations applicable Klein's UIM claim began to run. Farmers 
has filed a timely and proper motion for reconsideration.16 
The Court acknowledged in its decision that there are three (3) approaches taken 
to the issue of when a UIM claim accrues and when the statute of limitations begins to 
10 Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 719, 918 P.2d 583,588 (1996). 
11 Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172, 175 (2007). 
12 Theriault v. A.H Robins Co., 108 Idaho 303, 306, 698 P.2d 365, 368 (1985) citing First Piedmont Bank 
and Trust Company v. Doyle, 97 Idaho 700, 551 P.2d 1336 (1976). 
13 Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10 at 13, 175 P3.d 172 at 175. 
14 Id 
15 I.C. § 5-216; Sunshine Mine v. Allendale Mut. Ins. Co., 107 Idaho 25,684 P.2d 1002 (1984). 
16 See 1.R.C.P. 11.2(b). 
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run in other states. The first is the "date of accident rule" which determines that the 
statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the automobile accident17• The second is 
the "breach of contract rule" which determines that the statute of limitations begins to run 
until there has been a breach of the insurance contract. 18 The third is the 
"settlement/judgment rule" which determines that the statute of limitations begins to run 
on the date when the insured settles with, or obtains a judgment against the third party 
tortfeasor who caused and was responsible for the accident.19 
This Court chose to apply the "breach of contract rule." In so doing, the Court 
determined that Idaho courts would not follow either the "date of accident rule" or the 
"settlement/judgment rule". If the Court had determined that the "date of accident rule" 
or the "settlement/judgment rule" applied in this case, there would have been no genuine 
issue of material fact as to the expiration of the statute of limitations and Farmers' 
summary judgment motion would have been granted. 
The relationship between Klein and Farmers is contractual in nature. Applying a 
contract analysis to the contractual claim that Klein is making against Farmer's, led the 
Court to conclude that this case must be decided by a jury. I.R.C.P. 56(e) requires a 
party, in response to a motion for summary judgment, to set forth specific facts by way of 
affidavit showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. The Court determined that there is 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Klein's demand for arbitration was 
reasonable in light of the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and 
17 See Green v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 144 N.J. 344, 676 A.2d 1074 (1996). 
18 See Swaffordv. Huntsman Springs, Inc., 163 Idaho 209,409 P.3d 789, 793 (2017). 
19 See Danes v. Allstate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401,406 (Minn. 2000). 
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the circumstances attending the performance of the contract, as described in Weinstein v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. 20 
"[I]f the record contains any conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds 
might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied."21 In this case, 
Farmers as the moving party did not prove the absence of genuine issue of material fact 
on the issue of whether Klein failed to demand arbitration or finalize a settlement of her 
UIM claim within a reasonable time. Farmer's motion to reconsider is therefore denied. 
Farmers submits that the Court's decision to apply neither the "date of accident 
rule" nor the "date of settlement/judgment rule" leads to uncertainty, prolonged litigation, 
and perhaps unnecessary cost and legal expense for both parties. In other words, to try 
the issue of whether Klein's demand for arbitration was made within a reasonable time 
lends itself to a jury trial and the potential for appeal on the statute of limitations issue 
and perhaps other issues, before arbitration will ever be undertaken. Klein's accident 
occurred in February of 2010. A jury trial has not been set. 
Since the issue of when the five (5) year statute of limitations accrues on a UIM 
claim accrues is one of first impression in Idaho, this Court would consider a motion and 
argument, or a stipulation for an interlocutory appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Even 
though this case originates with an accident that occurred in 2010, the most speedy and 
cost effective resolution of the case for both parties, regardless of the outcome, might lie 
in an appellate determination of this one issue prior to a jury trial. 
20 Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 11, March 12, 2018; See 
Weinstein v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,318,233 P.3d 1221, 1240 (2010) citing 
Curzon v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 86 Idaho 38, 43,382 P.2d 906,908 (1963). 
21 Harris v. State, Dep't of Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,298,847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992). 
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CONCLUSION 
Therefore, as Farmers did not prove the absence of genuine issue of material the 
Defendant's Motion for Reconsider is DENIED. 
DATED this 10th day of July, 2018. 
District Judge 
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FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF IDAHO, 
Defendant. 
Case No: CV-2017-4584-OC 
PLAINTIFF'S NON-OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
COMES NOW, Plaintiff, Erica Klein, by and through her undersigned counsel of record, 
and hereby files Plaintiff's Non-Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Permission to Appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this£ day of August, 2018. 
Kenneth E. on, m 
Idaho Bar o. 4431 
Law Offi es of Kenneth E. Lyon, III 
10389 Double R Blvd 
Reno, NV 89521 
Phone: (775) 398-5800 


































CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this date, I served the foregoing Plaintifrs Non-Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion For Permission to Appeal on the party(ies) set forth below by: 
addressed as follows: 
Placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope placed for 
collecting and mailing in the United States mail, at Reno, Nevada, postage 
prepaid, following ordinary business practices. 
Gary L. Cooper - Attorney at Law 
J.D. Oborn - Attorney at Law 
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered 
151 North Third A venue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Electronic: gary@cooper-Iarsen.com 
jd@cooper-larsen.com 
DATED this /sf-day of August, 201~ 
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CASE NO. CV-2017-4584-OC 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
Defendant Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho filed a Motion for Permission to Appeal. 
Pursuant to Rule 12 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the Defendant requested permission to pursue an 
interlocutory appeal of the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider that was filed on July 13, 2018. 
The Memorandum Decision addressed the issue of when the five year statute oflimitations 
accrues on a Under-insured Motorist ("UIM") claim, which is a matter of first impression in Idaho. 
The issue of when the statute oflimitations on a UIM claim accrues is a controlling question oflaw 
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for which there is a substantial difference of opinion. The jurisdictions that have addressed this issue 
have taken three different approaches. The determination of which approach will be followed in 
Idaho will determine who prevails in this case. As well, the appeal will materially advance the 
orderly resolution of the litigation as it will determine whether a jury trial in this matter is necessary. 
It will ultimately save the parties and the Court time and money to have this issue decided now as 
the current procedural posture of the case will require a jury trial on the issue of whether arbitration 
was requested within a reasonable time frame and then the matter may have to be arbitrated, 
depending on the outcome of the trial. Plaintiff Erica Klein did not oppose the motion. 
As such, Defendant Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho' s motion for permission to appeal 
is granted. 
DATED lhisa t of August, 2018. 
District Judge 
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I hereby certify that on the ~ay of August, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to: 
Kenneth E. Lyon, III 
Attorney at Law 
10389 Double R Blvd 
Reno, NV 89521 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
5785 Rio Vista Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 
Gary L. Cooper 
J. D. Oborn 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
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Email: gary@cooper-larsen.com 
jd@cooper-larsen.com 
Counsel for Defendant 
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DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR 
PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
Supreme Court No. 46314-2018 
COMES NOW Defendant Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho, and, pursuant to Rule 12 
of the Idaho Appellate Rules, asks the Idaho Supreme Court for permission to pursue an 
interlocutory appeal of the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider that was filed on July 13, 2018, by Judge Rick Camaroli in Bannock County, Idaho. A 
copy of the Memorandum Decision is attached. After the Memorandum Decision was entered, 
Defendant filed a motion with the district court asking for permission to appeal the Memorandum 
Decision. Judge Camaroli entered an Order Granting Motion for Pennission to Appeal on August 
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23, 2018. A copy of that Order is attached. 
STATEMENT IN SUPPORT OF REQUEST FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
Plaintiff, Erica Klein, filed a Complaint against Defendant Farmers on November 22, 2017. 
The Complaint requests that the Court order Farmers to participate in arbitration regarding an under-
insured motorist ("UIM") claim submitted by Klein to Farmers. Klein was injured in an automobile 
accident February 1, 2010. The party responsible for the accident was insured by Allstate and only 
had limited liability insurance coverage in the amount of $25,000. Klein settled with Allstate for the 
$25,000 on April 25, 2011. Farmers thereafter paid Klein an additional $75,000 in UIM benefits on 
December 13, 2012. Klein did not submit an additional demand nor file the Complaint in this case 
until after Aptil 25, 2016, more than five years after the statute of limitations should have accrued 
if the UIM claim accrued either on the date of the accident or the date when Klein settled with 
Allstate, the. insurer for the at fault driver. 
The statute of limitations on insurance contracts is the written contract five (5) year statute 
of limitations contained in I. C. Section 5-216. Sunshine Min. Co. v. Allendale Mut. 1118. Co., 107 
Idaho 25, 684 P.2d 1002 (1984). That is not disputed by the parties. The issue to be decided on 
appeal is when did the statute of limitations accrue or start to run for purposes of the UIM claim. 
This issue has not been decided by any Idaho appellate court. Thus, this is an issue of first 
impression in Idaho. There are three different approaches to when a UIM claim accrues and the 
statute of limitations starts to run in other jurisdictions. The first is that the statute of limitations 
starts to run on the date of the accident, or the "date of accident rule." The second is that the statute 
does not start to run until there has been a breach of the insurance contract. This is called the "breach 
of contract rule." Finally, other jurisdictions have held that the statute starts to run when the insured 
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settles with, or obtains a judgment against, the third-party tortfeasor. This rule is refen-ed to as the 
"settlement/judgment rule." 
Fanners moved for summary judgment on the grounds that the "date of the accident rule" 
and/or the settlement/judgment rule." are more consistent with related Idaho case law than the 
"breach ofcontractrule." See Hill v. Am. FamilyMut. Ins. Co., 150 Idaho 619,249 P.3d 812 (2011). 
Farmers' motion for summary judgment was denied. Farmers filed a motion to reconsider and the 
district court issued the Memorandum Decision that is at issue in this request for permission to 
appeal. 
The district court stated in the Memorandum Decision that the issue of when the five year 
statute of limitations accrues on a UIM claim is a matter of first impression in Idaho. The district 
court denied the motion to reconsider and held that the "breach of contract" rule applied. This creates 
a problem because Klein has not claimed that there has been any breach of the insurance policy 
between her and Farmers. Thus, under the "breach of contract rule," the statute of limitations has not 
started to run even though the accident that gave rise to the U1M claim happened more than eight 
years ago. Under the ''breach of contract rule" the statute oflimitations would never start to run on 
a UIM claimant that choose to sit on a UlM claim indefinitely. 
An insurer that wishes to finalize a claim file involving a UIM claim that is not being actively 
pursued by the UIM claimant would have to intentionally breach the insurance policy with the 
insured UIM claimant in order to start the running of the statute oflimitations. This puts the insurer 
in the absurd position of either having to keep a potential UIM claim open indefinitely or to 
intentionally breach a term of the insurance policy. The first option is counter to the reason why 
statutes of limitation have been imposed, which is have such matters resolved in a timely fashion . 
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The second option raises issues of bad faith if the insurer has to breach the contract in order to 
prompt an UIM claimant to pursue his/her claim or to be able to close the claim file after the statute 
oflimitations expires. As well, it is unclear what conduct would be considered sufficient to breach 
the insurance policy to give notice to the insured that a UIM claim has accrued and the statute of 
limitations has started to run. The "breach of contract rule" creates a legal conundrum that creates 
confusion instead of finality on the issue of the accrual and running of the statute of limitation in a 
UIM claim. 
Given the nature of the case and the impact of which rule is applied, the district court stated 
that it would consider a motion for an interlocutory appeal to the Idal10 Supreme Court as that would 
result in the most speedy and cost effective resolution of the case for both parties. A motion was filed 
and the district court granted the motion for permission to appeal. 
The issue of when the statute of limitations on a UIM claim accrues is a controlling question 
oflaw for which there is a substantial difference of opinion. The jurisdictions that have addressed 
this issue have taken three different approaches that were briefly described above. The determination 
of which approach will be followed in Idaho will determine who prevails in this case. As well, the 
appeal will materially advance the orderly resolution of the litigation as it will determine whether 
a jury trial in this matter is necessary. It will ultimately save the parties and the district court time 
and money to have this issue decided now as the cutTent procedural posture of the case will require 
a jury trial on the issue of whether arbitration was requested within a reasonable time frame and then 
the matter may have to be arbitrated, depending on the outcome of the trial. 
As such, Defendant Farmers Insurance Company ofldallo respectfully requests that the Idaho 
Supreme Court approve this motion for permission to appeal and allow this appeal to be heard at this 
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time. 
CERTIFICATE OF UNCONTESTED MOTION 
The undersigned does hereby certify that he has contacted opposing counsel and is authorized 
to represent that opposing counsel has no objection to this motion. 
Dated and certified this :5l> day of August, 2018. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the 30 day of August, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing to: 
Kenneth E. Lyon, III [ ] U.S. mail 
Attorney at Law [ ] Express mail 
10389 Double R Blvd [ ] Hand delivery 




Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. [ ] U.S. mail 
Attorney at Law [ ] Express mail 
5785 Rio Vista Way [ ] Hand delivery 
Meridian, ID 83646 [ ] Facsimile: 
[)( Electronic: ken.1yon21@gmail.com 
\_ ~- ----... 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF Tiffi SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 










) Case No.CV-2017-4584-OC 
) 
) MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER 
) DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
) RECONSIDER 
) 
) _____________ ) 
This case comes before the Court on Defendant's motion to reconsider the Court's 
previous decision denying its motion for summary judgment. A hearing was held June 
25, 2018, where the Court heard oral argument from both parties through their counsel. 
The Court reserved ruling and took the Defendant's motion under advisement and now 
issues this written decision. 
DACKGROUND1 
The Plaintiff (hereinafter "Klein) filed her Complaint seeking an order from the 
Court to require the Defendant (hereinafter "Farmers") to participate in arbitration 
1 The background facts listed here are taken from the pleadings of the parties and the record in this case. 
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regarding an under insured motorist ("UIMn) claim submitted by Klein to Farmers. 
Klein's claim is a contract claim. Farmers asserts that it is entitled to summary judgment 
and dismissal of Klein's. Complaint asserting that it is barred by the expiration of the 
statute of limitations applicable to written contracts, J.C. § 5-216. 
UNDISPUTED MATERIAL FACTS 
On February I, 2010, Klein was injured in an automobile accident. Seth Hale 
(hereinafter "Hale"), the driver of the other automobile involved in the accident was 
insured by AJlstate. On April 25, 2011, AlJstate settled her claim against Hale. Allstate 
paid Klein the sum $25,000.00 which was the total policy limits available to Klein under 
the Allstate policy insuring Hale's liability. 
On December 14, 2010, Klein also made a claim for injuries suffered in the 
accident seeking UlM benefits from Farmers under her policy of automobile insurance. A 
demand letter was sent to Farmers by her attorney Ryan Lewis on November 7, 2012, 
Klein made demand upon Farmers for $250,000.00. On December 13, 2012, Farmers 
tendered $75,000.00 in resp'Onse to her demand. Farmer•s payment was not refused and 
the settlement check was cashed. However, Klein and Farmers did not consider or treat 
the claim as a closed matter following the $75,000.00 payment. In fact, an email 
exchange between Lewis and Mike Morrissey of Fanners on the day the check was sent 
and cashed, ended in a response from Morrissey stating that Fal'mers had not received a 
release from Klein and her UIM claim would be kept open, subject to future medical 
needs. Thereafter, Farmers sent letters to Ryan Lewis on November 5, 2013, December 
I. 2013, and January 22, 2013, seekjng to finalize the claim. 
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In July 2016, Klein made contact with Farmers through a new lawyer Kenneth 
Lyon III (Lyon), by letter dated July 7, 2016. Farmer's responded by letter dated August 
12, 2016, and informed Lyon that it would respond to any additional demand within sixty 
days. Lyon did not respond for six ( 6) months. On February 7, 2017, Lyon sent 
Fanner's a supplemental demand packet in which Lyon acknowledged that the last 
communications on Klein's behalf to Farmers occurred in 2013 and 2014 and that "no 
further information was provided by Mr. Lewis'' to Farmers after his demand dated 
November 7, 2012. 
Farmers sent letters to Lewis in January 2013 from Dan Emerson who was the 
second Farmer's adjuster assigned to handle Klein's claim, asking if "[Lewis] would like 
the claim to remain open?" No response was returned by Lewis. Again in November 
2013, another email was sent by Dan Surmelis e'Sunnelis'') who was the third of 
Farmer's adjusters assigned to handle Klein's claim, asking Lewis to call him to discuss 
options to resolve the claim. Follow up letters were sent by Farmers on December 1, 
2013, and January 22, 2013. The January 2013 letter reflected that Lewis and Surmelis 
had discussed the claim's status and the possibility of moving towards a resolution 
through mediation. 
On or about April 4, 2017, Surmelis confirmed receipt of Klein's demand package 
and stated that he had completed his evaluation. Surmelis requested a two week extension 
to respond to Klein's supplemental demand, as his evaluation had been sent to his 
supervisors and he was awaiting a response. Lyon agreed to the request and on May 17, 
2017, reached out to Surmelis for an update on the status of the claim. 
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In response to this communication, Lyon received a call from Gary Cooper 
("Coopert'), counsel for Farmers, advising Lyon that Farmers believed Klein's claim was 
barred by the statute of limitations. On June 26, 2016, Lyons sent a letter to Fam1ers 
concerning research on the issue of the application of the statute of limitations to Klein's 
claim. ln response, on July 11, 2017, Cooper provided Lyons with Fam1er's research on 
the issue and on behalf of Farmers inquired us to whether Klein wished to participate in 
mediation in an effort to resolve her claim. On September 22, 2017, both parties 
participated in mediation, but mediation was unsuccessful. 
On October 26, 2017, Lyons informed Fanners that the issue would need to be 
resolved through arbitration pursuant to the terms of Klein's policy and put Farmers on 
notice that Klein intended to seek pre-judgment/pre-arbitration interest and attorney fees 
as provided by Idaho Jaw unless other alternatives would be reached. Cooper advised that 
Farmers interpreted this letter as a demand for arbitration, proposed an arbitrator. and 
informed Lyon that he was seeking permission to file a Declaratory Relief Action to 
resolve the statute of limitations issue. On November 21, 2017, Lyon responded again by 
letter and advised that Klein would seek arbitration through an order of the Court 
pursuant to the terms of the policy. 
On November 22, 2017, Klein then filed her Complaint seeking an order from the 
Court to require Farmers to participate in arbitration regarding a UIM claim submitted by 
Klein to Farmers. Farmers answered and moved for summary judgment. Farmers asserts 
that it is entitled to summary judgment and dismissal of Klein's Complaint, asserting that 
it is barred by the expiration of the statute of limitations applicable to written contracts, 
I.C. § 5-216. 
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STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Under l.R.C.P. 11.2, a motion to reconsider a court order "may be made at any 
time prior to, or within 14 days after the entry of a final ju.dgment.,,2 No final judgment 
has been entered; therefore the Plaintiff's motion is timely. The standard of review 
applied by the Court is the same standard of review applied when initially deciding the 
order to be reconsidered.3 If the original order is within the Court's discretion, so is the 
decision to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration.4 A motion for reconsideration 
asks for reexamination of the correctness of an order and no new or additional evidence is 
required to support the motion. 5 
"Summary judgment is proper 'if the pleadings, depositions, and admissi()ns on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. "'6 When considering 
a motion for summary judgment a court should liberally construe all facts and draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.7 
The moving party h~ the burden of showing the lack of a genuine issue of material 
fact.8 To meet this burden, the moving party must challenge~ in its motion, and establish 
through evidence that no issue of material facts exists on an element of the nonmoving 
party's case.9 Summary judgment is properly granted in favor of the moving party when the 
2 J.R.C.P I 12(b)(J). 
3 Westby v. Schaefer, 157 Idaho 616,621,338 P.3d 1220, 1225 (Idaho 2014); Fragnella v. Petrovich, 153 
Idaho 266,276,281 P.3d 103, 113 (Idaho 2012). 
4 Id. 
5 fnt'I Real Estate Sols., lncv. Arave,. 157 [daho 816,819,340 P.3d 465,468 (2014). 
6 I.R.C.P, 56(c); Arreguin v. Farmers Ins. Co. of Jdaho, 145 Idaho 459,460, 180 P.3d 498, 500 (2008); 
Northwest Bee-Corp v. Home Living Service, 136 Idaho 835, 838, 41 P.3d 263, 267 (2002); see also Cox v. 
Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,494, 50 P.3d 987,989 (2002). 
1 Loomisv. City of Hailey, I J9 ldaho434, 807 P.2d 1272 {1991). 
8 Northwest Bee-Corp, I 36 Idaho at 838, 4 I P.3d at 267, 
9 Id 
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nonmoving party fails to establish the existence of an. element essential to that party's case 
upon which that party bears tl1e burden of proof at triaI. 10 
To support or oppose a motion for summary judgment, a party must "set forth 
such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and sha11 show affirmatively that the 
affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein.'' 11 "A party defending a 
motion for summary judgment may not rest on its pleadings, but must off er affidavits or 
other evidentiary materials which demonstrate that an issue of fact rcmains."12 The 
Court must determine as a threshold question whether the evidence submitted by the 
parties is admissible. 13 Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party 
fails to establish, through admissible evidence, that there is a genuine dispute of material 
fact to the moving party's case. 14 
ANALYSIS 
After applying the standards applicable to summary jud~ent in favor of the 
non-moving party (Klein), the Court found that entry of S\nnmary judgment in favor of 
Farmers is not appropriate. Insurance contracts are written contracts to which a five (5) 
year statute of limitations applies. 15 The issue in this case involves determination of the 
date when the statute of limitations applicable Klein's UIM claim began to run. Fanners 
has filed a timely and proper motion for reconsideration.16 
The Court acknowledged in its decision that there are three (3) approaches taken 
to the issue of when a UIM claim accrues and when the statute of.limitations begins to 
10 Smith v. Meridian Joint School Dist. No.~. 128 Idaho 714,719,918 P.2d 583,588 (1996). 
11 Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 ldaho 10, 13, 175 P.3d 172, 175 (2007). 
12 Theriault v. A.H. Robin., Co., 108 Idaho 303,306,698 P.2d 365,368 (1985) citing First Piedmont Bank 
and Trust Compa,ivv. Doyle, 91 Idaho 700,551 P.2d 1336 (1976). 
13 Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchinson, 145 Idaho 10 at 13, 175 P3.d 172 at 175. 
14 Id. 
u J.C.§ S-216; Sunshine Mine v. Allenciale Mut. Jns. Co., 107 Idaho 25,684 P.2d 1002 (1984). 
16 S<!e J.R.C.P. 11.2(b). 
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run in other states. The first is the "date of accident rule" which determines that the 
statute of limitations begins to run on the date of the automobile accident 17• The second is 
the "breach of contract rule" which determines that the statute of limitations begins to run 
until there has been a breach of the insurance contract. 18 The third is the 
"setUement/judgment rulet' which determines that the statute of limitations begins to run 
on the date when the insured settles with, or obtains a judgment against the third party 
tortfeasor who caused and was responsible for the accident. 19 
This Court chose to apply the "breach of contract rule!' In so doing, the Court 
determined that Idaho courts would not follow either the "date of accident rule" or the 
"settlement/judgment rule'\ If the Court had determined that the "date of accident rule" 
or the "settlement/judgment rule" applied in this case, there would have been no genuine 
issue of material fact as to the expiration of the statute of limitations and Farmers' 
summary judgment motion would have been granted. 
The relationship between Klein and Farmers is contractual in nature. Applying a 
contract analysis to the contractual claim that Klein Is m~ing against Farmer's, led the 
Court to conclude that this case must be decided by a jury. I.R.C.P. 56(e) requires a 
party, in response to a motion for summary judgment, to set forth specific facts by way of 
affidavit showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. The Courl detennined that there is 
a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Klein's demand for arbitration was 
reasonable in light of the subject matter of the contract, the situation of the parties, and 
17 See Green v. Selective Ins. Co. of Am., 144 N.J. 344, 676 A.2d 1074 (t 996). 
18 See Swafford v. fhmtsman Springs, Inc., 163 Idaho 209, _409 P.3d 789, 793 (2017). 
19 See O<mes v. Al/slate Ins. Co., 617 N.W.2d 401,406 (Mmn. 2000). 
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the circumstances attending the performance of the contract, as described in Weinstein v. 
Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co. 20 
"[l]f the record contains any conflicting inferences upon which reasonable minds 
might reach different conclusions, summary judgment must be denied."21 In this case, 
Farmers as the moving party did not prove the absence of genuine issue of material fact 
on the issue of whether Klein failed to demand arbitration or finalize a settlement of her 
UIM claim within a reasonable time. Farmer's motion to reconsider is therefore denied. 
Farmers submits that the Court's decision to apply neither the "date of accident 
rule" nor the "date of settlement/judgment rule" leads to uncertainty, prolonged litigation, 
and perhaps unnecessary cost and legal expense for both parties. In other words, to try 
the issue of wheiher Klein's demand for arbitration was made within a reasonable time 
lends itself to a jury trial and the potential for appeal on the statute of limitations issue 
and perhaps other issues, before arbitration wiU ever be undertaken. Klein's accident 
occurred in February of 2010. A jury trial has not been set. 
Since the issue of when the five (5) year statute of limitations accrues on a UIM 
claim accrues is one of first impression in Idaho, this Court would consider a motion and 
argument, or a stipulation for an interlocutory appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. Even 
I 
though this case originates with an accident that occurred in 2010, the most speedy and 
cost effective resolution of the case for both parties, regardless of the outcome, might lie 
in an appellate dctennination of this one issue prior to a jury trial. 
20 Plaintiff's Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, p. 11, March 12, 2018; Se<: 
Weinstein v. Pn1dential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 149 Idaho 299,318,233 P.3d 1221, 1240 (2010) citmg 
Curzon v. Wells Cargo, Inc., 86 Idaho 38, 43,382 P.2d 906,908 (1963). 
21 Harris v. State, Dep'to/Health & Welfare, 123 Idaho 295,298,847 P.2d 1156, 1159 (1992). 
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Therefore, as Fanners did not prove the absence of genuine issue of material the 
Defendant's Motion for Reconsider is DENIED. 
DATED this 10th day of July, 2018. 
CR-2017-4584-0C 9 
MEMORANDUM DECISION AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER 
Page 285
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on \~day of July, 2018, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing document upon each of the following individuals in the manner 
indicated. 
Kenneth E. Lyon 
Attorney at Law 
l 0389 Double R Blvd. 
Repo, NV 89521 
ken@lyonlaw.net 
Kenneth E. Lyon. Jr. 
Attomey at Law 
5785 Rio Vista Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 
ken.lyon2 l@gmail.net 
Gary L. Cooper 
Attorney at Law 
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered 
151 N. 3rd Ave, 2nd Floor 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
gary@cooper-larsen.com 
J.D. Oborn 
Attorney at Law 
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered 
1 S 1 N. 3n! Ave, 2nd Floor 
PocatcUo, ID 8320S-4229 
jd@cooper-Jarsen.com 
DATED this 10th day of July ,2018. 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(x) Email 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(x) Email 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(x) Email 
( ) U.S. Mail 
( ) Hand Deliver 
( ) Facsimile 
(x) Email 
Deputy Clerk 
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Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar# 1814 
J. D. Oborn - Idaho State Bar #9294 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Email: gruy@cooper-larsen.com 
jd@cooper-larsen.co111 
Counsel for Defendant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH ffiDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 






FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
OF IDAHO,. ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
CASE NO. CV-2017-4584-OC 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR 
.PERMISSION TO APPEAL 
Defendru1t Fru.mers Insurance Company of Idaho filed a Motion for Pcnnission to Appeal. 
Pursuru.1t to Rule 12 of the Idaho Appellate Rules, the Defendant requested permission to pursue an 
interlocutory appeal of the Memorandum Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to 
Reconsider that was filed on July 13, 2018. 
The Memorandum Decision addressed the issue of when the five year statute oflimitations 
accrnes on a Under-insured Motorist ("UIM") claim, which is a matter of first impression in Idaho. 
The issue of when the statute of limitations on a UIM claim accrues is a controlling question oflaw 
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for which there is a substantial difference of opinion. The jurisdictions that have addressed this issue 
have taken three different approaches. The detennination of which approach will be followed in 
Idal10 will detennine who prevails in this case. As well, the appeal will materially advance the 
orderly resolution of the litigation as it will detennine whether a jury trial in this matter is necessary. 
It will ultimately save the parties and the Court time and money to have this issue decided now as 
the cun·ent procedural posture of the case will require a jury trial on the issue of whether arbitration 
was requested within a reasonable time frame and then the matter may have to be arbitrated, 
depending on the outcome of the trial. Plaintiff Erica Klein did not oppose the mo.tion. 
As such, Defendant Farmers Insurance Company ofldaho' s motion for pennission to appeal 
is granted. 
DATED this\ 1 day of August, 2018. 
Hon.RICK CARNAROLI 
District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the _J&_ay of August, 2018, I served a true and con-ect copy of 
the foregoing to: 
Kenneth E. Lyon, III 
Attorney at Law 
103 89 Double R Blvd 
Reno, NV 89521 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
5785 Rio Vista Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 
Gary L. Cooper 
J. D. Oborn 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third Avenue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 


















Electronic: ken.lyon2 l@gmail.com 
~ U.S.mail 
[ ] Express mail 
[ ] Hand delivery 
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[ ] Electronic: gary@cooper-larsen.com 
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~ I , 
Gary L. Cooper - Idaho State Bar # 1814 
J. D. Obom - Idaho State Bar #9294 
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
151 North Third A venue, Second Floor 
P .0. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Telephone: (208) 235-1145 
Facsimile: (208) 235-1182 
Email: gary@cooper-larsen.com 
jd@cooper-larsen.com 
Counsel for Defendant/ Appellant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK 






FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendant/ Appellant.) 
Docket No. 46314-2018 
Bannock County District Court 
CASE NO. CV-2017-4584-OC 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, ERICA KLEIN AND TO HER 
ATTORNEYS: 
Kenneth E. Lyon, III 
1039 Double R. Blvd 
Reno, Nevada 89521 
Phone: 775-398-5800 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. 
5785 Rio Vista Way 
Meridian, Idaho 83646 
AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 




NOTICE IS HEREBY GNEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho ("Farmers"), 
appeals against the above-named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum 
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, entered in the above entitled action 
on the 13th day of July, 2018, after a hearing on the matter, Honorable Rick Carnaroli presiding. A 
copy of the order being appealed is attached to this notice. 
2. Farmers was granted permission to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to 
the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Permission to Appeal issued by the Idaho Supreme Court 
on September 7, 2018. The permission to appeal was granted pursuant to I.A.R. 12. 
3. Farmers provides the following preliminary statement of issues on appeal that 
Farmers intends to assert in the appeal. The right to assert additional issues is preserved in 
accordance with I.A.R. 17(t). 
(a) Whether the District Court erred in denying Farmers motion for summary 
judgment when it applied the "breach of contract" rule instead of the "date of accident rule" 
or the "settlement/judgment rule" in determining that the statute of limitations had not 
expired, or even started to run, on Klein's underinsured motorist claim. 
(b) Whether the "date of accident rule" or the "settlement/judgment rule" is the 
proper rule for determining when an underinsured motorist claim accrues and the statute of 
limitations starts to run. 
4. An order has not been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Reporter's Transcript. A reporter's transcript of the following hearings and trial 
testimony is requested: 
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Date Description of Proceeding Renorter 
June 25, 2018 Motion Hearing - Defendant's Motion to Stephanie Morse 
Reconsider 
6. Farmers requests the following documents that were offered and considered at the 
hearing on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider be copied and sent to the Supreme Court in addition 
to those automatically included under Rule 28 I.A.R.: 
Date Filed Description of the Exhibit 
February 21, 2018 Declaration of Gary L. Cooper in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
7. The undersigned, as counsel for Farmers, hereby certifies: 
(a) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the reporter's transcript; 
(b) That payment has been made for the estimated cost for the preparation of the 
Clerk's Record on Appeal; 
( c) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to I.A.R. 20; and 
(d) Service has been made upon Stephanie Morse, the Court reporter. 
-¥-
DATED this J.~ day of September, 20 
Attorney for Appellant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- PAGE 3 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
f{---
I hereby certify that on the~ day of September, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to: 
Kenneth E. Lyon, III 
Attorney at Law 
10389 Double R Blvd 
Reno, NV 89521 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. 
Attorney at Law 
5785 Rio Vista Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 


















Electronic: ken.lyon2 l@gmail.com 
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) Supreme Court No. 
) 
) 








Appealed from: Sixth Judicial District, Bannock County 
Honorable Judge Rick carnaroli presiding 
Bannock County case No: CV-2017-4584-OC 
Order of Judgment Appealed from: Memorandum Decision and Order Denying 
Defendant's Motin to Reconsider filed the 13th day of July 2018. 
Attorney for Appellant: Gary L. Cooper, COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED 
Attorney for Respondent: Kenneth E. Lyon, III, Attorney Reno NV 
Appealed by: Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho 
Appealed against: Erica Klein 
Notice of Appeal filed: September 26, 2018 
Notice of Cross-Appeal filed: No 
Appellate fee paid: Yes 
Page 295
Request for additional records filed: No 
Request for additional reporter's transcript filed: No 
Name of Reporter: Stephanie Morse 
Was District Court Reporter's transcript requested? Yes 
Estimated Number of Pages: Not Provided 
Dated ~~ --z_q ~CO\~ 
ROBERT POLEK!, 
Clerk of the District Court 
(Seal) 
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FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant-A ellant. 
Clerk's Record and Reporter's 
Transcript Due Date Set 
Docket No. 46314-2018 
Bannock County District Court 
CV-2017-4584-OC 
The Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript must be filed in this office on or before 
December 6, 2018. The Reporter's lodging date is November 1, 2018. 
Dated 10/02/2018. 
For the Court: 
Karel A. Lehrman 
Clerk of the Courts 
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Counsel for Defendant/Appel/ant 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE S...,,.,_..,.~._vw,ICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STA TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TH Y OF BAN'NOCK 






FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY ) 
OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Defendant/ Appellant.) 
Docket No. 46314-2018 
Bannock County District Court 
CASENO. CV-2017-4584-OC 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED PLAINTIFF/RESPONDENT, ERICA KLEIN AND TO HER 
ATTORNEYS: 
Kenneth E. Lyon, m 
1039 Double R. Blvd 
Reno, Nevada 89521 
Phone: 775-398-5800 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. 
5785 Rio Vista Way 
Meridian, Idaho 83646 
AND TO THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL• PAGE 1 
Filed:10/02/2018 14:46:15 
By: Clerk - Grove, Kimber 
Page 298
NOTICE IS HEREBY GWEN THAT: 
1. The above-named Appellant, Farmers Insurance Company of ldaho ("Fanners"), 
appeals against the above-named Respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum 
Decision and Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Reconsider, entered in the above entitled action 
on the 13th day of July, 2018, after a hearing on the matter, Honorable Rick Carnaroli presiding. A 
copy of the order being appealed is attached to this notice. 
2. Fanners was granted pennission to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court pursuant to 
the Order Granting Defendant's Motion for Permission to Appeal issued by the Idaho Supreme Court 
on September 7, 2018. The permission to appeal was granted pursuant to I.A.R. 12. 
3. Fanners provides the following preliminary statement of issues on appeal that 
Farmers intends to assert in the appeal. The right to assert additional issues is preserved in 
accordance with I.A.R. l 7(f). 
(a) Whether the District Court erred in denying Farmers motion for summary 
judgment when it applied the "breach of contract" rule instead of the "date of accident rule" 
or the "settlement/judgment rule" in determining that the statute of limitations had not 
expired, or even started to run, on Klein's underinsured motorist claim. 
(b) Whether the "date of accident rule" or the "settlement/judgment rule" is the 
proper rule for determining when an underinsured motorist claim accrues and the statute of 
limitations starts to run. 
4. An order has not been entered sealing all or any portion of the record. 
5. Reporter's Transcript. A reporter's transcript of the following hearings and trial 
testimony is requested: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - PAGE 2 
' " 
Page 299
... '~ ,'I 
Date Description of Proceeding ReRorter 
June 25, 2018 Motion Hearing- Defendant's Motion to Stephanie Morse 
Reconsider 
6. Farmers requests the following documents that were offered and considered at the 
hearing on Defendant's Motion to Reconsider be copied and sent to the Supreme Court in addition 
to those automatically included under Rule 28 I.AR.: 
Date Filed Description of the Exhibit 
February 21, 2018 Declaration of Gary L. Cooper in Support of Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
7. The undersigned, as counsel for Fanners, hereby certifies: 
(a) That the clerk of the district court has been paid the estimated fee for the 
preparation of the reporter's transcript; 
(b) That payment has been made for the estimated cost for the preparation of the 
Clerk's Record on Appeal; 
(c) That the appellate filing fee has been paid; 
( e) That service bas been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant 
to I.AR. 20; and 
( d) Service has been made upon Stephanie Morse, the Court reporter. 
r 
DATED thisl~ day of September, 20 
Attorney for Appellant 
NOTICE OF APPEAL- PAGE 3 
Page 300
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-¥---
I hereby certify that on the A day of September, 2018, I served a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing to: 
Kenneth E. Lyon, III [vf U.S. mail 
Attorney at Law [ ] Express mail 
10389 Double R Blvd [ ] Hand delivery 
Reno, NV 89521 ~~/ Facsimile: 775-398-5801 Electronic: ken@lyonlaw.net 
Kenneth E. Lyon, Jr. [v(/ U.S. mail 
Attorney at Law [ ] Express mail 
5785 Rio Vista Way [ ] Hand delivery 
Meridian, ID 83646 ~} Facsimile: Electronic: ken.lyon2 l@miail.com 
NOTICE OF APPEAL· PAGE 4 
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FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY OF 
IDAHO, 
Defendant-A ellant. 
Clerk's Record and Reporter's 
Transcript Due Date Set 
Docket No. 46314-2018 
Bannock County District Court 
CV-2017-4584-OC 
The Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript must be filed in this office on or before 
December 6, 2018. The Reporter's lodging date is November 1, 2018. 
Dated 10/02/2018. 
For the Court: 
Karel A. Lehrman 
Clerk of the Courts 
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V ORIGINAL 
1 KENNETH E. LYON, III 
ISB # 4431 
2 10389 Double R Blvd 
Reno, Nevada 89521 
3 Phone: (775) 398-5800 
Fax: (775) 398-5801 
4 Email: ken@lyonlaw.net 
5 KENNETH E. LYON, JR. 
ISB # 1117 
6 5785 Rio Vista Way 
Meridian, ID 83646 

























IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 




FARMERS INSURANCE COMPANY 
OF IDAHO, 
Defendant/ Appellant. 
Case No: CV-2017-4584-OC 
REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL 
TRANSCRIPT AND RECORD 
TO: THE ABOVE NAMED DEFENDANT/APPELLANT AND THE PARTY'S 
ATTORNEY, 
AND: TO THE REPORTER AND CLERK OF THE ABOVE ENTITLED COURT. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that the Respondent in the above entitled proceedings here 
requests pursuant to Rule 19, I.A.R., the inclusion of the following material in the reporter's 
transcript and the clerk's record in addition to that required to be included by the I.A.R. and the 




































March 26, 2018 
2. Clerk's Record 
FILING DATE 
March 12, 2018 
March 12, 2018 
March 12, 2018 
June 15, 2018 
DESCRIPTION OF PROCEEDING 
Hearing re: Motion for Summary 
Jud ment 
DESCRIPTION OF DOCUMENT 
REPORTER 
Stephanie Morse 
Affidavit of Kenneth E. Lyon, III in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and all attached 
exhibits 
Affidavit of Ryan Lewis in Support of Plaintiffs Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summ Jud ment and all attached exhibits 
Plaintiffs O osition to Defendant's Motion to Reconsider 
3. (a) I certify that a copy of this request for additional transcripts has been served on each court 
reporter of whom a transcript is requested as named below at the addresses set out below and 
the estimated number of additional pages is seventy-five (75). 
Stephanie Morse: P.O. Box 594, Inkom, Idaho 83245 
(b) I further certify that this request for additional record has been served upon the clerk o 
the district court and upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
( c) I further certify that the estimated fee for the preparation of the additional reporter's 
transcript and clerk's record has been paid to the clerk of the district court. 
DATED this J/_.!ctay of October, 2018. ··---
. LYON, III 































CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this date, I served the foregoing Request for Additional 
Transcript and Record on the party(ies) set forth below by: 
addressed as follows: 
Placing an original or true copy thereof in a sealed envelope placed for 
collecting and mailing in the United States mail, at Reno, Nevada, postage 
prepaid, following ordinary business practices. 
Gary L. Cooper - Attorney at Law 
J.D. Oborn - Attorney at Law 
Cooper & Larsen, Chartered 
151 North Third A venue, Second Floor 
P.O. Box 4229 
Pocatello, ID 83205-4229 
Electronic: gazy@cooper-larsen.com 
jd@cooper-larsen.com 
DATED this~~ day of October, 2018. 
3 
Clerk’s Certificate to the Record - D (MISC30) Page 1 of 1
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Supreme Court No. 46314-2018 Erica M Klein 
 vs.
 Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho CLERK’S CERTIFICATE TO THE RECORD
I, Robert Poleki, Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, 
in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in the 
above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true, full and correct record of, 
the pleadings and documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.
I do further certify that copies of all documents, charts and pictures offered or admitted as 
exhibits in a trial or hearing in the above-entitled cause will be duly lodged with the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court, along with the Court Reporter's Transcript and Clerk's Record, except that 
pictures or depictions of child pornography shall not be copied and sent to the parties or the 
Supreme Court unless specifically ordered by the court.  Documentary exhibits in pdf format 
may be sent to the Supreme Court on a CD that includes an index.  All other exhibits shall be 
retained by the clerk of the district court as required by Rule 31 of the Idaho Appellate Rules.  
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said 
Court on this the 30th day of October, 2018.
ROBERT POLEKI
Clerk of the Court
Seal
By: Diane Cano           
Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF BANNOCK
Case No. CV-2017-4584Erica M Klein 
 vs.
 Farmers Insurance Company of Idaho Clerk’s Certificate of Service
I, Diane P. Cano, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District, of the State of 
Idaho, in and for the County of Bannock, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing Record 
in the above entitled cause was electronically compiled at my direction, and is a true, full and 
correct Record of the pleadings and documents as requested by the parties. 
  
I further certify that I have caused to be served the Clerk's Record and  Reporter's Transcript (if 
requested), along with copies of  all Exhibits offered or admitted;  No Exhibits submitted; 
 Pre-sentence Investigation, or  Other Confidential Documents; or  Confidential Exhibits 
(if applicable) to each of the Attorneys of Record or Parties in this case as follows:
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that on October 30, 2018, I served a copy of the attached to:
Gary Lee Cooper cooperobornfiling@cooper-larsen.com [X] By E-mail
Kenneth Eugene Lyon, 
III
ken@lyonlaw.net [X] By E-mail
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx   
[  ] By personal delivery
Erica M Klein
516 South 8th Ave
Pocatello ID  8320100000
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx   
[  ] By personal delivery
Gary Lee Cooper
PO Box 4229
Pocatello ID  83205-4229
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx   








Clerk’s Certificate of Service – Revised 07/01/2018 Page 2 of 2
Unknown Payor
No Known Address
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx   
[  ] By personal delivery
Kenneth Eugene Lyon III
10389 Double R Blvd
Reno NV  89521
[  ] By E-mail    [  ] By mail    
[  ] By fax (number)    
[  ] By overnight delivery / FedEx   
[  ] By personal delivery
Dated: 10/30/2018 Robert Poleki
Clerk of the Court
By: Diane Cano
Deputy Clerk
Date: 
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